









# ENGLAND AND HER COLONIES.

*THE FIVE BEST ESSAYS*

ON

## IMPERIAL FEDERATION

*Submitted to the LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE for their Prize  
Competition, and recommended for publication by the Judges:*

J. ANTHONY FROUDE,

AUTHOR OF "OCEANA," ETC., ETC.

PROFESSOR J. R. SEELEY, M.A.

AND

SIR RAWSON W. RAWSON.

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## PREFACE.

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CONVINCED of the growing interest in the Imperial Federation question, both in official and unofficial circles, the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce, which has always given a strong support to the Federation movement, early in the year 1886 offered a prize of fifty pounds, to be awarded to the writer of the best essay "formulating a practical working plan for the federation of the colonies and the mother-country."

The Council of the Chamber believed that the offer of the prize, and the publicity given thereto, might induce those qualified to draft a scheme upon which practical rather than theoretical discussion could proceed in the future.

This anticipation was realized to its fullest extent. The judges who had, at no small personal inconvenience, undertaken to adjudicate upon the competitive manuscripts, were confronted, on the expiration of the date fixed for sending in essays, with the heavy and excessive work of examining 106 papers, many of which fell little short of the 75 pages of foolscap at which the limit was drawn. This will give some idea of the amount of labour thrown upon the judges, Mr. J. A. Froude, Sir Rawson W. Rawson, and Professor J. R. Seeley, and their report conveys evidence of the completeness of their perusal.

The report is appended. In placing it, together with the winning essay, and those other essays which it recommends for publication, before the public, it is the belief of the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce that the choice of judges of such high personal status and special knowledge must give exceptional value to the essays, which, through the kindness and co-operation of those gentlemen, they are now in a position to publish.

At the same time it must be remarked, in order to prevent misconception, that the judges in recommending the publication of five essays, in addition to the one to which they awarded the prize, have not intended to pronounce them absolutely superior in merit to all other essays submitted to them, except the prize essay. They have pointed out in their report that they held it desirable that the public should have an opportunity of seeing the problem attacked in different ways. Accordingly these essays have been selected not simply for their merit, but as expressing the opinions of the different sections into which the advocates of Federation appear to be divided.

#### AWARD AND REPORT OF THE JUDGES.

"GENTLEMEN,—We have the honour to lay before you the following report. There have been submitted to us 106 essays. We call attention to the number, partly in order to explain any delay which may seem to have occurred in our award, and partly in order to congratulate you upon the great and wide interest which your offer has excited. The quality no less than the number of the essays submitted seems a matter for congratulation. They have come to us from all parts of the empire, apparently in larger number from the colonies than from the mother-country; and when we remember the nature of the



problem proposed for solution, we are much impressed by the grasp and practical knowledge of the subject which many of them display. We are agreed in awarding the prize to the essay which has the motto, '*Auspicium melioris ævi*' (to be carefully distinguished from another essay which has the same motto, but coupled with another, viz. '*E pluribus unum*'). By making this announcement, we acquit ourselves, strictly speaking, of the commission with which you have honoured us. We cannot, however, refrain from adding the following suggestion, founded upon your published statement, that you reserve to yourselves the right of publishing the successful, or any, or all of the essays. Considering the magnitude, difficulty, and delicacy of the question, we are of opinion that more than one view of it should be presented to the public. We take the liberty, therefore, of naming five essays, which either as containing noteworthy suggestions or information, or as representing lines of thought, or methods of procedure, which appear in many, if not in the majority, of the essays submitted to us, we consider worthy of publication. These are the essays which have the following mottoes:—Quotation from Adam Smith's '*Wealth of Nations*,' '*Auspicium melioris ævi*—*E pluribus unum*' (omitting pp. 60–68), '*Civis Romanus sum*,' '*Vincit amor patriæ*,' and '*Causa non præmia*.' We desire it to be understood that we by no means intend to endorse all the suggestions contained in these essays, or indeed in the essay to which we adjudge the prize. Finally, we desire to express our opinion that many valuable suggestions and intelligent reflections are to be found scattered through the large number of essays which we do not recommend for publication.

“We have the honour to be, gentlemen,

“Your obedient servants,

“J. A. FROUDE,

“RAWSON W. RAWSON,

“J. R. SEELEY.”

An examination of the envelopes containing the real names of the competitors (after the placing of the competi-

tors by the judges according to mottoes) showed that the mottoes above referred to were adopted by Wm. Greswell, late Professor of Classics at the Cape University, Stowey Court, Bridgwater, Somerset (*Auspicium melioris ævi*), winner of the prize ; C. V. Smith, barrister, late Fellow of King's College, Cambs. (quotation from Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations") ; the Rev. Canon Dalton, The Cloisters, Windsor (*Auspicium melioris ævi—E pluribus unum*) ; F. H. Turnock, Winnipeg (Mani.), Canada (*Civis Romanus sum*) ; W. J. Bradshaw, Richmond, Melbourne, Australia (*Vincit amor patriæ*) ; and J. C. Fitzgerald, Wellington, New Zealand (*Causa non præmia*).

Canon Dalton's essay is not included in the present volume ; it will be considerably amplified, and published separately by its author.

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# IMPERIAL FEDERATION.

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## No. I.—PRIZE ESSAY.

BY WILLIAM GRESWELL, M.A., OXON.

(*"Auspicium melioris ævi."*)

THE rapidity with which the movement in favour of Imperial Federation has arisen within the last few years is one of the most remarkable features of the age, and justifies its advocates in claiming for it, as they claimed recently from Lord Salisbury, the deepest public attention. The movement is the offspring neither of temporary excitement nor of irrational enthusiasm; it is deep-seated, and founded upon fact no less than feeling, sense no less than sentiment. A united empire may be regarded as the logical outcome of a united kingdom. *Federation* has been the natural result of free institutions in our colonies, *Imperial Federation* may be a step again beyond this, until the goal of administrative and legislative unity throughout the length and breadth of our empire is reached.

The British system of colonisation is *en evidence*; on all sides we are met by signs and tokens of its material results, its opulence, power, and world-wide success. Contrasted with the attempts of our European neighbours, it stands out in striking magnificence. To quote a well-known aphorism, "the French have colonies but no colonists, the Germans colonists but no colonies," whilst Spain and Portugal lie as effete and worn-out colonising powers, holding on precariously to limited areas of country and scattered posts of commerce. England's life grows young and strong beyond the

seas, and De Tocqueville has struck the note of its prosperity and strength when he wrote: "Les colonies anglaises, et ce fut l'une des principales causes de leur prospérité, ont toujours joui de plus de liberté intérieure et de plus d'indépendance politique que les colonies des autres peuples." How to unite these free peoples in Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, and elsewhere, under one flag and under one Parliament, without sacrificing any part or fraction of their liberty and rights, this is the practical question we have to face. French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies send representatives to their National Legislatures at Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon respectively; can we follow their example, and call colonists to Westminster?

*Adam Smith* thought that the assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it; and fifty years afterwards, *Burke* (1775) said that the "great floods" and the "eternal barriers of the creation" seemed to him to be the only real objections to colonial representation in an Imperial Parliament. But steam and the great circle sailing have altered previous ideas about distance, and brought us all nearer together, so that the Canadian can reach London more quickly now than a Highlander could fifty years ago. The revolution which science has brought about is equally fatal to John Stuart Mill's objection, when he wrote that "Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one Government or even members of one Federation" ("Representative Government").

But we have to deal, *in limine*, with another class of objections. To a certain number of politicians, Imperial Federation conveys the idea of a rampant and crusading imperialism, jingoistic displays and wars all over the earth. The word federation implies a menace, in their judgment, however much defensive reasons may enter into it, as in the case of the Ætolian and Achæan leagues of old and the German Confederation in recent times. It may be briefly answered here: that a federation of England and her colonies would be the best guarantee for peace everywhere; and with regard to the proper definition of the terms "empire" and "imperial," there can be nothing offensive about

them if the ideas of vanity and aggression are eliminated from them, and they are associated with *bonâ fide* occupation, reclamation, and the natural expansion of our race. Professor Seeley has pointed out clearly enough that British colonisation is the overflow of our population into foreign lands, carrying laws, customs, and the whole machinery of the State with them.

Upon the platform, therefore, of a purged and revived imperialism, the advocates of Imperial Federation appeal to the nation. These advocates belong to no particular creed or party in English political life. As our colonial life has not been the result of bureaucracy or bureaucratic arrangements at home, but a voluntary life, free and progressive, so with this desire for Imperial Federation. It has come to men by unbiassed conviction and after spontaneous and anxious reflection. It seems to be a way of national salvation. The late Right Hon. W. H. Forster, Mr. Goschen, Lord Rosebery, on one side, and Mr. W. H. Smith, Right Hon. C. Stanhope, and Lord Dunraven on the other, prove that the question is no exclusive property of Liberals or Conservatives; whilst such adherents as Mr. J. Cowen, the Marquis of Lorne, Lord Wolseley, Professor Seeley, Lord Tennyson, Sir Alexander Galt, etc., indicate the catholicity of the movement amongst men of "light and leading." This array of names alone may be a sufficient answer to those "parochial politicians" to whom a British Empire extending its formal organization over the world is inconceivable and impracticable. But the question of Empire and Imperial Federation of some sort is so thrust before the Dêmos of England that they cannot refuse to consider it. If they disregard the legacy of a Colonial Empire, they will prove yet once again that democracies cannot be trusted with empire. But it will not be for lack of warning or advice. In this matter we may quote the words of two illustrious statesmen, now dead and gone, but immortal in the living wisdom they have left behind them, viz. Lord Beaconsfield and the Right Hon. W. H. Forster. The latter, in a well-known address delivered in Edinburgh in 1875, stated with full knowledge and prescience the case of Imperial Federation, and has been more than justified by time. Lord Beaconsfield, however, has left behind these imperishable words: "In my opinion no minister in this country

will do his duty who neglects every opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our Colonial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land " (1872).

The practical question, therefore, is how to re-construct? How can we bring forward any workable scheme which will be opposed neither to ancient precedent nor to the spirit of our institutions? How can we seize the enthusiasm of the age, and, whilst hearts are warm and sympathies soft, direct it along fruitful channels?

It would be impossible at the present moment to put forward a scheme of Imperial Federation which, having due regard to legislative and administrative details, would satisfy the requirements of our wide Colonial Empire. Paper constitutions are possible but not practicable, and a cut-and-dried scheme might share the fate of such an ineffectual document as John Locke's "Constitution of Carolina," which was drawn up by the famous philosopher for Lord Ashley in 1669, but doomed to early oblivion. The spirit of British colonisation rebels against precise forms and prosaic plans of administration, and prefers a kind of political development, which, like the growth of the British Empire itself, is wayward in its beginnings, poetical in its aspect, and, to the outward eye and logical mind, somewhat inconsistent. It has been proved, over and over again, that Britons, wherever they live, dislike bureaucrats and bureaucratic methods. No modern Lycurgus can step forward, and with the stroke of a master hand fix indelibly a form of government upon his countrymen, and bind them to the spirit and to the letter of his political instructions; no Solon can devise, offhand, a lasting reform or a supreme national council. In our complicated machinery of constitutional government we have long passed the age of heroic legislation of this kind. We cannot create, we can best interpret. "Oceana" is before us, with a real history and a real greatness, as Mr. Froude has pointed out. Shall we suffer it to pass away as a wraith upon the waves? Shall we allow the vision of consolidated greatness to glide for ever from our eyes, after catching only a brief and tantalising vision of its outlines? Are we to succumb to the charge of being dreamers and visionaries because we aspire to raise a structure of empire upon the undoubted loyalty, wealth,



good sense, and patriotism of the British race? No; this species of idealism should not be divorced from the sphere of practical politics. Δεῖ ὑποτυπῶσαι τὸ ὅλον, as the Greek sage wrote when he ventured to sketch his ethical system; so with our political system of a federated empire. We must sketch its outlines and draw its structural shape, even though this age may not see its fulfilment nor living architects fill in the details. A central chamber of Westminster and administrative unity from the heart to the extremities of the empire are what we want.

To obtain a view of what is best to be considered upon this question, the following scheme has been adopted in this paper.

I. The general state of the question itself of Imperial Federation—as presented to (a) Britons at home, (b) Britons abroad, (c) natives and native states—is discussed.

II. The various schemes which have already been formulated upon the subject of Imperial Federation are briefly enumerated and commented upon.

III. From a comparison of these schemes, which are examined in detail, the idea of a Central Chamber at Westminster, working and co-operating with the subordinate legislatures of the realm under the Crown, is sketched.

*India* is regarded as a crown dependency *sui generis*, and the subject of *Ireland* is kept as distinct as possible from the question of Imperial Federation. Ireland may be pacified by some kind of autonomy and provincial government given her under a scheme of federation, but the federationist leaves this problem outside his discussion.

The audience to which this question appeals is of a vast and unprecedented character. Imperial Federation concerns, *primarily*, the thirty-five millions of Britons in the mother country, and, *secondarily*, the eight millions of colonists who live under free institutions and responsible government in Newfoundland, Canada, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, Queensland, and New Zealand. The latter are concerned only secondarily because, in the event of the disintegration of the empire, the various groups in North America, Australasia, and South Africa would be less interested, comparatively speaking, than the mother country. Their future lies before them with

boundless prospects, undeveloped resources and infinite power of expansion ; but within the narrow limits of these northern islands the great struggle is by means of thrift and economy to utilize to the utmost the circumscribed area we possess, and, in the face of pauperism, competition, and the evils of a rapidly growing population, hold our position amongst the nations of the world. Moreover, it is rapidly becoming clear, that as a manufacturing nation we are becoming day by day more dependent upon colonial support and colonial purchasers. The fact that an Australasian buys £8 a head of our manufactures, a Canadian £2, whilst a Frenchman buys 9s. 3d. a head, and a German 8s. 4d., speaks volumes. Another fact of equal if not greater importance, is that we import two-thirds of our corn supply from foreign countries, and a very large part—about *one-fourth*—from our colonies across the seas.

Again, this question concerns that class of colonies which, although not absolutely in the enjoyment of responsible government are, like Natal, Mauritius, and even Jamaica, winning their way, from one constitutional privilege to another, in the direction of the desired ideal. In the case of these colonies the introduction of the federal principle at home will not arrest, but if possible further, their aspirations for local and provincial autonomy under a central form of government.

Last, and perhaps not least, Imperial Federation will arouse the keen interest, even if it does not affect the status, of those teeming millions of native subjects who, in every part of the world, from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, own allegiance to the British sovereign. From Burmah to the Bermudas, from Canada to the Cape, from Malta to Malaya, from Vancouver to the ancient Van Diemen's Land, the proposed scheme of world-wide consolidation will sweep sea and land. Not only the gorgeous rajahs of the East and the feudatory princes of India, but the humbler Kaffir headman of South Africa, the Maori chieftains in New Zealand, the Polynesian Islander, and the Red Indian of the far North-west will know that the Great Mother of Nations, the Queen of the Sea, is gathering her forces together in one impregnable whole. Hindoo and heathen, buddhist and barbarian, the worshippers at Mecca, as well as the disciples of Confucius,

will perceive that a great Christian empire is riveting the bonds of a peaceful empire along the highways of the world.

In a certain sense it is an appeal which, in its far-reaching consequences, may be said to be *ad mundum*. Whether we regard England as a great Christian empire carrying in her hands to remote regions the torch of Western civilization, or whether we regard her in the light of a greater Carthage or a more powerful Venice, spreading over the world a network of commercial posts, the issues are equally stupendous. The confederation of the British Empire would affect the history of the world to a greater extent than any other event we can conceive of; for if this confederation proved strong and durable, it would be, in all probability, a guarantee, as above stated, of peace everywhere. With one-sixth of the habitable part of the globe in our possession, we should scarcely wish for territorial aggrandisement. Moreover, the rate of our progress in the colonial world has been so great along the whole line, within the present century, that we are entitled to assume that in a hundred years' time the proposed confederacy would overshadow the nations of Europe and curb continental rivalries. In the days of the Roman Empire the Syrian, Pannonian, Briton, and Spaniard uttered the proud boast of *Civis Romanus sum*. But we look farther afield than to the *ultima Thule* of the Romans or the *columnæ Herculis* of Greek or Phœnician.

The *Britannica civitas* is a far wider, and we may be allowed to believe a far more honoured, privilege. It is a *civitas* built upon freedom not despotism, upon tolerance rather than upon force, upon voluntary effort and individual enterprise rather than upon bureaucratic orders and state diplomacy. England is the "Mother of Nations," in the phrase of *Claudian*—

"In gremio victos quæ sola recepit . . .  
Matris non dominæ ritu civesque vocavit."

The confederacy of the British race is a problem so peculiar in itself that we can scarcely refer for guidance to ancient or modern confederacies. The confederacy of Delos, with its assessment of men and money for defence purposes, under the hegemony of Athens, furnishes us with an example which it may be

useful to follow, considering that the *θαλασσο-κρατία* is as essential to us as to ancient Athens. But, obviously, the parallel is not complete, neither is that of the Ætolian or Achæan leagues. The German and Swiss confederacies are recent examples of the success of political consolidation, but the purely military aspect of the one and the republican form of the other make them differ essentially from our own case.

We may best look for enlightenment, *mutatis mutandis*, to the example of the United States. Granted all the differences between us in the matter of the geographical distribution of our states, and in the form of government, there is great similarity of ideas between us. The future history of the world will rest much upon the agreement of Britons and Americans. However this may be, we need be in no fear of Americanising our institutions if, in the study of the question of federalism, we turn to their annals with the best expectation of enlightenment. American public life is, after all, colonial life writ large upon the face of the earth, and represents what Canadian, Australasian, and South African life may be in their main political structure.

It is clear also that we must not forget to examine how the question of *Intercolonial Federation* is being solved in our own dependencies. The Canadian Dominion is a ready-made example of a successful system of Provincial Governments under the supreme Parliament at Ottawa; Australasia is cautiously following her example, and by the concurrent wish of many of the great settlements there, now actually engaged upon the work of construction. New South Wales and New Zealand, who have hitherto held aloof, cannot long continue to do so, and in the fulness of time we may expect to see the most important questions of the Pacific settled by a Parliament resembling closely that of Ottawa. The meeting at Hobart, in Tasmania, is surely indicative of the future history of our Pacific colonies. Turning to the West Indies and South Africa, we shall see that in the former the principles of central government have been illustrated for some years past in the *Leeward* and *Windward Islands*; whilst in the latter the meaning and the advantages of confederation, although not yet accepted by the heterogeneous South African states, have been made familiar to the mass of intelligent colonists in the

Cape Colony, Natal, Free State, and Transvaal. In course of time those exceptional circumstances which made confederation impossible and Lord Carnarvon's scheme abortive in 1875-7, may have disappeared, and a united South Africa under the British flag become a reality. In all our colonies the lesson is that federation grows slowly; and this lesson may be useful to us in treating the general question of Imperial Federation. In the Dominion of Canada, the maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island rejected the unionist resolutions of the Canadian legislature in Quebec (1865) with scorn and contempt; but time has taught them the value of unity. So in Australasia and South Africa, the objections of anti-unionists may be best answered by leaving the process of conviction to time, and by constantly bringing before their notice the substantial advantages of co-operation in trade and commerce, war or peace. Even such violent anti-unionists as Professor Goldwin Smith have learnt to change in time their ideas upon our imperial position, and to perceive that when one limb of an empire is severed from it, the whole body must suffer. But the Professor's conversion is not complete yet, if we may judge from his recent article in the *Nineteenth Century*, in which he accentuates the local disagreements in the maritime provinces, Upper and Lower Canada, and the eastern provinces from the lakes to the Pacific seaboard, refusing to believe in the solidifying effect of such an enterprise as the Canadian Pacific Railway. As he has always under-rated the loyalty of Canadians, so he has always misinterpreted the most wholesome signs of colonial life, and attached more importance to the centrifugal than the centripetal forces at work in the empire.

The declaration of the Imperial Federation League is, "That no scheme of federation should interfere with existing rights of local parliaments as regards local affairs"; and this declaration may be taken as embodying the true spirit of federation. Burke, moreover, has described that attitude of mind and thought which is the only possible one in approaching a vast question like the present, and recommends itself to insularists and anti-unionists and anti-imperialists of every description in every remote province,

outpost, and settlement, too much in love with individual liberty. He says, with much force and justice, that in a great empire we must, to reap the fruits of empire, "balance inconveniences and remit some right that we may enjoy others"; and, "as we must give away some natural liberty to enjoy civil advantages, so we must sacrifice some civil liberties for the advantages to be derived from the communion and fellowship of a great empire." This advice is particularly applicable in our own case, where we are, if possible, hyper-sensitive on the subject of local liberties, and too ready, in many instances, to mar our imperial prospects by indulging in commercial jealousies of secondary importance.

Never, however, have the vision and realities of empire burst upon a race so little prepared to receive them as our own. The British Empire has grown abroad whilst men slept at home. Until quite recent times indifference on this subject was popular and fashionable not only with the rank and file of the nation, but even with the heads of our official departments. We have all heard of the mythical and anecdotal period of our colonial history, when geographical ignorance was fashionable with our Colonial Secretaries and heads of departments. But this period is past, and the *lâches* of the Colonial Office are not so easily forgiven. Our queen and our princes have led public opinion here.

The Romans, whenever they made additions to their empire, thought fit to impress the nature of the extension upon the inhabitants of the metropolis by those wonderful processions to the capital, in which captive kings, garnered wealth, and all the spoils of war were displayed in picturesque confusion. But there has been nothing sensational or spectacular about our colonial empire of this sort, although with us the Temple of Janus is seldom closed. The Colonial and Indian Exhibition has been the first public attempt to popularise a knowledge of our imperial and colonial wealth. But this exhibition is of a thoroughly peaceful nature. Moreover, our colonies have advanced principally by quiet and unostentatious labour in bush and prairie, veldt and forest. That huge mountain of Australasian gold, as displayed in the exhibition, has been won by patient digging, not by armed violence and the spoiler's hand. Individual adventurers have gone forward whilst departments at home vacillated and called

back. When a few stragglers from Van Dieman's Land wished to settle at Port Phillip (now Victoria), in 1836, Lord Aberdeen first of all, and then Lord Glenelg, forbade them to do so with the voice of official authority. But the colonists persisted, and the result is a magnificent colony, with a capital of 320,000, a population of a million, and a revenue of six millions.

All this has been done in fifty years, and we cannot wonder, therefore, that comparatively few amongst us at home should realize accurately the momentous change throughout the Colonial Empire. Just as the mushroom city springs up in the midst of the desert, like Ballarat or Kimberley, upon unexpected spots, and with marvellous rapidity, so it has been with our empire. Yet it would seem as if a very large percentage of Englishmen at home, although they hear of this growth, regard it with doubting faith. It needs a journey round the world, and a visit to the places themselves, to convince the untravelled denizen of these islands of the reality of his heritage. Mr. Howard Vincent has left it on record, that after he had travelled round the world and seen the progress of the Canadian Dominion and of Australasia, he found it right to alter some of his most cherished convictions. In other words, from being what we may describe as an "insularist," Mr. Howard Vincent became an "imperialist." The secret, again, of Lord Rosebery's success as a minister, is not to be found in his political partnership with men of the Disunionist type, but in his own cordial sympathy with our colonial expansion acquired during a personal visit to the settlements themselves. Thus it was that the late Foreign Secretary could understand the soreness and vexation of Australians on the New Guinea and Pacific questions far better than Lord Derby. In England herself there is much to be done, even now, for popular enlightenment upon our empire. How many private citizens, living at ease at home, realize the character of some of our colonial undertakings. Last year a railway of more than 3,000 miles across the Canadian Dominion was opened with comparatively little ceremony and flourish of trumpets when we consider the scope and bearing of the enterprise in a commercial, strategic, and imperial sense. This railway, connecting the two imperial stations of *Halifax* and *Esquimault*, and running through

British territory every mile of its course, may, in time, help to bring about a revolution in our European policy, by proving to the world that we have solved the question of a north-west passage to the Indies in a way of our own, and may therefore attach less importance to the Suez Canal as a route to the East. Yet, if such a revolution is brought about, it will have been begun without the connivance, nay, even almost without the knowledge, of the average British elector. In former days the solution of the north-west passage difficulties would have excited popular enthusiasm of an unprecedented description ; but in the England of to-day the feats of the surveyor and engineer pass almost unnoticed, although they may in the future guide our destinies more than the sensational discoveries of those bold mariners who glided into unknown seas for the first time. The Diaz, Vasco di Gama and Columbus of the present day is the engineer and constructor, who, with the aid of steam, finds the quickest way to the most profitable markets, and learns to distribute his cargo quickest. Thus, in a brief survey of the British Empire, and in a statement of the broad question of Imperial Federation, it is important for us to know that there are, to quote the statistics of Mr. Jeans brought forward at a recent meeting in the Conference Room of the Kensington Exhibition, 30,000 miles of railway in the British Empire. Out of this total there are 7,000 in Australasia, and 10,700 in India. Even in unprogressive South Africa a railway of 700 miles has been constructed within the last few years, and the regions of the Zambesi and the valleys of Equatorial Africa brought near to our harbours at Capetown and Port Elizabeth and Natal. These engineering feats are at the basis of our calculations, whether we wish to mobilise our troops in any quarter of the Empire—either in Bechuanaland, Burmah, or elsewhere, as the case may be—or whether we wish to distribute our merchandise in the required markets. Railways and telegraphs are essential for quick federal action in every instance ; for easy transit and rapid information are the first considerations which occur to all those who wish to federalise our fleets, our armies, our chambers of commerce, and our post offices.

But if the stay-at-home Briton is ignorant of the precise nature and extent of our engineering enterprises in the colonies, does



he realize how deeply England is interested in them from a pecuniary point of view?

The public debt of our *nine Parliamentary Colonies* is—

Canada . . . .	£43,801,000
Newfoundland . . . .	333,575
New South Wales . . . .	21,632,459 (1883)
Victoria . . . .	28,325,112 (1884)
Queensland . . . .	14,917,850 (1883)
South Australia . . . .	13,891,900 (1883)
Tasmania . . . .	2,385,600 (1883)
New Zealand . . . .	32,367,711 (1884)
Cape Colony . . . .	20,810,000

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£178,465,207

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However, it has just happened that, by some undesigned coincidence in the evolution of political life, a fully enfranchised democracy at home have been brought face to face with this great vision of extended empire, and therefore extended responsibilities. Across the seas this full civic enfranchisement has been no new thing for some time past, and manhood suffrage is practically the custom in the Dominion, Australasia, and the Cape Colony. The colonial democracies, therefore, have had a longer political training than the English democracy, and have for some years past been in the habit of discussing and handling intricate questions of finance, religion, and law generally. It can be easily understood, therefore, that the treatment of imperial questions will be more familiar to them than to the recently enfranchised "Hodges" of Suffolk or Somerset, to whom a vestry meeting and a board of guardians have been the sole repositories of official power.

Again, relatively speaking, a colonist is of far greater importance in his political world than the average stay-at-home Briton in his, and, as Sir Julius Vögel has truly pointed out, as a rule is better educated. We may claim for the colonist what Thucydides claimed for the Athenian citizen, that he could ἐπὶ πλεῖστ' ἂν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ' ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες

*παρέχονται*. In the colonies religious difficulties are less acute, and the quarrels on the subject of a State Church practically unknown. In Canada the "Clergy Reserves" grievance has been long abolished. Sectarian differences have less fertile ground in the colonies, and men live under less straitened circumstances and a freer atmosphere than at home in tradition-haunted and ancestral England. All this is natural, and just what we should expect. The poetry, the passion, and the struggles of our burdened land are unknown in veldt, bush, and prairie.

Moreover, to the Briton at home a state department is a mystery, and a state officer an unseen deity issuing mandates through a formidable medium of clerks—who take care to observe the strict decorum of their order,—and through offices which are not inaptly termed "circumlocution offices." But the colonist is not so burdened with officialdom and tradition. His method of official communication is somewhat like that of his system of conveyancing, both simple and easy, according to which he boasts that landed property of any value can be transferred from one person to another in as many hours as it takes weeks or even months in England. The society in which he lives not being so complex as that of the mother-country, he is brought into closer personal contact with public men and their departments. Even the Governor, the representative of royalty, is accessible to all, and is interviewed at no more stiff a ceremony than a garden party or a dinner at Government House. In the actual arena of politics the Demosthenes or the Pericles of the settlement is constantly heard and seen, and upon the occasion of an exciting debate in such a centre as Capetown, where the policy of a Kaffir war is arraigned, or at Melbourne, where a debate takes place upon some important point in fiscal policy, the average colonist is well versed in the details of parliamentary procedure, and brings a great deal of shrewd perception and common sense to bear upon the complexities of the question. Such nimbleness of wit and dexterity of judgment cannot be expected in England.

But whilst there is no question as to the superior political foresight and judgment of colonists who have so long used the suffrage, in comparison with the British elector who is only just emancipated and combating with many prejudices, colonial

history tells us that colonial life is by no means purged of the taint of "provincialism." The *raison d'être* of the animosities between Free Trade Sydney and Protectionist Melbourne, the rivalries of the island communities of the West Indian group, the jealousies between Cape Colonists and Natalians, and in the Cape Colony itself between men of the Eastern and Western Provinces, the split between North and South Queensland and the men of Brisbane and Townsville, the recently expressed reluctance of the Nova Scotian Legislature to accept the Dominion Government as an accomplished fact, are all somewhat unintelligible to the ordinary Englishman, who may in all these cases retort with justice the charge of provincialism upon colonists who have rebuked him with "insularism" and "separatism."

To all, however, whether in the mother-country or the colonies, the question of Imperial Federation and the problem of a Central Government at the heart of the empire comes with a pacifying and unifying power, the more so because in a wide scheme of federalism there may be a better chance of allaying provincial jealousies by delegating provincial autonomy. The utmost possible freedom is consistent with centralization if a proper subordination is found and the terms of a mutual compact arranged in the spirit of Burke's suggestions. But it is at home that the greatest enlightenment is needed. Here, too, the constitutional initiative must in the first place lie. As Lord Carnarvon pointed out in the course of his official correspondence upon South African Confederation, the Home Government, however ready to wait for colonial development and the ripeness of time, must take the first step. For some time past there has been an historical preparation for confederation. The fully representative Parliament at *Ottawa*, the partially representative meeting at *Hobart Town*, are signs of the tendency of our colonies towards a Central Government. This tendency began,

1. In 1839, when Lord Durham sent in his well-known report upon Canadian affairs. The idea of provincial legislatures with local powers, but subordinated to a central authority, began then. The Dominion Act of 1867 was a logical sequel of Lord Durham's policy.

2. It found further development in Lord Grey's Administration

(1840-1857), when the principle of local government and provincial autonomy was extended to the Australasian colonies.

If we consider, then, only the two above-mentioned epochs in colonial history during the reign of Queen Victoria, and recollect how the colonists have been brought face to face with the federal principle, we may realize the fact that Imperial Federation involves no unusual and extraordinary departure in our national life. It is really a generous interpretation of *Intercolonial Federation* although, in adopting *Imperial*, we need not wait for *Intercolonial Federation* in every instance.

The *insularist*, therefore, as opposed to the *imperialist*, need not be alarmed at the introduction of the federal principle into more purely English politics. It has been done in 1707 and 1800, and also abroad. It is the climax and outcome of those laws and customs and principles which we cherish in England. It means both freedom and centralization.

### *Schemes and Ideas already put forward.*

I. To begin with one of the earliest and perhaps the least practicable ideas upon the subject of Imperial Representation in a common legislative chamber, it has been suggested that the colonies should appoint a Member of Parliament at home to be their agent, just as New York appointed Edmund Burke. Such an expedient might have suited the case in earlier days, when the care of the plantations was regarded as unimportant, and scarcely deserving the attention of a State department; but even then, such nominated members as Burke were always open to the charge either of knowing little from personal knowledge of the dependency which placed its interests in their hands, or to the charge of being paid and untrustworthy advocates. A certain instance, however, of the good done by a nominee of the Colonial Government occurred in the history of Australia, when the Port Phillip electors wishing to draw attention to certain grievances of their own rejected their local members and plumped for Earl Grey, in 1848. The strange occurrence of the election of an English nobleman by a colonial electorate, aroused attention in England, and Earl Grey was asked jokingly when he intended to sail for Australia.

However, the result of choosing him as their representative and nominee was a good one for the Port Phillip electors. They gained what they wanted, viz. a separate constitution, and loyally called their settlement "Victoria." In this case there was a pleasant termination to the struggle with that departmental apathy and torpor which has, until quite recent times, clung to our Colonial Office.

But the days of colonial nominees of this particular description are over. In the new Parliament we have several men who, although they are chosen by a British electorate at home, are thoroughly representative men from the colonies, such as Mr. J. Henniker-Heaton, Sir A. McArthur, and others now in the House of Commons; and travellers, such as Hon. Finch Hatton, Baden Powell, Lieut.-Colonel Howard Vincent, who have made colonial questions their especial study. Moreover, the class of officials known as "The High Commissioner of Canada," and the "Agents-General of the Colonies," are able to interpret in every case the wants and necessities of their respective settlements. If they are not elected representatives, and do not change with each successive colonial administration, they are none the less able to report faithfully upon the political aspects of their settlements, with which they have, in each case, a most intimate knowledge. But of course we must have some official acquainted with the rapid changes and current history of the colonies. The Right Hon. H. Childers was an Australian legislator himself once; but so quick is the progress of our colonies, that political knowledge and observation actually garnered in the colonies themselves, soon becomes obsolete, and we may therefore hesitate to accept the political reminiscences of this eminent financier as trustworthy now.

II. It has been suggested that colonists of distinction should be elevated to the peerage at home, with a view to securing a kind of colonial representation and a better hearing upon colonial politics. But they would be too few in number to be of any real good, and would be, in all probability, a class of men ill-spared from the colonies. Nor would the colonists themselves be content that such representatives should sit in the serene atmosphere of the Upper House, without a chance of participating

in the discussions of the Lower House where public questions are most eagerly threshed out. However eloquent and learned the debates of the peers, they do not affect greatly the decision of the Commons. A policy is begun in the Lower House before it is criticised in the Upper.

III. It has been proposed to have a Colonial Council of Advice, to assist the Secretaries of State. They would be made Privy Councillors, and would form a committee of the Privy Council. Governors, ex-governors, and the agents-general of the colonies would be a representative class of men from whom such a council might be selected. But the Privy Council is not a public body, and the mode of selection, unless controlled in every case by the colonists—and this would be difficult—savours too much of the nominee system, for which colonists have no love. It has been pointed out by the Duke of Manchester, that the existence of such a body, although merely a consultative one, might increase irresponsibility in the House of Commons, colonial affairs being delegated to them, and excluded as far as possible from parliamentary discussion. Moreover, such a council might become too numerous, as each small island or settlement would demand representation in it. Successive Colonial Secretaries would have to be instructed upon growing and separate interests in every part of the globe. The members of the council also, unlike the Indian Council, would have to instruct one another upon their respective settlements and colonies. For instance, the delegate of the Cape would be teaching the intricacies of the Basuto question and the Transkeian difficulties to the Ceylon or Hong-Kong delegate, and the Queenslander be pouring his especial grievance on separation or the New Guinea question into the ears of the reluctant Canadian. In fact, each delegate would have his hobby or his grievance which he would feel bound to air to all his fellow-councillors, with the view of obtaining from them, collectively, some decision. In a certain sense this importunity would be reasonable, because one colonial question, be it of sufficient imperial value, must affect all colonists. The distinction between local and imperial legislation not being clearly defined just yet, the functions of the consultative body would be

shadowy also. As regards India, the Indian Council are in a different position. They have to deal with a distinct class of questions, more or less intelligible to the whole board through their official experience.

Again, a colonial delegate, be he the agent-general or any other representative on the Council of Advice, may speak with uncertain sound if he represents the varying stages of colonial opinion on any particular policy. A change of Ministry at the Cape, for instance, may alter the lines of a native policy at any moment. The "Sprigg" Ministry, which carried out a forward policy in South Africa, was upset by a "Scanlen" Ministry, which reversed every measure its predecessors had endorsed. In such a case of fluctuating opinion, the advice of an agent-general as the accredited mouthpiece of his colony would go for little.

What, also, would be the position of the Governor? Little by little his judgments and decisions would be set aside by the Board in London, and he would be regarded as a useless and costly appendage of the Home Government. The colonists might begin to consider that Government House, with its expenditure of £5,000 to £10,000 out of the public chest, was scarcely worth while enduring on their part; and so in course of time Governors, representing the majesty of the Crown, and constituting in their own persons the sole constitutional links between the mother-country and the colonies, might disappear. On all hands this would be a subject of regret. This constitutional link would be snapped, the agents-general become as foreign consuls, and the best field of proconsular dignity and activity be taken from the British statesman. It is advisable, on the contrary, to strengthen this constitutional position, and to enhance the dignity of Colonial Governors by every expedient in our power. It has been demonstrated, again and again, that the courtly customs and military displays, and even the viceregal magnificence of Government House, are popular and acceptable in the busy and practical sphere of colonial life.

Again, in any trying crisis in the history of our country, and when the threats of war were surrounding us, the position of a Council of Advice would, even if they spoke and counselled with irresponsible voice, be awkward and embarrassing.

Supposing a *casus belli* were to arise between the Australasians and French on the convict question in the Pacific, or between the South Africans and Germans on a sovereignty claim, or between Canadians and the Americans on the "fisheries rights," how would the Council of Advice speak? Would they all agree upon certain points of foreign policy to be maintained at the risk of war for all? Would the Canadian delegates support the Australasians against the French, and the Australasians uphold in return the Canadian rights? Unless the main lines of a foreign policy were fixed upon beforehand, the Council of Advice would, in all probability, be a small and irresponsible Cabinet within the Privy Council, divided against itself, and speaking with uncertain voice. The agents-general would reflect colonial sentiment upon the subject before them, and this sentiment is not harmonious even in one group.

For instance, in the Pacific colonies, New South Wales and Victoria take somewhat different views of the character of the French occupation of the New Hebrides. A Monroe doctrine has more attraction for one set of colonists than it has for another. Again, the affairs of New Guinea are regarded with far greater interest and solicitude by Queensland than by South Australia, and the recent occupation of part of this island by the Germans was viewed with far greater indignation in one quarter than in another of our Australasian settlements. A Federal Council in each group may help to define the position of our colonies with regard to the outside world on questions of right and sovereignty, but at present there is chaos and disagreement. If the Australasians differ amongst themselves on Australasian questions, would they be more unanimous on Canadian, West Indian, or South African questions?

The fact is that a foreign policy has never been thrashed out in the popular assemblies of our colonies. Engaged in the work of colonisation, and busily employed in increasing their wealth and resources, they have scarcely imagined that they have any foreign policy at all. In the early days of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, our colonists knew and felt that they had a foreign policy when they fought in the basin of Annapolis and along the Cape Breton coasts against the French. But since



the downfall of France as a colonising power, there has been little to remind them of the stern necessity of war. But it has been proved, again and again, that colonists have wished to make the foreign policy of England their own by their numerous offers of help. In the Boer war the South Australians volunteered their help to the British Government, just as Canada has proved her loyalty over and over again in similar cases of danger. The New South Wales contingent was, however, the most striking proof of the desire of our colonists to share the dangers, as well as to participate in the prosperity, of the British Empire.

But we want it to be settled in a Federal Council, or in some supreme legislative body with a strong executive, that a free passage *viâ* the Suez Canal, the imperial boundaries in the north-west of India, along the St. Lawrence and the Canadian frontier, and the inland frontiers of South Africa, will be maintained with the concurrent wish of all British subjects and by means of the united force of the empire. It will be easily seen, therefore, that a mere consultative council of advice falls infinitely short of the requirements of the case. Such a council can simply be a provisional one, useful doubtless to advise, but perfectly powerless to fulfil, or even aid in fulfilment. However good their advice, it might be overridden by party considerations, either at home or in the colonies themselves.

IV. Constitutional reforms of a wide and sweeping order being despaired of by some, it has been deemed advisable to approach only one side of the Imperial Federation difficulty. Economists, strategists, geographers, are aware that England's position, as a maritime state, and dependent upon foreign supplies, demands what even the peaceful Cobden claimed for her, viz. an overwhelming naval force. The briefest examination of the character of our trade, our exports and imports, the means of communication and the facilities we possess for the distribution of our wealth and manufactures, impresses upon us the necessity of uniting with our colonies upon the subject of naval and military preparation. Trade, they argue, must be left out of sight for a time, and that Zollverein which was supposed to have been the only possible bond in the British political system, abandoned. Love of country

and a desire to share in common dangers may make men unite in warlike operations, although they differ on trade principles. In America, the ill-assorted customs union does not interfere with the love for the political union. In Australasia, colonists at Melbourne and Sydney may differ on trade, and draw a tight customs cordon along their barriers, but federalise their fleets and unite in repelling foreign attacks all the same.

Strategy and strategic requirements are all in all to this class of Imperial Federationists, and accordingly lecturers and enthusiasts like Captain Colomb take us along the highways of the world, speak of oceanic quadrilaterals, posts of vantage, forts and munitions of war in every part of the globe, and claim most deservedly from all of us the deepest attention. They would carry the spirit and tradition of our conquering legions and victorious navy into every part of the world, and seek for recruits from Newfoundland to New Zealand. Training ships like the *Britannia*, military schools like Sandhurst, should be multiplied over our colonial world, and depots established at the needful points. Colonial ships are to fly the imperial ensign, and there is to be no distinction in the services. The appeal to the martial ardour of Britons, which, it may always be expected, will be exercised in the cause of peace, is not likely to be in vain. It has been proved that we have lived for some time in a position of false security, and that our trade may pass away from us. Defeat at sea would be an unmeasured catastrophe and a national ruin. We should be prepared at all points against an aggressive power like Russia. Captain Colomb has reminded us that the sea trade of India alone is about equal to that of Russia, and that the trade of the mother-country has five times, and that of Australia twenty times, as much interest in the security and prosperity of India as they had thirty-five years ago. Our outlying empire has 400 millions' worth of goods on the sea in a year; and is it wise to neglect any precaution, however costly, to insure this? The sea commerce of Australasia alone exceeds by tens of millions the sea trade of the United Kingdom when Nelson triumphed at Trafalgar. Moreover, two-thirds of our wheat supply comes from abroad; so, if we are not able to maintain our supremacy at sea, we may be brought face to face with national starvation. Those who wish to federate our

forces by sea and land have, therefore, a powerful array of facts and arguments on their side. Although the consummation of their ideas does not mean a scheme of constitutional union throughout the empire, it will help a long way towards it.

The same may be said of those who wish to federalise our *Chambers of Commerce* and our *Post-offices*. In each case the identity of our interests and the advantages of co-operation will be illustrated. Nothing, perhaps, will tend more to bring about a common fiscal policy throughout the empire than a closer connection and a more frequent interchange of opinion between the Chambers of Commerce. The adoption of a universal postage rate would appeal to another class of people, and be a priceless boon to the poor emigrants.

A *common Emigration Office* in London, the ideal of some social reformers, if it could be arranged without offence to the Colonial Governments and without pauperising the poorer classes at home, would be an unmixed advantage in these days of over-pressure and want. Lord Brabazon has pointed out how terribly the evils of over-population are weighing upon our state, how hopeless individual effort is to cope with the task of relief, and how eagerly any opening in the colonial world is grasped at by our despairing mechanics and agriculturists.

As subsidiary measures to the great constitutional union perhaps in store for us in the future, these schemes of co-operation cannot be too highly valued. The great consummation of imperial unity waits upon their success, and if in each case we obtain a class of public men accustomed to deal with their especial subjects in a broad and imperial spirit, we shall possess so many additional *nuclei* of talent which will find their place at last in some great Imperial Council or Parliament.

V. Another scheme is to regard the House of Commons still in the light of an Imperial Parliament, but to bring in a redistribution bill, by which, without increasing their numbers, one-fourth of the representation would be handed over to the ten millions of our colonists abroad. The Upper House would also be recruited largely from the colonies. By this scheme, it is argued, no great revolutionary or organic change would be

required—simply a transference of seats and a transference of power.

In the case of the nine parliamentary colonies, the transference might be effected without a great constitutional wrench ; but the Crown colonies would cause a difficulty. For instance, from Natal, Jamaica, Ceylon, and Mauritius, etc., the Crown might claim the right of nominating members for the Imperial Parliament, and we should have the anomaly of a composite chamber at Westminster—partly elected, partly nominated. Moreover, India, a possession *sui generis*, and standing outside the pale of the franchise, would claim a voice in these assemblages.

The existence of these two chambers, with express functions of their own, opens up the question of provincial legislatures in the United Kingdom. The people of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, perhaps, might be content with one legislative chamber for all, or they might cling to the *bi-cameral system* ; or they might wish in each case for a provincial legislature. It is clear that in all the contingencies there must be a distinct and organic remodelling of our Constitution ; so that a scheme like that just given, apparently involving a redistribution bill, in reality involves in its consequences much more. It is impossible to carry out any federal ideas in our empire without some great change in our present Constitution. One question is whether the supreme Imperial Parliament should consist of one or two chambers. Considering that in our case, which is different from that of other federal states, the powers which will be delegated in the first instance to this Imperial Parliament will be less wide than those generally conceded to such a body (it is agreed generally that the control of a fiscal policy throughout the empire should be excluded at present from the programme, and each autonomous state allowed to pursue its own rules in this matter), and considering that the class of questions to be submitted to this Imperial Parliament, such as the general lines of a *native and foreign policy*, *postal arrangements*, *defence plans*, etc., are not in their own nature controversial, and do not involve such a complete thrashing out in party debate as matters relating, for instance, to trade, endowments, education, and such others—it seems advisable to content ourselves with one supreme council or chamber in our federal

system, with a strong executive at the head. Of its possible constitution more will be suggested later on in this paper. This single Imperial Chamber seems less likely to disturb our present political world than a composite assembly made up of members from our different colonies and chosen in different ways. Moreover, the present bi-cameral system, which is well-known and popular with us for every reason, will be left as it is. The House of Lords and the House of Commons will exist constitutionally, and although dominated by another power called up to adjudicate upon a large class of imperial subjects, will be still supreme on the most burning and interesting questions in these islands. If there is any wounded sensibility or hurt feeling that the ancient Parliament of England has been degraded from its position and lowered in its functions, there is the consolation that the Imperial Council or Assembly itself affords a peculiar and illustrious opening of its own to all those statesmen who have distinguished themselves in the provincial legislature, whether in the Upper or Lower Houses. The Imperial Council will be the goal of all and the ambition of all, and admission within its ranks the prize of politics.

But the very fact that there are reasonable grounds for doubting whether our supreme Imperial Parliament should consist of one or two chambers proves to us the enormous difficulty of the constitutional question involved in schemes of Imperial Federation.

In close connection with the above scheme, an ingenious and clever proposal has been suggested by some to secure the co-operation of the colonists in the defence of the empire. It is argued that *sentimentally* federation exists throughout the empire, and that there is no further need to appeal to patriotism. But this patriotism must be strengthened and confirmed by identity of interests in *material* ways. The question of imperial defence and the due apportionment of imperial expenditure in this direction puts patriotism to the test. It seems difficult to ask the colonies to perform the very first duties of federal states, and provide fixed sums for vessels, fortifications, strategic railways, and munitions of war. It would be certainly most profitable and useful if some scheme could be arranged by which, with the least possible fric-

tion, colonists could contribute their quota on a fair and equitable basis.

At present all the colonies come to the English money market for the loans they require, and pay interest thereon, in some cases 2 per cent., and in every case 1 per cent., higher than that on which the Imperial Government raise their loans. If, therefore, the Imperial Government would *in future* lend the colonies whatever money they may require, a saving of at least 1 per cent. would be effected. This saving might go into an *imperial defence fund*, to be administered, independently of the action of Parliament, by a special board sitting in London for imperial defence purposes, and consisting of representative men from the United Kingdom and the colonies, who, from their professional knowledge as officers or skill as financiers, would know best how to apply the money. Needless to observe, such a body of men would form a most important element in any future federal council in their character as administrators of a growing imperial fund.

No extra taxation would accrue either to the tax-payer of Great Britain or to the tax-payer in the colonies, inasmuch as the latter would pay no higher rate of interest than they do now; the only difference being that the saving in interest of 1 per cent. and upwards would go into the defence fund instead of into the pockets of the money-dealers in the city.

A question might be raised as to the security which the Imperial Government would have for the loans so made. If the security which the colonies give is sufficient for the public creditor, it must surely be ample for the Imperial Government, who have a deep interest in the colonies, upon all colonial loan bills.

The public works constructed in colonies by means of these loans would become, in a sense, *imperial public works*, and would, therefore, be available for defensive measures in any part of the empire. The interest in the loans and public works would become a common interest throughout the empire, and tend to *federate it financially*. The colonies which raise the most money must, as a matter of course, be the wealthiest, and therefore require a larger scale of protection for their security and property than the colonies which borrow less and are consequently not

so rich. Their contribution would be larger in a proportion, which would recommend itself to all as intrinsically fair.

With twenty years of peace this *defence fund* would accumulate money enough to construct a large fleet if necessary; but even supposing that so long a period of peace could not be reckoned upon, the saving of interest at 1 per cent. would, as the usual amount of annual loan raised by the colonies, give in the first year something like £50,000.

If war were to break out in the first year, the trustees of this fund would be in a position to raise and pay the interest on £1,000,000 sterling, which sum may be taken to be about as much as would be found necessary to expend upon defensive measures in one year. In the second year a similar operation might be repeated, and provision made for a sinking fund to pay off, at the usual rate of say 1 per cent. per annum, the money which would have to be raised by the trustees of the defence fund, to meet emergencies.

No constitutional changes would be necessary. All that would be required would be an Imperial Act empowering Her Majesty's Government to guarantee or to make such loans to colonies as they may require. The interests of present holders of Colonial Stock would not be damaged, as the value of existing Colonial Stock would be greatly enhanced by such an arrangement, and amply compensate the public creditor.

Further, there are bolder and more adventurous spirits, who have drawn up the outline of a complete constitutional union of the United Kingdom and the nine parliamentary colonies—*Canada, Newfoundland, The Cape Colony, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand*. These nine colonies are distinguished from (a) colonies with representative legislatures and Crown executives, as *Natal, Western Australia, British Guiana*, and the *Leeward Islands*, (b) Crown colonies governed by officials under the control of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, as *Ceylon, Mauritius, Hong Kong, Labuan*, and *Fiji*.

For confederation purposes the first nine are regarded as on the same footing as the United Kingdom, so far as their internal policy it concerned. But on all great national and fundamental

subjects, on the supreme questions of peace and war, foreign policy, diplomacy, and consular agencies, etc., colonists are looked upon as aliens.

It is proposed at once to remedy this by taking the statistical returns of the area, population, revenue of these nine colonies, and giving them representation in an Imperial Parliament of two chambers for the whole empire. Such a Parliament would correspond to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, whilst the local Parliaments would be in the position of the separate State Legislatures of the Republic. Another parallel is found in the present German Empire, which besides its Imperial Council and Diet, has local legislatures in each of the monarchies, principalities, and free cities which form the empire.

By such an arrangement a certain class of subjects would be withdrawn from the control of the present Parliament of the United Kingdom, and handed over to the Supreme Parliament.

These would be—

1. Revenues and expenditure for extra local purposes.
2. Defensive forces of the monarchy.
3. Intercolonial, home, and foreign trade.
4. External and foreign communication, postal, telegraphic, etc.
5. External and foreign affairs generally.
6. Coinage, currency, moneys of account, weights and measures.
7. External and maritime affairs and courts of appeal.
8. Naturalization.
9. National lands.
10. Census.
11. National and other public debts.

In order to find out the proper scale of representation in an Imperial Parliament, it is necessary to consult such an authority as the Colonial Office list and the statistical abstracts for the colonies by the Board of Trade.



	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Revenue.
			£
Newfoundland .	40,200	161,374	273,949
Canada. . . .	3,470,392	4,324,810	6,669,023
Cape Colony .	222,308	720,984	3,299,017
New South Wales	310,700	751,468	6,470,341
Queensland . .	668,224	302,090	2,383,859
Victoria . . .	87,884	945,703	5,934,240
South Australia .	900,000	304,515	2,060,139
Tasmania . . .	26,205	115,705	562,189
New Zealand . .	104,000	552,507	3,871,267
	5,829,913	8,179,156	£31,524,024

In addition to these statistical facts, it would be interesting to know the form of the Government scale of representation, and the kind of franchise already existing in these parliamentary colonies.

In all of them the *bi-cameral system* has been adhered to. The Canadian dominion has a *Senate* and a *House of Commons* over and above the local legislatures in the various provinces. The Canadian Privy Council is a reproduction of the English prototype. The Government of the Dominion is more complex and therefore more interesting a study to us than the rest of the colonies. Here the federal principle seems to have been grafted upon our monarchical institution with the greatest success. The idea of subordinate and provincial legislatures sounds novel to English ears, but it has been elaborated with the greatest care for ancient precedent, procedure, and even political phraseology. Leaving the local legislatures of the Dominion out of consideration, the following are the Colonial Legislatures:—

	The Senate.	House of Commons.
Canada . . . . .	72	181
	Legislative Council.	Legislative Assembly.
Newfoundland . . .	21	33
New South Wales . .	55	113
Victoria . . . . .	42	86
New Zealand . . . .	25	95
South Australia . . .	24	52
Tasmania . . . . .	16	32
Queensland. . . . .	34	55
The Cape Colony . .	22	74

If we take the whole total of our colonial population, as given above, in the nine parliamentary colonies, we shall find that the scale of representation is, to speak approximately, one member of the upper chamber to every 35,000 of the population, and one member of the lower chamber to every 15,000 of the population.

In a scheme of imperial representation in a Council or a Parliament at home, it would appear that the colonists, as they number about 8,000,000, in comparison with the 35,000,000 of these islands, would be entitled to a fractional representation of the whole.

The adjustment of a proper scale of representation throughout the empire, together with the question of a uniform franchise, are not the smallest difficulties in detail which an Imperial Federationist would have to meet and solve. He might also have to consider not only the population of a particular colony, but its *revenue* and *indebtedness*, and the general question of its solvency. Roughly speaking, however, the class of federationists to whom we are now referring will claim the *numerical basis* as the best, and demand, therefore, for the whole mass of colonists a proportionate share in the government of the whole empire.

Judge Haliburton's words, that the colonies "should be integral parts of one great whole, and as *counties* of Great Britain," are accepted literally, and upon the strength of this their scheme of Constitutional Union is elaborated. It is argued that the great changes in the Constitution of the United Kingdom which took place in 1707, 1800, and 1832, are a convincing proof that the three estates of the realm are not mere bigoted adherents to existing conditions when reasonable alterations are required.

With much of the above we may be inclined to agree, but the worst of this precise and rather mathematical scheme is, that it ignores some difficulties in the way. For instance, it takes it for granted that the Federal Parliament will be entitled to legislate upon intercolonial, home, and foreign trade. But it is upon this question that Imperial Federationists may wreck their reputation, if they do not approach it cautiously and discreetly, and with the utmost diffidence of success. Some will tell us that a *customs union* must be left out of sight altogether for the present, and

that we must federate upon every conceivable subject before we allude to a fiscal policy.

Again, there is no hint given as to the method of representation which should be pursued in Crown colonies, or in the case of India. Nor are there any suggestions thrown out how the members of the Imperial Parliament are to be elected, whether by *direct popular vote*, or by *election through elective bodies*. However, as a complete scheme, which reveals to us some facts and lays before us a distinct and uncompromising *modus operandi*, it deserves notice.

There are a certain number of persons who cannot look upon this question of Imperial Federation through any but fiscal spectacles. It becomes a question of *Free Trade* or *Protection* throughout the empire in their judgment. If we make Imperial Federation dependent upon the adoption of a uniform fiscal policy throughout the empire, our cause is nearly hopeless. In course of time, British colonists may be *Free Traders* by conviction; but the question is so intricate, and so many interests are involved, that we cannot hope that it will be so just yet. As above hinted, the federation of the British colonies may exist for all practical purposes of defence alongside of a diversity of method in raising revenue. *New South Wales* and *Victoria*, the champions respectively of *Free Trade* and *Protection*, must always be united, nevertheless, on defence measures and a foreign policy. It is difficult, moreover, to define what a Free-trading community really is; and the dispute going on at the present moment in the New South Wales Parliament on the measure of Sir Patrick Jennings, for the imposition of a five per cent. *ad valorem* duty on imports to the colony, proves that, after all, our only colony which pretends to be Free-trading is hesitating in its belief.

In South Africa, the interests of the colonists of Natal and the Cape Colony must always be identical, however tight the customs cordon is drawn between them. The truth is, that young communities have, in comparison with old manufacturing countries, few ways of raising revenue. It has been said that, when England parted with Crown control over her colonies, and handed over the Crown lands, she ought to have insisted upon the principles of Free Trade. But this insistence upon a principle of

finance would probably have brought great friction with it, and checked colonial progress. As it has happened, the sale of Crown lands, although by no means unaccompanied with evil results and monopolist principles, has formed a valuable asset upon which the colony might draw in each case. It is no good speculating as to what value these Crown lands may have been as an opening for emigrants, or as a means of guiding or controlling a colonial fiscal policy. They are gone irrevocably from imperial control in all the parliamentary colonies.

The West Indian group illustrates to us the most puzzling difficulties of an imperial fiscal policy. These beautiful and productive islands are brought to the verge of ruin by the free importation into England of bounty-fed sugar from France, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere. Their purchasing power is gone, and in their distress they are turning to Canada and to the United States for some reciprocity treaty which will help them out of their difficulties. Against such a treaty the Imperial Government raises objections,

In their distress, the planters ask for a countervailing duty at English ports, which will put them upon an equality with the beet-sugar manufacturers of other countries. But they are unable to gain even this point. The answer is, that the British public have become accustomed to cheap sugar, and are quite willing to let the foreigner tax himself with bounties to give them what they want. But this is not all the case. Against it they have to place the prospect of a ruined industry in the West Indies, Natal, Fiji, Queensland, and elsewhere, and a corresponding diminution of purchasing power in our colonies, which is really more essential to us in the long run than that of foreign countries.

The general and fully acknowledged truth is, that the British colonies are far more necessary to British traders than they were, and all trade legislation should proceed upon this assumption. Moreover, the British Empire is so wide and varied, that every possible product of the earth is grown within its limits, and therefore it should be self-sustaining with regard to the rest of the world. Such articles as wine, tobacco, and sugar should come exclusively from our colonies, with proper skill and care on the

part of the growers. Possibly imperial legislation should foster young and struggling industries.

With our control over *Indian, Malayan*, and other native markets, in which Australasians are now taking so deep an interest, we possess exceptional conditions for impressing our views upon the colonists with reference to a broad and statesmanlike policy. But although *fiscal union* is an admirable phrase, it is a dangerous one, and in a united British Empire it will be, in all probability, the last consummation of all. The Latin monetary system was supposed to be the precursor of greater unity amongst the Latin races than has actually followed. In our case, the advantages of a *customs union* throughout the empire may be too highly rated in its power to consolidate politically.

We must leave trade and trade regulations to the last, recollecting how we lost our first colonial empire by tampering with them. Meanwhile we must cultivate and nurse that sentiment which lives in imperial gatherings such as the *meeting at Montreal*, the *London Exhibitions*, so poetically described in the living poet's Tyrtæan strain :—

“ Britain's myriad voices call,  
Sons, be welded, one and all,  
Into an imperial whole—  
One life, one flag, one fleet, one throne.”

Such was the note which *Longfellow* struck in his “Building of the Ship” of State—

“ Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State ;  
Sail on, O Union, strong and great ! ”

and we know how powerful *sentiment* was in welding the *Disunited States* into the *United States*. *Fiscal union* was not the first union here.

In the midst of all these schemes and propositions, it is difficult to find the germ of our Federal Council. Yet if Imperial Federation is to come about, some such body must be called into existence ; and to be real, this body must be representative and include a powerful executive. Small councils called into existence with certain powers to carry out certain specific objects, would not suffice for the wants of the empire. We are not seeking for

a provisional, but for a permanent, arrangement. Nor does it seem possible to turn by a stroke of the pen, either the House of Lords or Commons into an Imperial Assembly which would command the sympathy and co-operation of the colonial world. Such an assembly would still be of a composite and puzzling character, charged with double functions and a doubtful mission, now and then distracted by imperial, and now and then by provincial questions. The Irish difficulties alone might suffice to render it powerless, if party rivalries again handed over the balance of power to a small and turbulent minority clamouring for the disintegration of the empire.

What we want is an independent body, to whom the management of that large and important class of questions known and recognised as the purely imperial, as opposed to provincial, may be handed over. It should be *constitutional* in its origin, *representative* in its character, and *supreme* in its decisions. Now there is only one such body in the United Kingdom which may answer all these requirements, and this is *the Privy Council*. The origin of this council lies far back in English history. The King's "Continual," *i.e.* Permanent, Council exercised enormous powers. Besides advising the Crown in all ordinary matters, it claimed a right of judicial interference. Sir Harris Nicolas observes, in his "Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council," preface. p. 11, that "there was scarcely a department of State which was not, in a greater or less degree, subject to its immediate control. No rank was too exalted or too humble to be exempt from its vigilance, nor any matter too insignificant for its interference." In the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council we recognise a survival of their powers, albeit much diminished and checked, which is recognised in every law court throughout the empire. If there be a dispute between theologians in South Africa, or a quarrel between merchants in Bombay, the final appeal on the question of justice lies with this learned and august relic of the King's Permanent Council.

In course of time we know that the Privy Council was supplanted by the Cabinet Council, of which the latter is in reality a committee, and little by little the two bodies became distinct. Clarendon, in Charles II.'s reign, tried to revive the power of the

Privy Council, as a set off against the popular assembly, and proposed a subdivision of it into four committees, the beginning, in reality, of our system of public departments ; but these very committees proved the downfall of the whole body, as the public business became concentrated in few hands. Macaulay has clearly put the difference between the Cabinet and the Privy Council. He says : " Few things in our history are more curious than the origin and growth of the power now possessed by the Cabinet. From an early period the kings of England had been assisted by a Privy Council, to which the law assigned many important functions and duties. During several centuries this body deliberated on the gravest and most delicate affairs. But by degrees its character changed. It became too large for despatch and secrecy. The rank of Privy Councillor was often bestowed as an honorary distinction on persons to whom nothing was confided, and whose opinion was never asked. The sovereign, on the most important occasions, resorted for advice to a small knot of leading ministers, whose name of Cabinet was derived from the circumstance of their deliberations being conducted in an inner room or cabinet of the council apartments in the palace. The advantages and disadvantages of this course were clearly pointed out by Bacon, with his usual judgment and sagacity ; but it was not till after the Restoration that the interior Council began to attract general notice. During many years old-fashioned politicians continued to regard the Cabinet as an unconstitutional and dangerous board."

It will be gathered, therefore, that if the Privy Council, as at present constituted, have little constitutional power, they may claim more on the grounds of their historical position. In one sense they represented the outside view of politics as opposed to the king's arbitrary will, who preferred to deal with a few of his councillors instead of all of them together in full conclave. In former days the Cabinet was regarded as dangerous, because it claimed for itself powers which belonged to many others besides themselves, and posed, therefore, in the attitude of a despotic clique.

The Privy Council as at present constituted is one of the most representative bodies in the world. Its members are chosen from all

sides, irrespective of party considerations, and no sovereign would dream of impairing its catholicity. So far, therefore, the body is constitutional. Its purity and honesty are unimpeachable, the members being selected upon the ground of their merits, and not by means of any unworthy electioneering devices. If a member is disgraced by his own crimes, his name is struck off the list of Privy Councillors by the Queen's command. As this has rarely happened, it proves that there has been little occasion for this necessary censorship. If we should look for a reproduction of such an august body as that of the Roman Senate in its best days, we might find it in the 200 or 300 members who compose Her Majesty's Privy Council. If we glance through the names, we shall be impressed with the fact that the names are the best that we can think of in every department of State and every profession of life. The old charge that the body was cumbrous, and consisted of useless nominees, is no longer to be alleged with justice now.

Cannot, therefore, the ancient functions of this body be revived? Cannot it rise, phoenix-like, from its ashes, and become again, under altered conditions and in a constitutional and representative manner, a supreme council, "deliberating on the gravest and most delicate affairs"? In the colonial world, and in fact wherever the British authority extends, it appears as the incarnation of imperial justice. Why not enlarge its sphere, and give it control, not over the courts of law, but over the main question of an imperial law?

But it might be asked, How would this council be constituted, and how would its members be elected? It has been already pointed out that there is little fault to be found with the selection of Privy Councillors in the United Kingdom itself. They are really representative men, not exactly placed there by a popular vote, but in the majority of cases finding their way there indirectly through the popular vote. Their elevation to the inner sanctum of constitutional privilege is a corollary of their popular success.

In the colonies and India the case is different. If the Privy Council is taken as the germ of a Federal Council, or as a Federal Council in itself, colonists will claim representation in some clear and definite way. They will ask that just as in the mother-



country, so in the colonies, a seat in the Supreme Council of the empire shall be the result of popular success and of political elevation in the colonial world. Earl Grey has countenanced the idea of the admission of colonists and colonial politicians within the magic circle of the Privy Council by suggesting that the agents-general should be selected and made a committee or department, as it were, of the whole body, with consultative powers. But there was no reason to suppose that these agents-general would be anything more than a consultative body of a provisional character, doing mainly what the governors in our respective colonies were accustomed to do, *i.e.* inform our public secretaries upon the opinions and attitudes of the various colonial Governments.

But if a Federal Council grew out of the Privy Council, and was invested with especial powers of its own, it would be necessary to select colonists upon some scale of representation. The nine parliamentary colonies, in proportion to their wealth, population, and political responsibilities, would demand their share on the Council as a matter of right, if the administrative unity of the empire was to be attained. How far would this demand as a matter of right, and as a claim for just representation, be in harmony with the wishes of the sovereign?

Considering the loyalty of colonists to the throne, which has been displayed on many and notable occasions, there could scarcely be any objection to their admission. Colonists have been men whom royalty has recently been delighted to honour. The task of selection from amongst so many loyal candidates would be difficult, but it would become simplified, and introduce a truly representative principle, if the cabinet ministers of our parliamentary colonies were regarded as *ex officio* members of the Supreme Federal Council.

The Queen's Privy Council existing in Canada, the appointment of such colonists as the Right Hon. W. B. Dalley, in New South Wales, and the general favour with which royalty has regarded the British colonies, are all facts tending to prove that legislative ability of a high order is acknowledged fully at home. If *South Africa* and *Australasia* were confederated, we should probably see Privy Councillors there as well as in Canada. The materials,

therefore, of a Supreme Council of the empire are at hand in profusion :—

1. In the nucleus of the *present Privy Council*.
2. In the *Canadian*, and possibly a *South African* and *Australasian* Privy Council.
3. In the ranks of *Colonial Governors, ex-Governors, Agents-General*, and Ministers.
4. In the *Defence and Loan Board* of the empire, as described above.
5. In the heads of a possible Imperial Emigration Bureau Federalised Post-office, Federalised Chambers of Commerce, and all other distinguished and representative men acquainted with the wants of the empire.

Such an assembly would be extremely powerful, both from its constitution and from the eminence of its members. Would it be too powerful? Could there be found any sufficient constitutional check upon it? The Americans have elaborated a system of checks upon their powerful federal system. The written constitution of the United States is subject to amendment at any time, by consent of two-thirds of both representative bodies; or by a convention specially called by the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States for the purpose.

The supreme judicial authority which forms the final court of appeal on constitutional and legal questions, consists of a chief justice and eight judges. As the wit of man has been equal to devising checks upon a federal form of government in one instance, so may it succeed in another. In our own case the Crown has a constitutional veto, and the Crown therefore might be the guardian of our imperial liberties, acting through some such judicial committee as that of the United States. There seem to be at any rate two or three distinct advantages about a federal form of government, and a federal council for the British Empire. (1) They would protect us from the danger of the one-man tyranny to which open democracies and veiled democracies alike are liable. (2) The Council would be strong, and representative of all interests. It would devise and carry out a foreign policy better than our present party government. (3) A confederated empire of Great Britain and her dependencies would, after the manner of all

federations, be content to organise and consolidate the resources at hand. Probably it would seek to internationalise law, and carry out the ideas of the Geneva arbitration.

In conclusion, it may be worth while to call up the form of our political "Utopia," as foreshadowed in the above remarks, which are necessarily inadequate, brief, and naturally too general to deal with the great issues involved.

At the head of our empire will be the *Ancient Monarchy* of England, the fountain of honour and justice, acting through its responsible Ministers and Parliaments upon multitudinous races in all parts of the world. Next in authority, and bound to the throne by the closest ties, will be the *Federal Council* of the empire, sitting at Westminster, the old historic seat of Government, and dealing with high matters of State. In this supreme council, however formed, whether it will be an enlarged Privy Council, changing its character from *a close to an open* chamber; or whether it will be a *perfectly new institution*, consisting of members *elected by elective* bodies, there must be fair and equitable representation of all the parts of our Colonial and Indian Empire. Not only will the best of British statesmen at home, but their colonial compeers, full of world-wide experience and imperial sympathies, the feudatory princes of India, and the rajahs of the East, find a place suitable to their rank and importance. A United Empire will follow upon our United Kingdom. Abroad Her Majesty will be represented personally by her Governors-General and Governors, as she is now. There is no reason why viceregal appointments and colonial governorships should disappear before a Federal Council. They will remain as visible links of our empire. If the occupiers of these exalted posts could be chosen from the members of the royal family, so much more lustre and glory for the ancient monarchy of England. Instead of presidents we should have princes, who might hold delegated powers, and represent in themselves the fountain of honour and justice. Such powers delegated to governors are no new thing in our colonial history. The Governor of Maryland used to have power to grant patents of nobility; the "Baronets of Scotland and Nova Scotia" (1621) were an especial Colonial Order created by the sovereign. In the whole of our colonial

history the throne has been regarded as the fountain of honour; and when a dispute recently arose in the Canadian Dominion, whether the Lieutenant-Governor of the Provinces or the Governor-General of the Dominion should appoint Queen's Counsel, it was decided that the selection should rest with the former, as the more direct representative of the Crown.

But what is still more to the point, we have in Canadian history an instance of the delegation to a governor of the queen's power of conferring honour. In 1879 the Marquis of Lorne was authorised to hold an investiture of the "Most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George," and six Canadian Privy Councillors were created Commanders of the Order.

The monarchy lives in the hearts of all emigrants, and is cherished with affectionate interest. During the Rebellion an asylum was offered to King Charles by loyalists in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and had a refugee English king landed on the shores of North America, and lived there, he might have influenced the history of the New World. Ruined monarchs have often looked across the seas from the Old to the New World, and dreamt of transatlantic realms. Even Sertorius dreamt of an Elysium in the western waves. Had Napoleon escaped to America, a new France might have arisen under new auspices and with a new destiny. Portugal might certainly have lived again in the magnificent Empire of Brazil had she known the true secret of successful colonisation, which is to give colonists liberal institutions and the chances of free development. But Portuguese kings never thought that a constitutional monarchy could exist in the colonies, and Portugal remains an effete and nerveless power. English sovereigns have recognised the rights of colonists to free local development ever since it was stipulated in Queen Elizabeth's patent to Sir Walter Raleigh that his comrades in adventure should have all the rights and privileges of Englishmen at home.

Colonists have repaid the sovereigns of England with loyalty, and never more so than at the present time. In Newfoundland, the most ancient of our colonies, the fact is recorded with loyal pride that a sovereign of England was once a Newfoundland

magistrate. His Royal Highness Prince William Henry, afterwards King William IV., when in the British navy, commanded a ship at that station, and was during his commission a justice of the peace and surrogate. There can be no doubt that if any of our queen's descendants ever became, not simply a magistrate, but a "governor" in our colonies, he would be welcomed with open arms and with chivalrous devotion. In a scheme of Imperial Federation suited to our wants we need the monarchical principle with its cohesive power. Without it we shall drift away into weak and disorganized atoms. It gives us that central point to which all society looks, even in the most advanced republics. When it disappears

"it dies not alone; but

Like a gulf doth draw

What's near it, into it: it is a massy wheel,

Fixed on the summit of the highest mount,

To whose huge spokes ten thousand lesser things

Are mortised and adjoined."

The future is *in gremio Jovis*, and we cannot see what will be the end of our "Second Colonial Empire"; but this we know, that we alone amongst the nations of the earth have elaborated a system of government in which the exercise of the greatest local independence and provincial autonomy is consistent with loyalty to a throne and fealty to a sovereign. There are gradations, but not chasms, in the Imperial Government; and against chasm, ruin, and disintegration we as a nation must fight.

"For government, though high, and low, and lower,

Put into parts, doth keep in one consent;

Congreeing in a full and natural close,

Like music. . . . I this infer,

That many things, having full reference

To one consent, may work contrariously;

As many arrows, loosed several ways,

Fly to one mark;

As many several ways meet in one town;

As many fresh streams run in one self sea;

As many lines close in the dial's centre;

So may a thousand actions, once afoot,

End in one purpose, and be all well borne

Without defeat."

—*King Henry V.*, Act I., sc. 2.

## No. II.

By J. C. FITZGERALD,

OF WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND.

(“*Causa non præmia.*”)

**I**N the prospectus calling for the best essay on the subject of Imperial Federation, which was published by the London Chamber of Commerce, it is stated that “the object of the Chamber is to obtain the best essay formulating a practical plan for the Federation of the colonies and the mother-country,” and that “the essay should only treat with practical suggestions, including such alterations of the Constitution and other parts of the Government of the empire, and its constituent portions [as may be] adaptable to parliamentary and representative institutions.”

The difficulties involved in any attempt to construct or amend institutions of Government are never fully realized until it is endeavoured to express in the form of a statute the means by which the desired object is to be accomplished. For this reason, and not in the idle presumption that my powers are equal to the task, especially in the brief time allowed to competitors in distant colonies, I have attempted to draft the skeleton of an Act which may serve as a rough sketch or outline of a plan for effecting the federation desired, and which may be expanded by more skilful hands so as to cover all the various matters for which provision will doubtless be required.

Some notes explanatory or in defence of the several clauses of the proposed Act will more conveniently follow the text; but a few remarks on the need of a federation of some sort of the British Empire may appropriately precede it.

Two primary questions underlie all others in relation to the subject: First, is it desirable that the unity of the empire should be maintained? Secondly, is it believed that, under the existing relations of its component parts, that unity will be maintained?

As to the first question, many will be inclined to answer that there can be no difference of opinion; that the answer must of course be in the affirmative. And yet I well remember a speech delivered at a colonial dinner in London more than twenty-five years ago, by a noble lord, who had been but shortly before the Colonial Minister, in which his lordship described the natural and necessary development of Colonial Government through three stages, as that of parental government in infancy, greater freedom in adolescence, and, finally, entire independence. I do not, of course, recall the actual expressions, but it is well-known that, in propounding that doctrine, his lordship gave utterance to opinions which were held by no small number of the public men and parties in England at the time. But public opinion has much changed since then. The instinct of great empire has revived in England, co-ordinately with the tendency displayed in Europe, in the direction of consolidating in large states races having common language, parentage, traditions, interests, and sympathies. But as the call for this essay assumes that the unity of the empire is desirable, and confines us to practical suggestions for its maintenance, further argument on this point would be superfluous.

On the second question—Is it likely that that unity will be permanent under existing conditions?—more is to be said.

Before attempting an answer, it will be well to give a short notice of the present relations of Great Britain to her colonies in respect to their comparative populations, revenues, and trade. The following table, although perhaps not absolutely accurate, or presenting figures derived from the most recent returns, is sufficiently near the truth to support the arguments for which it is here used; and any error will be found to lie in its giving too great preponderance to British over colonial numbers; a preponderance which the rapid increase of the colonies in population, as compared with that of the United Kingdom, must tend year by year to diminish.

The following table shows approximately the relative population and importance of the United Kingdom and its dependencies.

	Population.	Revenue.	Public Debt.	Exports and Imports.
United Kingdom .	36,400,000	£ 88,000,000	£ 740,400,000	£ 685,985,000
North American Colonies . . .	4,650,000	8,000,000	51,000,000	42,650,000
Australn. Colonies	3,500,000	22,000,000	105,000,000	112,000,000
West Indian Colonies, including Guiana, etc. . .	1,610,000	2,050,000	2,500,000	19,050,000
African Colonies .	2,350,000	6,250,000	23,000,000	17,260,000
Other Possessions .	375,000	755,000	630,000	3,000,000
Asiatic Possessions	267,000,000	83,000,000	167,800,000	196,075,000
Total . .	315,885,000	210,055,000	1,090,330,000	1,076,020,000

The proportion which the population, revenue, etc., of the dependencies bear to those of the United Kingdom is as follows:—

	Population.	Revenue.	Public Debt.	Exports and Imports.
United Kingdom .	100'00	100'00	100'00	100'00
North American Colonies . . .	12'77	9'09	6'88	6'21
Australn. Colonies	9'61	25'	14'18	16'32
West Indian Colonies, including Guiana, etc. . .	4'4	2'33	'33	2'77
African Colonies .	6'45	7'1	3'1	2'51
Other Possessions .	1'03	'85	'08	'43
Asiatic Possessions	733'51	94'32	22'66	28'58
Total . .	767'77	138'69	47'23	56'82

It appears, then, that for every hundred inhabitants of the United Kingdom, there are seven hundred and sixty dwelling in her dependencies; that the combined revenues of these dependencies are greater by nearly one half than those of the mother-country; and that their trade amounts to more than one



half, and their public debt to nearly one half respectively, of the trade and debt of the parent State.

Many of these dependencies, however, are not colonies, for many of them contain populations of foreign races, as especially is the case with India ; and such dependencies are not subject to the same condition of expansion, by immigration and settlement, as those which are distinctly British in their origin and character. Hence it will be more pertinent to the present inquiry to confine out attention to the latter.

Taking, then, the two groups of colonies, those of British North America and Australasia, we gather the following facts :—

	Population.	Revenue.	Debt.	Trade.
The United Kingdom	36,400,000	£ 88,000,000	£ 740,000,000	£ 685,000,000
The Colonies	8,150,000	30,000,000	156,000,000	154,000,000

That is to say, their population is nearly one-fourth, their revenue more than one-third, their debt nearly one-fifth, and their trade considerably more than one-fifth, of those of the United Kingdom. From the same figures it would appear that the amount of trade per man of the population is—

	£	s.	d.
For the United Kingdom about	18	16	10
For the Colonies	18	19	6

indicating so far an average equality in the wealth and prosperity of the two, but a slight advantage in favour of the colonies.

Again, if we calculate from the above figures the rate of taxation per head, and the annual charge per head of the public debt, and assume the difference between those two to be the rate per head of the burden of maintaining the government and defence of the respective countries, we have the following result :—

	Taxation.	Debt.*	Government.
	£ s. d.	s. d.	£ s. d.
The United Kingdom	2 8 4	12 2	1 16 2
The Colonies	3 15 7	15 3	3 0 4

It thus appears that not only is the taxation of these colonies considerably heavier per head than that of the United Kingdom, but that, after deducting the debt charges, which are also heavier, the remainder, which represents the cost of the government and of defence, approaches an amount double that of the mother-country per head of the population.

I would again say that it is not pretended that the above figures are those resulting from the most accurate or recent statistics; but it is believed that they sufficiently approach correct results to establish the relative conditions of Great Britain and what may be called her specially English colonies, in those peculiarities which bear on the problem propounded for solution.

Bearing these facts in mind, we return to the question whether the unity of the empire, under the existing relations between its component parts, is likely to be maintained.

Looking at the proportionate rate of increase in the population of the mother-country and her colonies, and at the enormous tracts of land in the latter still unoccupied, and being rapidly peopled, it would seem to call for no prophetic power to predict that, even within the lifetime of persons now in their infancy, at all events within a period which is but a span in the life of a nation, the colonies, even those of our own race only, will equal, if not surpass, the United Kingdom in population, wealth, and importance. The United States had a population of three millions at the time of their revolt a century ago; their population has increased fifteen-fold since that time; but they had all Europe as a reservoir from which to replenish their population. On the other hand, the masses of Europe are more than ever in need of room for expansion, and the facilities for locomotion

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\* The interest on the British debt is taken at 3 per cent., and on the colonial debt at 4 per cent. on the capital.

by land and water are immeasurably increased and still increasing. It would therefore be hard to speculate on the limit to the possible expansion of the colonies in the not very distant future.

Can it then be reasonably expected that the present position of the supreme legislative authority, vested in the mother-country alone, will be permanently palatable to the other communities of the empire? Does any future destiny present itself as possible for the British Empire but, on the one hand, a federation upon fair and equitable grounds; or, on the other, its final disruption?

What causes may operate to bring about the latter it is impossible to foresee; one at least suggests itself to every mind. It is true that the power of internal taxation of the colonies by the British Parliament has been long abandoned, nor is it likely that the insane policy which resulted in the loss of the American colonies will ever be repeated; but it is not impossible that discontent might be excited by hostile tariffs and vexatious restrictions on trade. Again, the power of imperial legislation in colonial affairs is rarely exercised, and then, not in restraint, but generally at the instance, of the colony affected. In such matters it is not likely that any dangerous strain on the bond of union will be experienced. But in the question, of all others imperial, involving the policy of the Imperial Government in the direction of peace or war, the colonies have an interest at least as great as, if not greater, than the mother-country itself. The outlying portions of a great and widely distributed empire are not the parts least likely to be attacked. It was by successful assault on the colonies of France that her power was crippled in the eighteenth century. It was by the revolt of her colonies that Spain irrecoverably lost her position as one of the first States of Europe; and the vast increase of her colonies and possessions in other parts of the world enabled England to maintain her position after the revolt of the American provinces.

Can it then be believed that, as the colonies approach nearer to the mother-country, or, it may be exceed it, in wealth and population, they will submit, or ought to submit, to the dictation by one portion only of the empire, on questions in which they have

an equality, if not a preponderance, of interest; or that they should continue to have no voice in the determination of questions which may involve them in tremendous sacrifices—no voice in the maintenance in or dismissal from power of the statesmen to whose hands their destinies are committed? Or can there be, it may well be asked, a more favourable time than the present for making such changes in the constitutional system of the empire as prudent foresight may suggest—a time when the loyalty of the colonies is deep and strong, and no questions have yet arisen to disturb the harmony of their relations with their parent state? In any practical scheme for the federation of the empire, two considerations must be kept in view: First, the change should be as little as possible; Secondly, that it may be acceptable to the parties interested, any federation must be voluntary, not forced. It may indeed be doubted whether any federation at all is possible under existing conditions; whether the colonies may not say—"We are as well off as we can be under present arrangements, what should we get by any change?" The feeling of nationality is a sentiment, and in certain circumstances one of the most powerful which inspires human action. But such a feeling—a nationality controlling action, superseding self-interest, involving the sacrifice of lower to higher objects—is a plant of slow growth which may be killed by forcing. The history of the United States has taught us how slow is the process by which it acquires the strength of a dominant passion in the sentiments of a people. How great was the danger, even under the guidance of the great statesmen who have from time to time moulded the institutions and trained the thought of America, of the disruption of that great nation into a community of isolated and jealous States! Nor was it without a terrible convulsion that the final destiny of America was determined. The partial success, up to the present time, of the endeavour to form a federal union of the Australasian colonies, and the threatened separation of one colony from the Dominion of Canada, are pregnant warnings of the futility of all endeavours to force a nascent sentiment beyond the period of growth at which it has arrived. Better were it that existing ties should remain for a time to bear the normal strain to which they are exposed, than that they should be subjected to rash experi-

ment designed to elicit their strength, but which may possibly fracture their fibres.

It is, then, with full recognition of the difficulty, it may be the impossibility, of the task, and in the belief that, if possible, the experiment can only succeed by the adoption of a plan which may win general consent, and above all to test the possibility of converting an abstract proposal into a concrete form, that I have endeavoured to sketch out in the following outline an Act for effecting a federal union of the component parts of the British Empire.

*An Act for the Reform of the Imperial Parliament, and for providing for the Representation of the Colonies therein.*

*WHEREAS* the colonies of Her Majesty in various parts of the world have in these late years greatly increased in population, wealth, and importance, and continue to increase, not only by their natural and internal progress, but also by the emigration and resort thereto and the settlement therein of great numbers of Her Majesty's subjects of Great Britain and Ireland; *and whereas*, to the end that the feeling of loyalty to Her Majesty's throne and person, and of attachment to their mother-country and the free government thereof, which have ever been displayed by the inhabitants of the colonies, may be maintained and fostered, it is right and expedient that they should be enabled to participate in the legislative government of the empire by their representatives in the Imperial Parliament; and so consolidate in a closer political union Her Majesty's subjects in all parts of Her dominions; *and whereas* the Imperial Parliament has ever had, has, and of right ought to have, full and supreme power and authority to make laws binding upon Her Majesty's subjects in all parts of her dominions in all matters touching the general weal of the empire and the maintenance and defence of the same, and it is right and expedient that representatives of the colonies should have seats in both houses of the Imperial Parliament, and that the Constitution of the said houses should be amended for such purpose in the manner in this Act provided;—

Be it therefore enacted, etc.

1. The short title of this Act is the Imperial Federation Act.
2. This Act shall come into operation on the . . . day of . . . . . 18 . . . ; and a copy shall, immediately on the passing thereof, be sent to the Governor of each colony, who shall cause it to be forthwith published therein.

PART I.

*Of the House of Lords.*

3. The House of Lords shall consist only of the Lords of Parliament elected or appointed as by this Act provided.
4. The Peers of the United Kingdom shall elect . . . . of their number; and the Peers so elected shall be Lords of Parliament.
5. Such elections shall be conducted in the same manner as that heretofore in force for the election of the Representative Peers for Scotland and Ireland.
6. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty from time to time, by her royal letters patent, to appoint such persons as she thinks fit to be Lords of Parliament to represent the colonies in the House of Lords; but so that not more than . . . . persons so appointed shall have seats therein at any one time. Such Lords shall hold their seats on the same conditions and for the same period as other Lords of Parliament, and shall, whilst holding such seats, rank as Barons in the order of their patents.
7. Except as otherwise herein provided, every Lord of Parliament shall vacate his seat after ten years from the day of his election or appointment, but may be re-elected or re-appointed thereto as the case may be.
8. Upon any vacancy of the seat of an elected lord by death, resignation, or lapse of time, a fresh election shall be held by the Peers of the country in whose representatives the vacancy has occurred.
9. The Sons of the Queen being of full age, and every Peer holding or having held the office of Lord High Chancellor of England, and every Lord of Parliament holding or having held office as one of Her Majesty's Cabinet Ministers, shall be

- . a Lord of Parliament, and shall hold his seat for life, unless he resigns the same.
- 10. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect in any manner the royal prerogative to create privileges or titles of rank or honour.

## PART II.

### *Of the House of Commons.*

- 11. The House of Commons shall consist of . . . . members; and the numbers of members to be returned for the several parts of the United Kingdom and for the several colonies respectively shall be those set down in the First Schedule.
- 12. The members for Great Britain and Ireland shall, until otherwise provided, be returned for the several electoral districts described in the Second Schedule; in the manner and by the constituencies for the time being in force for the election of Members of Parliament.
- 13. The members for each colony shall be returned in the manner provided by any Act in that behalf to be passed by the legislature of the colony; or, until any such Act is passed, then in the manner provided by orders of the Governor in Council.
- 14. Any such Act or Order in Council may be amended from time to time, as the authority making the same thinks fit; but no such amending Act or Order in Council shall affect the seat of any member for the time being, until otherwise vacated.
- 15. Every member of a colony shall, upon a dissolution of Parliament, take his seat as a member for the same constituency in the new Parliament, until the return of the writ certifying the return of a new member in his place.
- 16. The writ for the election of any member for a colony shall be addressed to and shall be returned by the Governor.
- 17. Any petition against the return of a member for a colony shall be addressed to the Governor, who shall cause the same to be heard and determined in the colony, in the manner provided by any Act in that behalf to be passed by the legislature thereof; or, if no such Act is in force, then in such manner as may be prescribed by Order of the

Governor in Council ; and the Governor shall withhold the return of the writ until such matter is determined.

### PART III.

#### *Of the Contribution of Colonies to Imperial Expenditure.*

18. *And whereas* it is of ancient usage and right that no tax or tallage should be imposed on Her Majesty's subjects, except by their consent thereto by their representatives in Parliament, but that they should, of their free will and pleasure, give and grant to Her Majesty supplies for the maintenance of her royal dignity and government and for the defence of her dominions by land and sea ;

*And whereas* power has from time to time been delegated by the Imperial Parliament to various colonies to make laws, by legislatures representing the inhabitants thereof, for the peace, order, and good government of the same, and to raise revenues for the maintenance of Her Majesty's Government therein, and for the defence and protection thereof ; and it is right and expedient that Her Majesty's subjects inhabiting the distant colonies of her empire should contribute towards the maintenance and defence of the same, and that the Parliament of each colony should of its free will give and grant to Her Majesty for the charges of the Imperial Government, and for the defence of her empire by land and sea, such supplies as may be found to be fair and reasonable, regard being had to the comparative wealth and population of the United Kingdom and of each colony severally, and regard being also had to the cost of maintaining Her Majesty's Government in each such colony and of the defence of the same, which are borne by the inhabitants thereof,

Be it therefore enacted, etc.

It shall be lawful for Her Majesty to recommend to the Parliament of each colony in which a representative legislature is established, to appropriate so much of the revenues thereof as may be found to be fair and reasonable as the



contribution of such colony to the purposes above set forth, regard being had as aforesaid.

19. The Governor of each such colony shall lay such Her Majesty's recommendation before the Parliament of the colony; and all supplies which may be appropriated in accordance therewith shall be paid from time to time into Her Majesty's exchequer, and shall form part of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.
20. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty from time to time to appoint a Commissioner or Commissioners to inquire, in concert with the Government of each such colony, and to report to Her Majesty the amount of the contribution which may be found to be fair and reasonable, regard being had as aforesaid, which should be paid by each such colony to the exchequer.
21. It shall be lawful for any such colony, instead of paying any sums by way of such contribution, to agree with Her Majesty to maintain, at its own cost and charge, for the service of Her Majesty, such forces by land and sea, with the proper armament and equipment thereof, as may be set forth in any such agreement.
22. It shall not be lawful for any representative of a colony in the Imperial Parliament to vote, or otherwise take part in any question before the same, whereby any tax, rate, or charge may be imposed upon the inhabitants of the United Kingdom.
23. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to alter or in any way to affect the power or right which Her Majesty or the Imperial Parliament have heretofore had and exercised, and ought to have and exercise, for the government of the colonies, possessions, and dependencies of the empire not possessing representative institutions, and not being represented in the Imperial Parliament.
24. In every case unprovided by this Act, and in all matters relating to Parliament and to the members of either House thereof, and to its and their powers, rights, privileges, and immunities, all laws, orders, rules, customs, and usages now in force in respect to the Parliament of the United Kingdom,

shall apply and be in force in respect to the Imperial Parliament, except in so far as they are contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

### SCHEDULE I.

Countries sending Representatives to Parliament.	Number of Members.
England . . . . .	
Scotland . . . . .	
Ireland . . . . .	
Etc., etc., naming the several Colonies	

### SCHEDULE II.

Description of the Several Electoral Districts in England, Scotland, and Ireland.	The Number of Members for each Electoral District.

*The Preamble.*—Preambles have gone out of fashion in modern bill drafting. Although inoperative as a part of the statute, not the less were they formerly thought of value for the purpose of setting forth the objects it proposed to effect, or the abuses it was designed to remedy, and still more the spirit in which it was intended that the law should be administered. In drafting a bill, therefore, for effecting a great change in the national polity, I have ventured to follow earlier rather than later examples.

*Sections 3-8.*—It may be objected that the reform of the House of Lords is foreign to the subject under consideration; and it is only after realizing to their full extent the conditions involved in federation, that we are led to the conclusion that an alteration in the constitution of the House of Lords is essential to a complete solution of the problem. For a primary condition of a successful and permanent consolidation of the empire must be that its citizens, all those at least who are possessed of the full

rights of citizenship, wheresoever domiciled, shall feel that they are on an equality in the enjoyment of political power and political privileges—an equality even more real than that which was expressed in the *Civis Romanus sum*, of the world-wide empire of the past. At the same time, when we consider the extent to which the question of a reform in the House of Lords has become the subject of public discussion, indicating a growing dissatisfaction with its present constitution and attitude as a branch of the legislature, and that some change in its form appears inevitable at no very distant period,—it seems to be a fitting occasion, when dealing with the constitution of the representative chamber, to incorporate into the scheme such an alteration in that of the Upper House, as may at once deal with the demand for its improvement made on other grounds, and at the same time carry into complete effect the special object which we are now advocating.

In the proposals described in the draft bill, it has been endeavoured to introduce as little change as possible, to leave the state and privileges of the nobility untouched, except only as regards their legislative functions; and even in this respect to place the whole of the peerage upon the same footing as that upon which a part of it now stands.

The scheme of representative peers for Scotland was adopted at the Union by mutual treaty between the two kingdoms, in order that the peerage of England might not be swamped in the House of Lords by the proportionately more numerous peerage of the smaller and poorer State. The same reason suggested the adoption of the same machinery in the Irish union. But surely, had it not been for the necessity of avoiding offence to the jealousies and susceptibilities of the parties to those treaties, it might well have been asked, as it is well now to ask, why should the peerage of one part of the United Kingdom sit in the House of Lords in right of their peerage, and of other parts only by representatives? That all should equally exercise their legislative functions by representatives of their order, is surely the more reasonable and logical conclusion. The plan proposed of limiting the Lords of Parliament to those who may be likely to take an interest in its proceedings, excluding those who indicate by habitual absence

the small value they place on their privileges, and of limiting the time for which a member shall hold his seat, and thus providing the means of introducing new blood into the chamber, would not only raise the character of the House of Lords as a legislative body, but would open the door to the creation of an order of peers holding their seats and titles for a limited time, with a view to incorporating members having large interest in and extensive acquaintance with the various colonies, without at the same time unduly enlarging the number of the hereditary nobility.

A few years ago the right of the Crown to create peers for life, having seats in the House of Lords, was successfully opposed by that body; and an Act to bestow such power on the Crown, in favour of a limited number of the judges, failed to pass the Lower House. It was admitted by the peers, who passed the measure, that, for a specific object, it was politic that the constitution of the Upper House, as the hereditary counsellors of the Crown, should be modified. The present proposal, therefore, is not so much a constitutional innovation as the extension of a principle already admitted. Given that some change in the constitution of the House of Lords is demanded, and is impending, and that the object is one of sufficient importance to justify the change, the proposed reform may be admitted to be as slight an interference with the constitutional status and privileges of the peerage as will at once provide for that object and correct an abuse which is universally recognised.

It may be questioned whether the members of the Upper House representing the colonies should be appointed by the Crown instead of being chosen, as other Lords of Parliament, by the peers. In favour of the latter, it may be said that the elective system being adopted, it should be uniform. But, on the other hand, as the proposed lords are not to be of the order of the hereditary peerage, there is no reason why the latter should control their election. The creation of peers is a prerogative of the Crown, as the fountain of honour; and in the creation, as it were, of a new order of peerage, for a limited period and for a special purpose, it is more in accordance with ancient constitutional usage that the nomination should rest with Her Majesty. There is nothing in the proposed scheme to limit the power of the

Crown to elevate a colonist to the peerage ; but the object has been to make no further innovation in the existing order of things than is sufficient to accomplish the end desired, and that is to render the imperial legislative federation as complete as possible by introducing into the Upper House men who have distinguished themselves in the government of the colonies, or by their special interest in and acquaintance with colonial matters, and who have acquired a recognised social position both in the colonies and in the mother-country, fully fitting them to be associated with the peers in the work of legislation.

I am far from saying that this proposal is essential to any scheme of federation ; but I submit that it would not only be a graceful concession to the colonies, but would be of great practical utility ; it would induce the House of Lords to take a greater, better informed, and more beneficial interest in the concerns of the outlying portions of the empire, whose welfare so strongly re-acts upon that of the mother-country.

*Section 9.*—Under the present system of party government it is indispensable that there should be representatives of the Government in the Upper as well as the Lower Chamber. Under a wholly elective constitution for the former, it might possibly happen that the most eminent leaders of a party might for a time be excluded from the House of Lords, and much embarrassment might arise in the construction of a Government. It is proposed to overcome this difficulty by providing that peers who have filled high office as Ministers of the Crown should continue to hold their seats for life, nor is this an undue concession to men who, in addition to the high rank in which they have been placed by birth, have achieved personal distinction by services to their country in the councils of the sovereign. That the sons of the royal blood should hold a similar position will not, I think, raise an objection so long as a crown and a peerage remain integral parts of our Constitution.

*Of the House of Commons, Sections 11-17.*—The operation of the eleventh section will depend on the numbers with which the blanks will be filled, and on the details specified in the schedules. It may be presumed to be undesirable that the number of members of the House of Commons should be

materially increased. The introduction, therefore, of a fair proportion of members for the colonies will involve a reduction in the number of representatives for Great Britain and Ireland, and a redistribution of seats will be unavoidable. Many important questions will arise in filling in the figures in the first schedule. For example: Is representation to be confined to colonies possessing representative institutions? or is it to embrace the Crown colonies? In the case of the North American colonies, shall its number of members be allotted to each province? or shall the Dominion be treated as a whole, and its Parliament be left to determine how the numbers allotted to the whole shall be divided amongst the several provinces? In the latter case, might not the larger provinces grasp an undue share of the representation? Again, if any Crown colonies or groups of Crown colonies are to return members, are the latter to be returned by the existing nominated Governments, or is a representative system to be introduced into each? And if such a system is possible for the election of members of the Imperial Legislature, why not for members of the local Parliaments? And, above all, is the vast empire of India to have a voice in the senate which rules its destinies? or are its inhabitants, manyfold more numerous than the population of the rest of the empire, to be unheard in the Supreme Council? All these questions will sooner or later demand answers. In the meantime, it is sufficient to say that if, in striving to effect a radical and desirable change, embodying a distinct principle, we are deterred by finding that the proposed ameliorations will not embrace all cases, no reform can ever be effected. A man does not go naked because he fails to find clothes which exactly fit him.

The question seems to resolve itself into this: Is it the colonies we desire should be represented in the Federal Parliament, or the people of the colonies? In the latter case we must remember that the whole of the inhabitants are, in no colony, directly represented, because nowhere does universal or manhood suffrage completely obtain. It is the constituent body in whom the right of election is vested in trust for the whole; and where the suffrage is most contracted, we still consider all the population to be represented in the local Parliaments; and with the same consti-

tuency the elected members would represent the colony in the federal councils. But where the local legislature is partly or wholly nominated by the Crown, or the officers of the Crown in the colony, can we say that the people are in the same sense represented in their legislatures, or, that if it were entrusted to the latter to determine in what mode members should be returned to the Imperial Parliament, the colonies would be represented in the same sense as where the right of popular election existed? If then no members are to be returned from the Crown colonies, the colonial representations must be confined to those of the colonies of British North America, Australasia, the Cape of Good Hope, and perhaps one or two others. Were that so, the scheme would hardly be said to deserve the name of a federation of the whole empire.

It must, again, be borne in mind that it is no part of a federation scheme to alter the existing forms of local governments, or provide that the population in the various dependencies of the empire shall be granted electoral privileges which they may, under their present conditions, be incapable of using with any benefit to themselves. We can but apply the existing political organization of each community to the possible scheme for federation—to a general plan which will include all the colonies which are at present conformable to its requirements, leaving those still incapable of its application to the work of time, when, by natural growth in social and political development, they too may be brought into the common fold.

Nor must it be forgotten that the genius of the British Constitution has ever regarded the members of the legislature, not as delegates of parts, but as representatives of the whole—as trustees of the interests equally of their immediate constituents as of those who have no direct voice in their election. The object of federation is not to enunciate new principles in the Constitution, but to adapt to new circumstance those which have the sanction of ancient usage; to expand rather than to innovate. That members for the colonies will assume the attitude of delegates to a greater degree than is the case with those of England, is not unlikely; but they can hardly do so more distinctly than do the Irish members at present.

I have not attempted to fill in the names of the colonies which should return members to the House of Commons. To do so will demand much consideration and a very wide acquaintance with the circumstances of the various colonies and dependencies of the empire. It may be deemed right that those of our own race, and whose inhabitants are trained in the use of political privileges, should at all events be more fully represented than those under less favourable conditions; but it would be a matter for much regret if it were found necessary altogether to exclude many which do not as yet enjoy representative institutions, or in which, as in the West Indian Islands, large interests are involved. At the same time it is idle to ignore the difficulties which present themselves; not the least arising from the consideration that where the members of the local legislatures are nominated wholly by the Crown, or the officers of the Crown in the colonies, it is not impossible that they might become close boroughs in the hands of the Government of the day, giving it, in the case of a general election, a dangerously large influence in the House of Commons.

Of India, and how far it would be right or wise to incorporate it into the scheme of general federation, I can only speak with the utmost diffidence. It would be impossible not to regret that the voice of so many millions of men under our rule should be wholly silent in the assembly in which questions affecting their happiness or misery are discussed and determined; but I must leave it to others, more competent than I humbly feel myself to be, to deal with the complications of that great question, and to forecast the issues of any policy which may be adopted for the improvement of the government of India. One feeling only I cannot but express: a conviction that the present relation of the races in India cannot be other than transitional; that unless we succeed in identifying their interests more closely with our own, the British Empire in India cannot be permanently maintained.

But whatever may be the conclusion arrived at, as to the extent to which, or the manner in which, dependencies largely peopled by alien races may be incorporated into the general scheme of federation, such a difficulty should not be permitted to estop the great object in view, or debar the rising kindred communities



of our own brotherhood from taking their due share in moulding the destinies of the empire of which they are proud to form a part. If the object be right and just, and, looking to the future, necessary, let not those who are fitted to share its advantages be deprived of the privilege because others are at present incapable of enjoying them.

*Sections 13-17.*—It is proposed to leave to each colony full liberty to make such provision for returning its members as it may think most effectual for securing its fair representation in the Imperial Parliament, not only because such a plan will probably be most acceptable to the colonies, but because it will relieve the authors of the Federation Act from the necessity of dealing with a mass of details on local matters, with which they would find themselves very imperfectly able to deal. It cannot be doubted that the English colonies at all events would make the requisite provisions far more readily than the present Parliament; and the clause providing for this being done by Order in Council is only necessary as a temporary expedient, in case the local Parliament should have failed to pass the necessary measure in time. The suggestion that disputed elections should be settled in the colony is made to provide against the cost and delay which must involve a reference of such matters to England; and the provision that a sitting member should, after a dissolution of Parliament, retain his seat until the return of his successor, is only another expedient to remedy the evils which might otherwise arise and are inseparable from any plan involving the representation in one Parliament of communities scattered over the whole surface of the globe.

The second schedule will provide for the representation of the United Kingdom, the number of whose members is proposed to be considerably diminished, in order to make room for those of the colonies without materially increasing the strength of the House. This will involve a redistribution of the electoral districts, and would probably be most conveniently effected, at all events at the outset, by uniting existing districts, and, so far as possible, leaving the electoral boundaries unchanged. It would be impossible to regard such an arrangement as permanent, for the whole question may be largely affected by coming events. We cannot ignore the possible consequences of the vital question now

before the country as to the establishment of a local government for Ireland, nor the utterances of public men of the most opposite parties, indicating that the time is not very remote when a measure may be passed establishing such local legislatures in England and Scotland, as well as in Ireland.

Without entering on a discussion of matters which are without the range of our present inquiry, it is clear that in any scheme for a Federal Parliament, such possibilities of the future must be taken into account. The conversion of the present Parliament of Great Britain into what would practically be a Federal Parliament in its relations with subordinate local legislatures in England, Scotland, and Ireland, would pave the way to larger federation to embrace the whole empire. There is one point in which questions which will then demand discussion and settlement should influence any practical scheme for federation at present: it is as to the division of power between the federal and local bodies, especially as regards the electoral law; whether the powers herein proposed to be delegated to the colonial legislatures of determining the machinery by which the members for the colonies shall be elected to the Imperial Parliament should be similarly committed to the provincial Parliaments if established in the United Kingdom. A uniformity in the electoral law for the same assembly is desirable but not essential. The mode of election involves not only such important points as the areas of electoral districts and the principles on which they should be formed—whether, for example, on a rigid rule of equality of population, or with regard to old-established county and municipal divisions,—but also the still more important question of the franchise. The franchise in any colony, is, though similar, not identical with that in any other or in the United Kingdom; and yet there would be great difficulty in working any measure for a Federal Parliament which did not accept the electoral law in each colony as the basis for a federal constituency. And yet if this power is to be vested in the colonial Parliaments, it can hardly be denied to the provincial Parliaments of the United Kingdom should they come into existence. Nor has there been such an absolute uniformity in the franchise in different parts of the United Kingdom as to present any formidable obstacle to the

acceptance of the principle that the settlement of the electoral law in all parts of the empire should be delegated to the subordinate legislatures. But if, on the other hand, the Imperial Parliament retains that power in its own hands as regards the United Kingdom, it would be right to exclude colonial members from voting on any question affecting the electoral laws for that portion of the empire.

*Finance, Sections 18-22.*—The most difficult part of the subject to deal with is that relating to finance. It is not to be denied that there is a growing feeling, on the one hand, that the colonies ought to contribute somewhat towards the defence of the empire, the benefits of which they share,—a duty which, if not generally recognised, seems to have been admitted by some leading colonists; whilst, on the other hand, whatever feeling of distrust in or antagonism to any scheme of federation may exist on the part of the colonies, arises out of the fact that representation will carry with it the power of taxation, and that it may open the door to the imposition of burdens by the Imperial Legislature which the colonists may be unwilling and possibly unable to bear. To bring these apparently opposing ideas into harmony will probably be the key to any successful solution of the problem of federation.

That in time of war the English colonies would strain every nerve to resist all assaults by the enemies of their country is universally felt, and needs no further proof. From all attacks by land forces, except on the southern portions of the dominion of Canada, and the northern frontier of India, should unhappily any calamity embroil us in war with the United States or Russia, the colonies are comparatively, if not perfectly, secure. Their safety consists in the difficulties of transporting by sea any force of sufficient strength to reduce and permanently hold any maritime dependencies. The principal colonial ports and harbours being in, or being rapidly placed in, a state of defence, no great danger is to be apprehended from attack by sea, except by fleets of sufficient strength to have attracted the attention of the British navy. The principal question, then, appears to be that of the command of the ocean. But the fact that the British navy is constructed, equipped, and manned at the sole cost of the British

taxpayer is that which gives point to the arguments of those who maintain that the colonies, which rely so largely on the navy for their safety, ought to bear some share of its cost ; and were there no other side to the question, it would be difficult not to admit the claim. But there is another side.

When a deputation of Australian colonists once waited upon the late Sir John Packington, who was then the First Lord of the Admiralty, to request that Australia should be constituted a separate naval station—it having been up to that time included in the South American Pacific station—the late Mr. Wentworth, of Sydney, the spokesman on the occasion, laid great stress on the fact that the banks, the shipping, even the gold exported, were almost all the property of English owners. The Minister very naively but courteously replied, that he had expected that the deputation had come to advocate colonial interests, but if they only rested their claim on those of England, he did not perceive that it was any particular business of theirs ; England could look after her own interests. And there was much truth in the reply. The colonies are to an enormous extent the property of the English people. Their railways and their public works have been constructed mainly by English money ; shares in banks and in financial and other companies are held to a great extent in England ; and British capital has been sunk to a vast amount in mortgages on colonial land, and expended in its reclamation and cultivation. The whole of the colonial public debts have been borrowed in the English money market. The interest on these vast investments is paid by the colonists, and swells the income of residents in England, where it is subject to taxation, and thus the colonies do substantially, although indirectly, contribute to the imperial exchequer and the charges which it bears. I have shown above that the relative wealth of the inhabitants of Great Britain and her specially English colonies, per head of the population, so far as it is indicated by the export and import trade, is nearly on an equality, and that the taxation in the colonies, per head, is considerably the heavier of the two. Any fair estimate, therefore, of the contribution which ought to be paid by the colonies towards imperial expenditure can be arrived at only by a careful investigation of all the elements which should be taken

into account, especially that of the actual contributions of the colonies at present. So far as a superficial observation of the facts can guide us, it seems far from improbable that it may turn out that the colonies are now paying their full share of the cost of the government and defence of the empire.

In dealing with this, the most critical part of the subject, it would be surely wise that any Act should set forth, as is attempted in the draft given above, in the form of a preamble, a declaration of the constitutional doctrine now generally accepted as to the relations between the Crown and its subjects in respect of taxation. This was the course taken by Lord Chatham in the bill which he introduced into the House of Lords in the vain endeavour to heal the breach between the mother-country and her colonies in America ; and no more fitting occasion can occur for an authoritative declaration of the same principles than in an Act intended to bring the colonies into new and closer relations to the mother-country.

It will no doubt be urged that by the introduction of colonial representatives into the Imperial Parliament, the right of taxation follows, and may be exercised to any extent without violating the principles laid down in the preamble. That might be admitted if applied to an empire in which all taxation were decreed by the central authority, all its proceeds flowed into one exchequer, out of which were paid the whole cost of government and defence in all the communities of which the empire was composed. But it is idle to discuss conditions which are beyond the range of practical legislation. Our task is not to construct a paper constitution of theoretic symmetry, but to deal with existing elements, and combine them if possible so as to produce the desired result ; and it may be broadly stated that no federation of the component parts of the empire is within the range of what is proposed, which does not recognise the full independence of the Colonial Parliaments in the taxation of the communities in which they exist, and does not absolutely disavow the intention, and even the constitutional power, of the Imperial Parliament to invade their exclusive authority. Without this we may be fully persuaded no federation will ever take place, and were any attempt made to force it, the lesson of the

revolt of the American States would have been taught in vain.

Nor can it be hoped that any federation will be successfully accomplished except by a voluntary acceptance of its terms by the public opinion of the colonists. It cannot be said that there is as yet any strong public feeling in the colonies on the subject, or any distinct perception on their part of definite advantage to be gained by it. Such a feeling must, as was said above, grow in the course of time and under circumstances favourable to its development. But under any circumstances we cannot hope that it will be acceptable unless it results from mutual negotiation. In the cases of Scotland and Ireland, the union was brought about by treaty. England, Scotland, and Ireland were three separate realms, although under one crown. Hence in each case a distinct treaty was entered into by the respective Governments, whose terms were incorporated into Acts passed by the respective Parliaments, setting forth the conditions on which the union was agreed to be established. The relations of the colony to the mother-country are different from those of which I have been speaking. The Parliament of the colony never had an independent existence. It is the creation of the Imperial Parliament, having no powers but those delegated to it by its author. Nevertheless, in the public feeling and sentiment it has an individuality as strong as the old legislatures of Scotland and Ireland. The sentiment has grown with usage, and cannot be ignored without danger. To these local assemblies the people look for all the practical legislation which deals with the interests and needs of society, with the protection of life and property, the administration of the law, the settlement of the lands, the development of their country. It is their inquest of the nation for the correction of abuses and the guardianship of rights. It is to the colony what the Imperial Parliament can never be. Hence it is not to be expected that any federation will be accepted which proposes to remove, or may tend to the removal of, powers once delegated to and enjoyed by them to a distant and to them far less responsible authority. They must be satisfied that the integrity of the local legislatures will remain unimpaired. They must be taught to realize that federation means

something else; that it means the power of influencing by their representatives the policy of the empire at large, which, although at ordinary times unfelt, may at any moment precipitate them into a situation involving great sacrifices and much calamity. The moral effect of such a federation on the colonies would be immeasurably beneficial, enlarging the circle of their political interests, awaking and satisfying that instinct which is latent in all great and energetic races—the love of great empire and the pride of forming a part of it. But if, in endeavouring to evoke that underlying sentiment, the equally potent feeling of loyalty to local institutions is offended, the experiment of federation must fail.

But it may be asked whether, in case it is found that a direct money contribution from the colonies is fairly payable, it is likely to be paid? The answer may be found in another question: By what method is it most likely to be paid? By taxes imposed by the Imperial Parliament, or by revenue raised by the local legislatures? Were the colonies unrepresented in the Supreme Council, the experiment tried in the American provinces in the last century would afford a conclusive reply. But even, when so represented, it may be assumed as a basis of any settlement, that the colonies would not consent to any restriction on the power which has been delegated to them, and which they have so long enjoyed, of taxing themselves only through their local assemblies. And that they would do so need not be doubted. What stronger contrast between the two systems can be displayed than that shown by the conduct of the American colonies in the war with France, and that which they exhibited within a few years after in their struggle with England, voluntarily undertaking greater burdens in the imperial cause in the one case, than they would accept as a forced imposition in the other?

The New South Wales contingent to the Egyptian campaign was not a momentary ebullition of patriotic ardour; it was the outcome of the sentiment of the people, and may be taken as a fair indication of the response which would never be wanting on the part of the English colonies to any reasonable appeal made to their instinct of nationality. Nor is that sentiment

feebler now than it was shown to be by the colonial contributions to the Patriotic Fund during the Russian war; nor can it be otherwise than strengthened by the sense of more complete identification with the interests and fortunes of the mother-country which would spring from the consciousness of sharing her responsibilities by taking part in her councils.

But if on the one hand the Imperial Parliament foregoes its right to tax the colonies for imperial purposes, on the other the colonial representatives must be excluded—as has been provided in the draft bill—from taking any part in questions involving the taxation of the mother-country.

A few words may be said on the executive relations between the central and local governments. The points of contact may be limited to three; first, the appointment of the Governor by the Crown; secondly, the power of the Crown to veto Acts of the Colonial Parliament; and thirdly, the revision of decisions of the supreme courts of the colony by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In none of these has any general dissatisfaction found expression in the colonies; in none therefore is there any call for change.

Except in the Crown colonies, the political relations of a Governor to the popular assembly are the same as those of the Queen to Parliament. The Governor is supposed to be guided by instructions from the Colonial Office, and thus he is indirectly responsible to the Imperial Parliament. But the Colonial Office has no longer a policy which it endeavours to carry out in any particular colony, at all events in matters which affect the interests of the colonists. The days of great colonial pro-consuls are of the past; Governors' despatches are now for the most part narratives of events, and Colonial Ministers' replies little more than criticisms of their contents. And so it should be. Except with those who are in love with the name rather than the reality of a republic, there is no demand for any change in the existing system. In times of war, indeed, or of internal disturbance, as in New Zealand formerly, and at the Cape frequently, questions have arisen, and may no doubt again arise, as to the employment of the British army and the expense attending its operations. But it is not easy to see how any alteration in the constitutional



position would get rid of the difficulties which have arisen from this cause. With that exception, matters of imperial concern, which are within the personal control of the Governors, have never in recent times interfered with the interests of the colonists, or created any conflict between his relations to the Crown and to the colonial government. But apart from his active duties, the high social standing of the Governor has an appreciable effect on the feeling of loyalty which exists in the colonies towards the mother-country, or at all events on the expression of that feeling; and hence the need of great care in the selection of men to fill the office. But of this the Home Government has now for a long time perceived the importance, and very unpopular Governors are not often heard of.

The veto of the Crown on Acts of the Imperial Parliament has for two centuries disappeared from the Constitution as a personal prerogative of the sovereign. It exists as regards the colonies, nominally as an act of the Crown, really of the Secretary of State for the Colonies; but its exercise has fallen into disuse as regards almost all local matters. It is only put in force when the statute it affects is inconsistent with Acts of the Imperial Parliament, or when the colonial legislature has inadvertently exceeded its legal powers. No complaints have been made of the abuse of this prerogative, and therefore change is unnecessary.

Still less is any feeling of opposition or jealousy awakened by the appeal to the Privy Council. Its obvious utility seems to be recognised, of infusing into the administration of the law throughout the whole empire a community of spirit and uniformity in the principles of interpretation.

What may be called a new institution in the practical relations between the governments of the mother-country and her colonies has been, it may be said, rather developed than created in the last few years in the offices of Agents-General resident in London, holding virtually the same position as ambassadors from foreign states, and representing the opinions of the colonies to the Home Government more fully and effectually, *vivâ voce*, than can be done through the medium of letters. That the recognition of their position by the Government has been of some utility, both to the colonies and the mother-country, cannot be doubted. But still it

is a position of courtesy, not of right; although their office is a closer bond of union between the colonies and the parent state than previously existed, yet their influence is too indirect. They represent their respective Governments, and the latter represent the people. Representatives of the colonies in Parliament would not only more directly express the feelings of their fellow-colonists, but they would be in a position of power. In such questions, for example, as those at present occupying the attention of the colonial world—the North American fisheries, the deportation of convicts to the Pacific, the occupation of the islands of the Pacific by European powers—in all such questions the voice of the colonies heard directly in the Houses of Parliament, extorting information directly from the Ministers, and pressing the interests of the colonies on the attention of the Government and the public by speeches and motions, would have a weight which can hardly be exerted by conferences and conversations in the Minister's room. In one way, indeed, it may be said that the institution of political agencies is incompatible with that federation which is sought to be obtained; for the latter aims at a complete political unity, whilst the existence of agents or ambassadors implies a separate autonomy on the part of the states thus represented.

Again, it was thought a few years ago that the bonds between the mother-country and the colonies might be somewhat strengthened by the distribution of honours and titles to distinguished colonists. The wisdom of the scheme may be doubted. Titles and decorations, even without the substantial power and pecuniary rewards with which in ancient times they were associated, and of which they were but the outward symbols, to a certain extent doubtless captivate the minds of the multitude. But the creation of a separate order of a lower class than that which would be bestowed on eminent men in Great Britain must tend rather to distinguish than to identify the relative merits of men in different parts of the empire. Colonists receive decorations for colonial services which they would never have acquired had their career lain in England, and the title and the star fall to men far inferior in merit and ability to numbers in the home-country and other colonies, of far greater pretension to public honours than those on whom they are bestowed. If it be desirable to prolong the fashion

of distributing these decorations, at least let them be dispensed with regard to some standard of merit common to all subjects of the Crown, instead of being bestowed, as at present is often the case, to equalize the favours to different colonies, or different parties in a colony, with little respect to the merit of the individual whom the chance of colonial politics may have placed for a time in a leading position. The enlargements of the Orders of St. Michael and St. George, and its utilization as an order to be bestowed on leading colonists, was rather an appeal to the snobish than a reward to the loyal feelings of colonists, and will rather retard than help all that is valuable in the idea of Imperial Federation.

In conclusion, the main principles which have been kept in view in this essay may be briefly stated as follows:—

1. That the incorporation of the outlying communities of the empire into its legislative system is desirable at present, and, if the unity of the empire is to be maintained, will be indispensable in the fast approaching future.

2. That such incorporation should be as complete as possible, and should therefore embrace both Houses of Parliament.

3. That no further constitutional change should be made than is necessary to effect the object in view.

4. That all such change should be made in the direction of, and so as to be consistent with, alterations which are now demanded on grounds wholly independent of federation, and are likely to be made in the existing machinery of the Constitution; such as a reform in the House of Lords, and the creation of subordinate Parliaments in several parts of the United Kingdom.

5. That the Imperial Parliament as proposed to be reformed should be regarded, not as a newly created legislature, but as the ancient Parliament of the British nation as handed down from the past, extended on the old lines so as to embrace the extended area of the nation.

6. That the right of self-taxation which has been conferred on the colonies should be maintained inviolate, and that their contributions to the imperial expenditure should be left to their free spirit of loyalty. That there is no reason to doubt that they will liberally respond to any demands which are shown to be fairly due

from them for the maintenance of the common empire, of which they will, under a federal legislature, more than ever feel that they are a part.

7. That any scheme of federation should be at once applied to the English colonies in America and Australasia which enjoy representative institutions ; and to the other dependencies of the empire so soon and to such an extent as may be compatible with its safety and with benefit to themselves.

Those who may be startled at what they may regard as rash and needless change, would do well to consider whether any alteration now proposed is greater than those which Parliament has from time to time undergone since its first appearance on the page of history ; and whether when England, abandoning her insular position and policy, launched on the career of creating a vast colonial empire, she can now shrink from the responsibilities in which her success has involved her, or from such a modification of the machinery of her government as has become necessary to consolidate and preserve the mighty fabric which it is her pride and glory to have called into existence.

### NO. III.

BY W. J. BRADSHAW,

OF RICHMOND, MELBOURNE.

(*"Vincit Amor Patriæ."*)

TO the average Briton it is no doubt satisfactory to find that the great question, how to draw together the various British communities into some kind of effective union, is beginning to attract the attention of leading men in all parts of the Queen's dominions. The latest instance of the growing importance of the question of Imperial Federation is the determination of the London Chamber of Commerce to offer a prize for the best essay on the subject.

The programme of instruction issued by that body for the guidance of competitors, states that the object is to obtain the best essay formulating a practical working scheme for the federation of the colonies and the mother-country, and instructs that essays should only treat with practical suggestions, including such alterations of the Constitution, etc., of the various portions of the empire, as are adapted to parliamentary and representative institutions. This limitation of the subjects to be treated, of course presupposes that the desirability of Imperial Federation is felt and acknowledged in each of the self-governing communities entitled to take part therein. Such limitation is no doubt wisely intended as a means of providing that the various competitors shall be placed on a level, and of preventing the introduction of merely local matter, and is so far salutary ; but having regard to the fact that probably more than one of the essays will be printed for circulation, it is to be regretted, as much valuable argument, which would go far to

convince the gainsayers, will be kept back in consequence. For instance, here in Victoria we have not only at least one daily journal, but also a considerable number of persons who condemn the project altogether.

We have also a much more to be feared class of press writers and public men, who, while honestly and hopefully looking forward to the federation of the empire, insist that it must be preceded by the at present hopeless scheme of local federation, and this latter class are apparently oblivious of the fact that the delay of the greater scheme, caused by such insistence, is fraught with the gravest consequences. For convincing such as these, a page or two of arguments in favour of an early development of Imperial Union from some of the eminent writers who will doubtless enter this competition, would be of immense value. Take for instance the late narrow escape from a quarrel with France over the New Hebrides. How easy to show that the taxpayers of the United Kingdom will not for long consent to run the risk of embroilment with foreign powers in order to conserve islands for Australia, while Australia bears no share of the expense of the naval and military armaments necessary to maintain the prestige of the empire and to enable Great Britain, as its guardian, to speak forcibly in such matters. On the other hand, essayists on this side might endeavour to convince their fellow-colonists of the wisdom of Imperial Union, by showing that in this case of the New Hebrides local federation, even if attained, would have given us no greater power than that of protest, and we should still be asking our fellow-countrymen at home to do something for us, in the cost and risk of which we bore no share. Again, for the benefit of those among us who maintain that as soon as these young communities are sufficiently powerful to stand alone, separation is the only natural solution of the problem of government, what powerful pages might be written by able men, showing that if separation in some distant future is so natural, Imperial Federation would be powerless to prevent its taking place, but that during the time which must elapse before we can attain such maturity, some sort of Imperial Union would certainly enable us better to retain our hold on what we here in Australia consider our natural heritage. Or to put it briefly, if when we grow older we must of course set

up for ourselves, a preceding period of Imperial Federation will most decidedly enable us to have more to set up with.

And here the question may fairly be asked, What is intended to be understood by Federation of the Empire? it being of the highest importance that this question shall at the outset be fully and fairly answered. There is no doubt that much of the opposition of the enemies to the measure, and the lukewarmness of its friends, may be traced to a want of knowledge of what is intended to be the result of such federation, what are its necessary preliminary conditions, and what the scope and limits of its jurisdiction when attained.

And this want of knowledge is not confined to the class which may fairly claim an excuse for their ignorance. Many prominent statesmen in this and the neighbouring colonies have apparently given so little attention to the idea of imperial unity as to be utterly unaware of what is intended by it, or what would be the relations of the various portions of the empire to each other were this unity an accomplished fact. A remarkable illustration of this occurred quite recently. In an *Argus* telegram of the 31st May last, we read that in London, on the 28th of the same month, a paper was read before the Colonial Institute by Mr. Francis Labilliere, advocating Imperial Federation; and we are told that in the discussion which followed, the late Sir Alexander Stuart, ex-Premier of New South Wales, told his hearers that "the colonies would not permit any interference in the matter of their fiscal policy, but that each colony ought to have liberty to arrange its own tariff as it liked." Now, unless the scheme propounded by Mr. Labilliere was unlike anything which has preceded it, such remarks were quite unnecessary. For, at least so far as I have been able to grasp their meaning, no such interference is contemplated by the advocates of a closer union of the autonomous portions of the empire. It is perfectly true that in the less comprehensive but much more difficult scheme of Australian federation, it has constantly been insisted that such must be preceded by an assimilation of tariffs; but this certainly does not apply to a federation of the empire.

But the *Times* takes up the same erroneous idea of the aims of Imperial Federation, and, as we in Australia are informed by

telegram, assures its readers "that the absence of a universal tariff throughout the empire is the chief obstacle in the way of its closer union." With all deference to so great an authority, I can assure the *Times*, that if absence of a common tariff is an obstacle to Imperial Federation, an obstacle it will remain ; and if it should become a settled conclusion that we must wait for closer union until that obstacle is removed, we may as well at once cease to hope for it, and resign ourselves as best we may to the prospect of a gradual disintegration.

But I am prepared to assert that tariffs have nothing to do with the matter. I have read the speeches of many public men in Great Britain and Canada, and I have in this colony listened to the expressed opinions of some of our foremost men on this great question, but I have not, in either speeches or writings, detected any expressions conveying the idea that the form of federation these gentlemen were advocating necessitated a common tariff. No ; so far as my knowledge of it extends, the scheme has been, to quote from the manifesto of the Imperial Federation League, "A federation which should combine on an equitable basis the resources of the empire for the maintenance of common interests ; and that no scheme of federation shall interfere with the existing rights of local Parliaments as regards local affairs." My answer then to the question, "What is intended to be understood by Imperial Federation ?" is : A union of the various self-governing portions of the empire for the purpose of offence and defence, and for the furtherance of all objects which affect the empire as a whole, but reserving the fullest rights of autonomy in all matters which are now legislated for by the local Parliaments. Under such a system each province would be called upon to provide its fair and proportionate share of the military and naval expenditure of the whole empire, of the cost of administering the government of new acquisitions of territory, such for instance as New Guinea, and of all objects which tend to uphold the prestige and security of the empire as a whole.

And as a matter of course such proportionate subscription to the expense would carry with it the right to a proportionate voice in its disbursement, in the right to declare war or make peace, in the acquiring of new territories, and what is of supreme import-



ance to outlying dependencies, a voice in the prevention of such acquisitions by foreign powers, in undesirable proximity to any portion of the empire.

Before venturing to propose a scheme for the realization of what a vast number of Britons in all parts of the empire believe to be desirable, it is well to ask, Would closer union, such as I have described, in any way detract from the material prosperity of its component parts? It may safely be asserted it would not. Take, for example, this island-continent of Australia: under such an imperial rule the various colonies would continue to raise their revenues, to educate their children—in short, to conduct their own affairs—precisely as now, and they would simply have to pay a certain sum of money into an imperial treasury for imperial purposes, and no questions would be asked as to how they raised it. On the other hand, the advantages they would receive would be properly authorised representation at head-quarters, efficient protection from foreign invasion or interference with commerce, a voice in the settlement of such questions as the control of the Suez Canal, and above all a voice, far more powerful than mere protest, in the disposition of the still unannexed islands of the Pacific.

The objects, then, to be attained are surely most desirable; the difficulty, How shall we attain them?

“Send representatives to the British Parliament” has been proposed in some quarters; but such a scheme, though apparently simple, on consideration will be found to carry with it almost insurmountable objections. First of all, it is well-known that the House of Commons, the real governing chamber, is already overburdened with work; that the constantly accumulating questions affecting the vast empire over which the British Parliament holds more or less control, are now discussed at the expense of domestic legislation. Sending colonial representatives to such a Parliament would simply increase the evil, so far as the British taxpayer is concerned, by increasing the difficulty the House of Commons now experiences in dealing with the local affairs of the United Kingdom; and on the other hand, a position might easily arise under such a system, where a question which the Greater Britain beyond the seas considered of vital consequence would

have to stand aside to allow the discussion of subjects of importance only to the United Kingdom.

The idea, then, of carrying on Imperial Federation by the House of Commons of Great Britain must be abandoned, on the broad ground that no system of federation would be absolutely fair in which imperial functions were exercised by what is after all merely the local Parliament of one of its constituent parts. The example of the United States may in this case be studied with profit. The supreme governing body of that country is entirely distinct from any local legislature, and as such gives satisfaction to the whole ; but we can readily conceive the many disintegrating circumstances which would have arisen in America if the supreme government had been vested in the legislature of any one of its constituent States, however well the founders of the constitution had provided for the representation of the other States in that one legislature.

No ; it seems perfectly plain, and certainly only reasonable, that if we are to have Imperial Federation, we must of necessity create some imperial chamber to carry it on. I am aware that something of this kind has already been proposed. Ardent advocates of imperial unity have considered the advisability of constituting an Imperial Council, which, being composed of representatives from the various self-governing portions of the empire, should have the right of tendering advice to the existing so-called Imperial Parliament in all questions affecting the collective interests of the empire. But such a scheme, though much to be desired as a present expedient, would only be a preliminary. It would certainly not be real federation, for under it the actual power would still be vested in the British Parliament, and there only ; in other words, though the various colonies would have the right to advise, Great Britain alone would have the right to act upon or reject such advice. But some will possibly say, Well, Great Britain would be entitled to such pre-eminence in control by virtue of her greater population, and the consequent larger share of the expense which would be borne by her. I am quite willing to admit that she is entitled to a greater voting power ; but the constitution of an Imperial Council of advice, such as I have seen proposed, would give to the colonies no such

power whatever ; and in my opinion, any scheme of federation likely to prove acceptable to the colonies, must confer upon them at least the beginning of a voting power commensurate with their population and contributions to the imperial revenue.

For Imperial Federation, worthy of the name, must suppose a future as well as a present ; and although certain lately promulgated theories of the future colonial population have been proved to be much exaggerated, the time is certainly not far distant when the population of the outlying portions of the empire will approximate very closely to that of the United Kingdom. The body or chamber, then, which must be created in order to administer a Federal Government, must, by whatever name we choose to call it, be really an Imperial Executive. The representatives entitled to a seat therein must possess the confidence of their respective legislatures to an extent which shall enable, or rather I would say empower, the whole of them, sitting as one body, to administer the affairs of the federated empire in all matters for which the federation was formed. And upon consideration, it will be found that the formation of such an executive chamber is not so difficult as it would at first sight appear. In each of the self-governing portions of the empire there is at the present time a body of men who are entrusted by their respective legislatures with the precise control they would be called upon to exercise were they welded into one whole : I mean Her Majesty's Ministers in Great Britain and the various colonies.

In order properly to explain my scheme, I will take Great Britain first. The supreme control in that country is exercised by the Cabinet, subject of course to the directing influence of the legislature. Ministers declare war, make peace, annex territories, conduct treaties with foreign powers, and in short control the affairs of the empire, and, it is important to remember, are swayed in their decisions on some of these matters by the opinion of the colonies without forfeiting the confidence of the House of Commons which created them. On the other hand, the colonies possessing self-government have also their Cabinets, which provide for the defence of their respective countries, incurring frequently heavy expense and weighty responsibilities in so doing ; and these Cabinets are even now the only recognised mouthpiece for bring-

ing pressure to bear on the British Ministry in questions which affect the welfare of the colonies.

If then we can, by some scheme of representation, federate or combine these several Cabinets, we shall, in my opinion, have attained at once a working scheme of Imperial Federation sufficient for all cases where federation is pressingly necessary. And such a scheme possesses many and weighty advantages to recommend it for adoption. First, it does not run counter to, but simply advances on the lines of, our present received notions of Constitutional Government, and is consequently easy of attainment; and second, it is, as I shall endeavour to show later, elastic enough to meet the requirements of increased numbers and consequent voting power of the communities outside the United Kingdom.

In addition, the scheme has this one great recommendation, that it does not create any actually new institution or governing body. Former schemes for the initiation of an Imperial Council have intended, or rather I should say have proposed, that representatives from the various portions of the empire should be empowered to meet together, and in some sort legislate for imperial purposes. But the office of a representative in such a council would be an innovation. Its duties and powers would have to be defined by statute, and such statute would require the assent of each of the many legislatures to render it operative. In fact it would for these reasons be difficult to establish such a council; and even if established, its authority would be in constant danger of being weakened by the circumstance that its members might not possess the confidence of the Ministry for the time being of the province they were supposed to represent.

But the scheme I have set forth of a united executive proposes that the executives of the various provinces of the empire shall administer unitedly, and for the benefit of the whole empire, the same powers which they now exercise each in their respective portions. The plan I advocate is that the British Ministry of the day shall, for all purposes which are strictly imperial, be empowered to call to their aid, in council, the Ministries of the self-governing colonies.

Of course in the case of the colonies this would certainly not

mean that the entire Ministry should have a vote, as apart from other inconveniences, that would mean that the ten millions of Britons outside the United Kingdom would have a greater voice than the thirty-five millions within. No ; under this system I am proposing, the Ministries of the various colonies would allot a portfolio to some gentleman of their party, who would be known as the Minister for Imperial Affairs, and his duty would be to proceed to England and represent his ministry's views and wishes not to, but in, the Imperial Cabinet. Of course in proposing this scheme I am prepared for much hostile criticism and possibly some ridicule.

It will be said, Suppose such a combined executive to be formed, is it conceivable that the House of Commons would consent that the deliberations of gentlemen enjoying its confidence should be liable to be swayed by outsiders? I would ask such to consider for a moment a circumstance which has just happened. The British Ministry, in order, as was supposed, to placate France, were known to have intended to allow that power to annex the New Hebrides. Australians protested, Australian Premiers gave the British Ministry to understand that such annexation was contrary to the wishes of their people, Canada added her powerful voice to the general protest ; and now we hear that the British Ministers, admittedly yielding to Australian interference, have decided not to entertain the French proposals. Has the House of Commons withdrawn its confidence from the Ministry in consequence of such yielding? Certainly not ; and how then can it be said they would do so if such interference come through a properly constituted and certainly less noisy channel.

But it may be urged : Oh, yes, the British Ministry yielded, and may yield again, to mere protest ; but that is a very different thing to consenting to admit a possibly hostile vote from colonial representatives. It will be well to bear in mind that the colonies will not always consent to government by protest. Some safer and less irritating means of at least trying to enforce their wishes will have to be discovered, and the sooner it is done the better.

There is another probable objection to be considered. Would the colonies consent to such a scheme? Would they not hesitate to commit themselves to a scheme which might involve a large

outlay for warlike purposes? My reply is that the same may be said of any scheme which can be proposed, and that the hesitation will certainly not be on the score of any reasonable and fairly proportioned expense.

The doubts which are at present felt in some quarters as to the advisability of Imperial Federation arise from the fact that it is feared it will in some way interfere with local administration. That being so, the scheme most likely to prove acceptable to the colonies will be the one which the most clearly shows that no such interference is either intended or possible; and which at the same time provides sufficiently for the one great object of such union, viz. "Combination for the maintenance of common interests."

But on the question of warlike expenditure, the colonies have already shown a laudable desire to provide liberally for their own defence, and at the present time the Australian Governments have under consideration certain proposals laid before them by Admiral Tryon, whereby if adopted they will bind their respective colonies to maintain a number of armed cruisers, which will be, to all intents, a portion of the imperial navy, and which to the extent of the subsidy they provide will lessen the imperial burdens. And so far as I am aware no objection has been made to the principle of such a subsidy, but merely to the amount.

In other words, the leading statesmen of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, etc., have signified their willingness to assist in protecting imperial interests in these seas, and have so far only hesitated to adopt the precise amount of the burden sought to be laid upon them. This being so, I cannot believe they would object to a plan by which they would have some voice in the disposal of their contribution. On the contrary, I have a firm conviction that should the colonies assent in any degree to the admiral's proposals, it will not be long before they will ask for the adoption of some such control as the scheme I am propounding proposes to give them. Again, I think it is highly probable that under some scheme of a united fund for general defence, the proportion to be borne by the outlying provinces of the empire would not in any case exceed that which is now spent on what is called local defence by each separate colony.

But some will say, Why not let matters remain as they are? We have hitherto managed well enough; each colony has looked after her own interests in her own borders, and Great Britain has provided for the rest.

I reply, that the state of affairs which rendered such a haphazard control possible is fast passing away. Great Britain has asked the colonies to assist in maintaining the prestige of the empire, and she is undoubtedly right in so doing; and colonists are beginning to feel a real interest in imperial matters, and are evincing a willingness to share the burdens and responsibilities of empire.

This being so, any comparison with the past, any attempt to trade further on our present unsatisfactory relations, is purposeless and out of place. But opponents of my proposals may possibly urge: The scheme you propose does not give sufficient representation to each province. It is not likely that a colony such as, for instance, Victoria, would allow the control of its imperial affairs to be concentrated in one man. I reply, that by my plan Victoria would certainly be represented by one voter, and one vote would for the present be about what she would be entitled to on the basis of her population, but the gentleman having that vote would really be representing the imperial opinions of the entire Ministry of which he formed a part. His position would be precisely that of the political head of any of the departments of the State. Take the case of the customs in this colony of Victoria: a gentleman called the commissioner is said to administer that department, and he does really attend to and control all the lesser details of its policy; but it is well understood that in all important matters of fiscal policy he is really not carrying out simply his own ideas, but the united opinion of the ministerial cabinet of which he forms a part, and that cabinet simply carries out the opinions of the parliamentary majority for the time being. Under these circumstances it will be seen that one man, viz. the commissioner, is actually giving effect to the fiscal opinions of the majority of the people of Victoria. And in like manner, under my scheme, the imperial convictions of the majority of the people of any one province would be equally well expressed by its one Minister for Imperial Affairs, resident for the time in England, but holding

office as a Minister of the Crown, and responsible to his colleagues in his own particular colony for his ministerial actions.

If it should further be objected that the possession by any single province of only one vote would give little real power, let me point out that the executive body in which that vote would be used would itself be numerically small. Such an imperial executive as I am proposing, consisting as it would of the entire British Ministry, with representatives of the Ministries of the three groups of self-governing colonies, would not exceed forty in number; and if to the thirty-five millions in the British islands we add the ten millions of British colonists, it will be seen that at least on the basis of population the proportion of representation is quite as much as any single colony is entitled to at the present time, and moreover is capable of easy adjustment in the future, as the population and growing power of the Greater Britain required it. I may as well add here, that in this connection the great Dominion of Canada is really a group of colonies, and would be entitled to proportionate representation as such.

I now come to the consideration of another possible objection to such a system of Imperial Government as that I have proposed, viz. that it is too bureaucratic; that any form of federation to be successful must provide not only an executive, but some kind of Imperial Parliament. My reply to this objection is, in the first place, that the creation of an Imperial Parliament would of necessity lower the status and, in certain cases, decrease the powers of the House of Commons, which at once raises an almost insuperable difficulty, and puts off federation to a time when the House of Commons shall consent to such a lowering of its status and powers, which is certainly not likely to occur just yet.

What is required is a scheme of federation which shall involve so little change in existing institutions, and which shall by the very nature of its constitution be so plainly incapable of interference in merely local matters, as to be capable of application at the present time, when a large proportion of the adult population of the various colonies are natives of one soil, Great Britain, and are bound to each other and to the empire by the ties, not merely of race, but of a common birthplace and common memories. Again, federation does not require an Imperial Parliament for the reason



that federation will not have to discuss ways and means and raise resources ; it has, or should have, merely to provide for a combination, on an equitable basis, of resources which already exist, or at least are already legislated for, but which lack that combination which would adequately provide for an organized defence of common rights.

The question is then, Does the scheme of a united executive propounded in this essay provide such a combination? If it does, then in my opinion it is all that is required to constitute a present scheme of Imperial Federation. But the conditions of the London Chamber of Commerce state that essayists are to formulate a practical working plan for the federation of the colonies and Great Britain. In order to test the practicability of the plan of a united executive, let us briefly consider the state of affairs which would obtain under our present disjointed system in event of a great war, and then contrast it with the system under which we should be governed were some such plan adopted. Suppose the aggressive tendencies of some of the great powers to be no longer endurable ; in that case the British Ministry would declare war. They would be loyally supported by the British people, and intrusted by the legislature of the United Kingdom with full powers to carry such a war to a successful issue. Having once launched into war, the real governing power during its continuance would be the British Ministry. They would augment the land forces, increase the fleets, detach squadrons to what in their opinion were the likely points of attack ; and in all these, unless convicted of disgraceful blundering, would have the support of the British legislature. And in the self-governing colonies what would happen? Although having no voice in the control of the warlike operations, or in the issues of the war itself, their respective Ministries would be intrusted with the entire control of the local defence, regardless of any reasonable expense. The one recognised fact would be that Great Britain was at war, and that the colonies were liable to attack, and must be defended. Who then, throughout the whole British Empire, would be carrying on the war? Practically and actually the few men included in the British and Colonial Ministries ; upon the shoulders of these men would lay the whole blame of

administrative blunders, or praise for success. Why not then allow these men, trusted representatives as they are of the various portions of the empire, to federate, to unite by a fairly-balanced scheme of representation into one body, in order that by unity of purpose and a union of the resources under their control, they might be able to carry out one comprehensive scheme, instead of each fighting merely for his own hand? Under such a plan, the present isolated and wasteful system of colonial defence would be a thing of the past; we should hear no more of such points of vantage as Albany and Vancouver being undefended, of our commerce open to attack and plunder; for under such a scheme Australia and Canada would be represented in the executive which had declared war, would have paid their fair share into a common fund, and would have a voice in the disposal of the ships and war material so provided. I am convinced, then, that in some such simple scheme as that I have propounded will be found all the present possibilities of Imperial Federation.

To enter into elaborate calculations of proportionate representation in some Imperial Parliament, which must in the outset be constituted for the purpose of overriding or setting aside in certain cases the authority of existing legislatures, would serve no better purpose than to still further relegate a much-needed union into the dim futurity of improbable attainment. For the present the great colonies of Canada, Australasia, and even South Africa are each working out their own destinies in their own way and after their own fashion, untrammelled by the interference of the other portions of the empire. The pressing need of union lies in the fact that these great colonies have no means of enforcing their wishes in those truly imperial concerns which lie outside their own immediate borders. Briefly stated, we federationists want, the empire only needs, political unity in those matters in which there is already unity of sentiment. In the truly great questions of peace or war, in the enforcement of treaty obligations on foreign powers, in all that goes to uphold the honour and prestige of this grand Anglo-Saxon empire—in these we are already of one heart and one mind. And throughout our world-wide dominions there is not a local legislature which upon any one of these questions could not safely be trusted to legislate for, and speak out the

sentiment of, the whole empire. Unite then the mouthpieces of these various legislatures in the persons of their respective Ministries, and we shall have set the official seal of authority to a sentiment which needs only that seal to give it force and vitality.

Here, then, is my plan for Imperial Unity. I propose a united executive ; but I merely formulate the principle. I give few details, because I believe it to be unnecessary to do so. Let the British Ministry take the initiative, let them send out circulars to the various colonies, inviting the attendance at a conference of a ministerial representative from each, at the same time clearly defining the limits of the federation sought to be established ; let these representatives meet together, and decide to adopt the principle of such a united executive, and they could speedily settle the details. They would have but little difficulty in apportioning the number of votes to be possessed by each province, in deciding upon the amount of contribution for imperial purposes to be paid by each (by the way, Victoria's defence vote for the present year is £110,000), and in deciding upon the practical routine of such a governing chamber. And such a chamber, every member of which by the very nature of his selection and appointment would possess the confidence of the parliamentary majority of the province he represented, would be thoroughly capable of carrying out the details of a political, as distinguished from a commercial, federation. To those who prefer to wait and dream till they can attain to both, I would respectfully but earnestly point out that "half a loaf is better than no bread."

Such a political federation as I have briefly outlined, "for the purpose of combined defence and the maintenance of the interests of the whole empire against the encroachments of the foreigner," would, in addition to the feeling of security which would result from it, serve these two great purposes : it would enable the various provinces of our widely-scattered dominions to keep touch of the centre, and it would give a tone of reality to our British citizenship, which at least to the Canadian or Australian-born Briton would be simply invaluable. And are such far-reaching results to be despised because they do not include all that some, judging from a remark of the *Times*, may possibly have set their hearts upon ?

I think not. Rather I believe they are grand enough, and comprehensive enough, to inspire in the heart of every Briton a determination to do his utmost to attain them. If then on this great question of Imperial Federation the *Times* has a following, if there are those in our dear old motherland who are hoping for something beyond all this, who as their ideal of federation are looking for, and hoping for, a customs union, I would say to them with all earnestness: You hope for union; cease then to look for that phase of it which is impracticable, and you may then do much to bring about a form of Imperial Union which from a patriotic view should satisfy your highest aspirations.

In conclusion, let me say I am fully aware there are in Great Britain, as I have previously stated there are in the colonies, those who consider that Imperial Federation of any kind is a chimera, who profess to believe that the present condition of our political relations will last for a long time yet, and that when the present so-called silken, and certainly most unsatisfactory, ties which bind the empire together are no longer strong enough for the purpose, then disintegration is the only natural and satisfactory solution of the destinies of our Anglo-Saxon race. And these men have too long had the course almost to themselves; but I rejoice to see that the friends of unity are bestirring themselves, and I trust that some satisfactory solution of the problem of what form of federation is best suited to our requirements may be the outcome of their labours. And believing as I do, that the breaking up of the British Empire would be an act of treachery to the best interests of Britons everywhere, I say of those who wish for it, in the words of the laureate,—

“Hands all round,  
May God the traitor's hope confound.”

## NO. IV.

BY F. H. TURNOCK,

OF WINNIPEG (MANITOBA).

(*"Civis Romanus Sum."*)

WHEN we look back into the past and note the present condition of the various empires that have from time to time held the foremost positions in the world's history, we are tempted to ask ourselves the question, What position will the British Empire occupy one hundred years hence? Is she, as some pessimists would have us believe, destined within that period to meet the fate that has befallen so many mighty empires, to disappear like Assyria and Persia, or decline like Spain? or will she, as we hope, continue to hold, if anything, in a greater degree than at present, the proud position which so becomes her, of leader of civilization, the mother of commerce and the seas, to which, as in Joseph's dream, all her contemporaries shall bow and make obeisance?

We believe that the solution of this question rests mainly with the present generation, and that the action of her subjects for the next quarter of a century will decide whether she is still to pursue her onward course, or whether the summit of her greatness has been reached and the period of her decadence is at hand.

Those historic empires seemed in their day as prosperous as the British Empire appears now,—yet they fell; and, as history repeats itself, it is not improbable that the empire which is to-day the most exalted, may to-morrow be humbled in the dust. However, the page of history is spread open before us, and it is for us to examine into the circumstances which operated in causing the

downfall of these nations, and apply the conclusions we arrive at to our own. If we find we are suffering from the same weaknesses that undermined their strength, let us at once seek to remedy them, lest a like evil come upon us.

What then, for example, was one of the chief causes of the overthrow of the great Roman Empire? One by one those possessions which had been obtained by the expenditure of so much blood and treasure were allowed to lapse into such independence as to league themselves with those barbarians who subsequently overthrew this great empire. We read that one of these colonies, a little island in the Atlantic Ocean, after Rome had withdrawn her protection, implored her in the following pathetic terms: "The barbarians drive us into the sea. The sea throws us back on the swords of the barbarians; so we have nothing left but the wretched choice of being either drowned or butchered." This appeal met with no response, and the unlucky colony had to shift for itself. By the irony of fate that despised little island to-day occupies the exalted position that Rome did then, and it will be well for her if she profits by the mistakes, lest she meet the fate, of her great prototype.

With this object in view, it would perhaps be as well that we should take a glance at the relations existing between Great Britain and her colonies and dependencies at the present time, and see if they are those that are most likely to conduce to the stability and well-being of the empire.

Born in the mother-land, with many strong ties yet binding us to it, and living now in one of her colonies to which we have come with the intention of remaining, and where we have contracted ties of almost equal strength, we feel that we can approach this subject in an unprejudiced manner.

In the United Kingdom we find amongst the mass of the population a great amount of ignorance on colonial affairs. There is, it is true, a vague sort of idea that England has possessions somewhere in the Antipodes, comprised under the general term Australia, where people find gold or go sheep-farming; that there are possessions in America, where snow is on the ground nearly all the year round, where people go about muffled up in furs, and the noble red deer reigns in all his glory; and that in

the south of Africa there is territory which is a great source of trouble, occasioning now and then an inglorious war, for which the British workman complains that he is taxed ;—but beyond this not much is generally known. There is no very definite idea as to how these colonies are governed, or their geographical extent. In fact the errors made in this latter subject, even by some of the leading newspapers, are quite amusing. Of course the learned few, and those whose business requires that they shall know something concerning the colonies, are better informed ; but even persons who are on most subjects well informed, show surprising ignorance on colonial matters. This ignorance is, however, happily being overcome to some extent by the dissemination of maps, pamphlets, and information by the emigration agents of the various colonies. The Colonial and Indian Exhibition also served greatly to draw the attention of the public to the extent and resources of the colonies, and induced more to take an interest in them and in their welfare than have done so previously.

With this ignorance prevailing in the old country in respect of colonial matters, it is scarcely surprising that the average colonist does not form a very favourable opinion of the British public, nor is it to be wondered at that the colonists feel themselves slighted and are annoyed that they are not appreciated at their true value. This unfavourable opinion, we regret to say, the majority of emigrants from the old country to the colonies do not tend to remove. It generally takes them some time to get rid of their old-country habits and adopt those of their new neighbours, which are in the colonists' eyes much superior. So the British public has a reputation for being slow and unprogressive, and, generally speaking, "away behind the times." As a matter of fact there is not quite that brotherly love existing between the colonists and the old country that some enthusiasts would have us believe. Colonists who have visited the old country have of course a more favourable opinion of Britishers, but these are the exception, not the rule. The average colonist has, however, a better idea of England than the Englishman has of the colonies. He is well acquainted with its geography and history, and has a fair conception of events that are transpiring there. His views

on British politics cannot be said to be very reliable, but considering he has not much interest in them, he is fairly well informed. Though the colonist is as a rule a very loyal subject of Her Majesty, and unites with his old-country cousin in common admiration of the prowess and achievements of their ancestors, a careful observer will not fail to have noticed a certain amount of friction in their intercourse. So far, socially, things are not quite so satisfactory as they might be. Politically, they are worse.

The old-country man looks at the matter in this wise.

Of what benefit to England are her colonies? Virtually they are so many independent States over which she exercises merely a nominal suzerainty, so far at least as their internal government is concerned. There is continually some danger of their embroiling her in a war with her neighbours, the expenses of which falls solely upon her; and for this protection, what return do they make her? They relieve her of her surplus population to some extent, it is true; but the people that England wishes to dispense with are the ones that the colonists do not at all care to receive, and as a certain amount of emigration is bound to go on from districts where the population is congested, it is questionable whether the flow of emigration would experience any check if they were totally independent of England. Commercially they offer her no advantage, imposing as they do prohibitory tariffs against her exports, whilst all their products are received by her duty free. They would be equally valuable as fields for the investment of capital were the last link that binds them to England severed, as they are now. Why then need we hesitate to grant in name what they have in reality, "colonial independence," and save the expense of their defence, for which we receive nothing in return? To this suggestion, however, we trust the patriotic Englishman will never lend an ear. Manifestly disadvantageous as are at present the relations existing between England and her colonies, such a course would be infinitely worse. It would be nothing short of political suicide, for the moment wherein such an act is consummated will be the death-blow to her greatness. For what is England without her colonies? Has she been for so long striving to obtain them, has she been for so long pouring forth her blood and treasure to



secure, retain, and defend them, in order that she may at last create them into independent kingdoms which will one day overshadow and dwarf her into insignificance? No, surely not. True it is that the present state of things cannot long continue; but is colonial independence the alternative? We believe not. There is another course open for our consideration, which, although not absolutely perfect, is, we believe, preferable to either. This course, after glancing briefly at a colonial view of the empire as at present constituted, we will proceed to consider.

If the old-country man is dissatisfied with the state of things at present existing, the colonist is almost equally so.

While it is true that the colonies, and we are now speaking more especially of the colonies as distinguished from the dependencies, have all the self-government one would imagine they required, they are not exactly happy. As a Canadian, we will look at the question from a Canadian point of view.

Since the confederation of the British North American colonies nineteen years ago, a "national" spirit has been manifesting itself, and is each year on the increase. The Canadians glory in the fact that they are British *subjects*; but it is pointed out that at the same time they have not all the rights and privileges of British *citizens*. Though they have extensive self-governing powers, they have not a voice in the making of their treaties. However just their cause might be, they have no means of declaring war, neither can they prevent a war by which their country might be overrun and desolated. It is true at the same time that they are not put to the expense of a standing army, and that the *moral* protection of England has averted for them much trouble that otherwise might have befallen them. But it must also be remembered that whenever any trouble has occurred between England and the United States, Canada has always been the battle-ground, and should any matter occur in the future between these two powers which would necessitate recourse to arms, it would be Canada again that would bear the brunt of the battle.

This "national spirit" that is springing up is nothing but natural. It is her national spirit that has made England what she is, and it would be strange indeed had her colonial children become so degenerate that they did not inherit this from her

This spirit may be for good or it may be for ill. If it is fostered and directed into the right groove by England, it cannot fail to be a source of mutual strength to her and her colonies; but if it is repressed and trampled on, she must beware of the consequences. When her New England colonies exhibited this same spirit and asked that they might have representation in the British Parliament, to which as British citizens they were entitled, their request was contemptuously ignored, and eventually they left the parental roof in anger; whereas, had their request been met in a fair and common-sense manner, possibly the whole of North America would to-day acknowledge the sovereignty of Queen Victoria. It therefore remains to be seen whether England has learned a lesson from past experience and is willing to give her colonies a chance to exercise this spirit in a legitimate manner. There are various channels into which this sentiment may run, and it is for England to decide which it shall take. Canada cannot long continue as she is at present, this spirit is now too strong to admit of that. What then is her future? Independence; annexation to the republic to the south of her; or a readjustment of her relations with England? There is not much doubt that the first is analogous to the second, for were independence granted her, she would not remain in that condition long. With the metal and earthenware pots floating in the same stream, it is easy to judge the result; in short, independent Canada would soon become part of the American Union. In that Union she would enjoy equal privileges and rights with American citizens. Her national spirit would here find an opening and merge into that of the Americans, for she would then have full enfranchisement and be an *active* instead of a passive part of a great nation. The Americans are doing everything in their power to accomplish this result. Is England prepared to offer Canada the same as the United States does? Is she prepared to confer on her colonial subjects the full rights and privileges of British citizens? If she is, there is not the least question as to which Canada will adopt. She is loyal to the British Crown, and is, we believe, capable of fulfilling the new duties that would devolve upon her. And what may be said of Canada may be said, we believe also, of the other colonies. We have instanced Canada because she is the oldest

and most advanced in self-government of all the colonies, and is, perhaps, the least English of them, having a great deal in common with the United States. Australia would perhaps be in a better position to maintain her independence, were it granted to her, on account of her geographical position ; but would she prefer independence to being placed on an equal footing with the United Kingdom? We greatly mistake if she would.

But, it may be asked, is such a scheme practicable, and if practicable, is it not too *radical* to obtain the acceptance of the English people? And even suppose it were accepted by them, is it certain that such an arrangement will satisfy the national aspirations of the colonies? We will see.

We are, it gives us pleasure to say, a strong English Conservative, and are much opposed to any interference with the time-honoured British Constitution. But the colonies now present a problem that could not have entered into the minds of the statesmen who have been instrumental in developing the Constitution to its present form. It would be the height of folly for a man who found his business greatly increased in volume to refuse to enlarge his premises and staff in order adequately to transact it, simply because in his father's time the size of his buildings and the number of his staff were amply sufficient for the business of the firm. Besides, we believe the true conservative is he who looks ahead and endeavours to turn the stream of progress into the proper channel, instead of trying to check it. Instead of trying to confine steam, and so causing an explosion or revolution, the engineer uses it for the purpose of propelling the steam engine. And thus an element which improperly treated will cause fearful destruction, is, under proper management, made to minister to the wants of mankind. We hold that a scheme which will tend to consolidate and make firmer the foundations of our empire is essentially conservative, and will be more in accord with a conservative policy than the abandonment of the colonies.

As we propose to make the old-country man and the colonist equal, and give the colonist the same voice as the old-country man in the management of imperial affairs, there should be scope sufficient to satisfy the most exalted aspirations of the colonists.

We believe that with a scheme that accomplishes this they will be perfectly satisfied. More they cannot expect, and any proposition offering less we do not believe they would seriously entertain.

But how, it may be asked, is this to be accomplished? We reply, by federation. We cannot take up and examine all the schemes that have been enunciated under that name, but will proceed to the consideration of one that we think might without any serious difficulty be adopted, and produce good results. Of course fault may be found with any measure that has for its object the changing of the existing order of things, however well it may be prepared; but we believe that whatever may be the imperfections of our scheme, it will be better than the present state of affairs.

In the consideration of this matter we have no precedent to guide us. A number of *contiguous* States have frequently joined themselves into a confederacy for the purpose of mutual protection and defence or for commercial advantages; but as far as we are aware, no attempt has ever been made to federate communities thousands of miles apart from each other, varying in size from a very small island to a continent, and scattered throughout all parts of the world.

While we do not make it a *sine qua non*, we believe that colonial federation is a necessary adjunct to Imperial Federation, and for convenience in the consideration of our scheme, we shall divide the empire up into groups, each group composed of colonies which, from their geographical position and otherwise, we believe might advantageously confederate amongst themselves.

The various component parts that we have to federate fall into the following classes: 1. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 2. Those of the colonies who have self-government accorded to them, and are practically independent. 3. Crown Colonies; and, 4. Dependencies. It is, as we have before said, our object to secure for every British subject, no matter in what part of Her Majesty's dominions he may reside, his fair share in the government of the empire. In fact, if we do achieve less than this, we shall not have established an absolutely perfect federation. Nevertheless, however much we may strive to make our scheme conform to this principle, it will be

strange if *some* flaw cannot be found therein. In a work of such magnitude, with so many different interests to be taken into account and considered, it will be indeed a marvel if every one is satisfied. But we would remind objectors that the present state of affairs is exceedingly far from being perfect, so that a scheme in itself much short of perfection might nevertheless be worthy of consideration. We do not mean to say, however, that any plan should be adopted simply because it is better than the present; on the contrary, it is as well, if a change be made, that it should not take place until every possible scheme has been fully canvassed and the one that most nearly approaches the criterion decided upon. We are tempted to interpolate these remarks because we do not wish it to be considered that the various confederations which we shall form for the purpose of argument and illustrating our plan are vital points, and intended to be forcibly put into effect whether the component parts are willing or no. We are well aware, for instance, that colonial federation is a question involving local issues which would not be affected by the larger question of Imperial Federation, though we believe the two go hand in hand. Also we would say, that though we believe the figures we may have to quote are fairly approximate, we do not guarantee them to be absolutely correct, and only use them, as in the previous case, for the purpose of illustration.

We will proceed to divide the empire into seven groups. The first consists of the British Isles; the second, the American system; the third, the Australian system; the fourth, the South African system; the fifth, the West Indian system; the sixth, the Indian Empire; and the seventh, the remaining portions of the empire which, from their natural situation or comparative unimportance do not combine with any of the previous systems. The approximate population of the various groups is as follows:—

GROUP I.	.	.	.	.	.	36,000,000
„ II.	.	.	.	.	.	5,250,000
„ III.	.	.	.	.	.	3,500,000
„ IV.	.	.	.	.	.	1,750,000
„ V.	.	.	.	.	.	1,500,000
„ VI.	.	.	.	.	.	260,000,000
„ VII.	.	.	.	.	.	2,074,000
						<u>310,074,000</u>

The groups or systems are comprised as under :—

GROUP I.

England	Wales
Scotland	Ireland
and Islands.	

GROUP II.

The Dominion of Canada, consisting of the following :

Quebec	Prince Edward Island
Ontario	Manitoba
New Brunswick	British Columbia and the
Nova Scotia	North-west Territories.
Newfoundland.	

GROUP III.

New South Wales	Tasmania
Victoria	West Australia
New Zealand	Fiji Islands
South Australia	New Zealand.
Queensland	

GROUP IV.

Cape Colony  
Natal and other South African possessions.

GROUP V.

Jamaica	Leeward Islands
Windward Islands	Bahamas
British Guiana	Honduras
Trinidad	Bermudas.

GROUP VI.

India and Burmah	Ceylon.
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GROUP VII.

West African Settlements	Perim and Aden
Straits Settlements	Gibraltar
Mauritius	Labuan
Cyprus	St. Helena
Hong Kong	Heligoland
Malta	Falkland Islands.

GROUP I. consists of the oldest, the wealthiest, and most important parts of the British Empire ; in fact, until a comparatively recent date, it was all of which the empire proper consisted. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland possesses the finest form of government the world has ever seen, and it is on this form that the government of her colonies is for the most part modelled. The British Constitution as it now exists is the product of time. It has been gradually evolved and brought up to its present state of perfection by succeeding generations, and judging by the past, this process of evolution is likely to continue. For although there are many who will tell us that the Constitution has been preserved from time immemorial, and must continue to be preserved inviolable, as a matter of fact the Constitution, or rather the form of government, has been the subject of continual change. A glance at the past will fully show this to have been the case. Still, through all its transitions it is true that the same principles have remained fresh and vigorous, and in one sense it is the same. As Macaulay puts it: "The change, great as it is, which England's polity has undergone during the last six centuries, has been the effect of gradual development, not of demolition and reconstruction. The present constitution of our country is to the constitution which flourished five hundred years ago, what the tree is to the sapling, what the man is to the boy." Though we propose to take another onward step, the change we contemplate is by no means violent. It will doubtless be one of the most *important*, though not the most radical, that has for a long time taken place in our administrative system. The Parliament of the United Kingdom will remain exactly as at present ; there will be no occasion to disturb existing arrangements in that respect. Queen, Lords, and Commons will, under our scheme, occupy the same position as they do now, and perform almost the same functions. But inasmuch as Parliament has from time to time relieved itself of several duties, notably by the establishment of colonial legislatures, we propose still further to relieve it by the establishment of a superior council, which will have control of all matters of an imperial nature—that is, which affect the empire as a whole, and not the British Isles in particular,—and whose composition and duties will be found hereafter fully described,

leaving the Parliament to legislate on such subjects as solely affect the United Kingdom. We shall not define the composition and powers of this council until we have reviewed the various component parts of the empire, and pointed out certain alterations in their forms of government that we consider necessary for the more efficient working of our scheme. When we have, as it were, laid the foundations, we shall be in a better position to erect the superstructure. We deem it necessary, however, to state at this juncture that such a council is contemplated in order that the reader may not remain too long in the dark as to our ultimate intention.

GROUP II. consists of the oldest of the British colonies, and, except of course Group VI., is the next in point of population to the United Kingdom. If the form of government has been frequently modified in the motherland, changes equally great have been made in the constitution of this colony, or rather this confederation of colonies. The old provinces of Upper and Lower Canada have had the greatest changes. Many schemes for the harmonious working of the French and English provinces had been tried and failed ere the British North America Act formed the great Dominion of Canada. This Act has now been in operation for over nineteen years, and the success that has attended the federation of the British North American provinces has eclipsed the most sanguine expectations of its originators. Each succeeding year appears to knit closer the ties that bind its various members, and although one of the provinces has recently indulged in some wild talk about secession for the purpose of securing better terms for itself from the Dominion, the emphatic stand that all the other provinces have taken against any attempt to break up the union proves conclusively the firm root that Canada's constitution has taken in the affections of her people. Admirable however as this constitution is, there is one thing lacking. Ample as are the self-governing powers which it accords, Canadians have a natural and laudable desire to take the stand among nations which the size and importance of their country entitles them to. It is felt that although from a mercenary point of view the arrangement by which Canada enjoys the moral and practical protection of being a part of the British



Empire at the cost of the British taxpayer is not one that Canadians can grumble at, the present state of things cannot last for ever, and that soon Canada will be called upon either to provide for her own defence or pay her fair share towards the maintenance of the British army and navy. The former, to a young nation like Canada, would be a heavy and serious responsibility to shoulder, and one that Canada, owing to the extent of her territory, cannot possibly assume for many years to come; and in respect to the latter, Canada is not at all likely to submit to taxation without representation. It would be manifestly unjust that a territory having at present a population larger than either Scotland or Ireland, and which is rapidly increasing, should contribute its due share to the imperial revenue and be deprived of any voice as to how that revenue should be expended. Besides, what security would Canada have that Britain's power would be exerted in her cause when she judged it necessary? Supposing that a quarrel between Canada and the United States should occur, such as has recently been in progress respecting the fisheries question, it is not improbable that England would, if need be, allow Canadian interests to suffer rather than enter into a war of such magnitude as one with the American republic would be. Yet if Canada were contributing her fair share towards the imperial revenue, she would have a right to demand that her interests be not allowed to suffer any more than those of the United Kingdom. This right she would not be in a position properly to insist upon unless representation in the Imperial Parliament were accorded her, and her representatives allowed to take a part in the conduct of Imperial government. This would open for her the door which she finds shut against her. A Canadian statesman, if possessed of the necessary ability, might then wield the destinies of the great British Empire in the same manner as an Englishman, Scotchman, Irishman, or Welshman. What higher ambition than this could be open to her sons? Then truly would she be able to take her place amongst the nations of the world, and occupy a more exalted position than it would be possible for her to attain as an independent State. This it is that is necessary to complete her otherwise admirable constitution, and this right and privilege we propose to confer on her.

We have already said that we consider colonial confederation the handmaid to Imperial Federation, and while we wish it to be most distinctly understood that we do not wish in any way to force the various colonies into any arrangement of this kind that would be distasteful to them, we feel that we ought to submit to them a plan of colonial federation, in case they should be disposed to take advantage of it. We shall therefore give a brief sketch of the constitution conferred on Canada by the British North America Act, believing that it will serve, with various local modifications, as a model upon which the other groups can confederate. This is not an experimental scheme, but one that has borne the test of experience, and has succeeded in satisfying seven provinces, nearly all with different, if not conflicting, interests, the inhabitants of some being of an entirely different language, laws, customs, and religion to the others. One British American colony still stands aloof from this union, namely, Newfoundland, but there are indications that it will not be long ere she also applies for admission, especially if the scheme of Imperial Federation herein proposed is wholly, or in part, carried into execution.

The Parliament of Canada consists of the Queen, an upper house (the Senate) and a lower house (the House of Commons). Her Majesty is represented by a Viceroy, styled the Governor-General, who is appointed by the Imperial Government, and paid by the Parliament of Canada, and who is also commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces in the dominion. The Governor is advised by the Queen's Privy Council of Canada, or rather a committee thereof, the Cabinet, which is responsible to Parliament. The Senate is composed of members appointed for life, each province having a fixed number of representatives therein, and answers very much to the British House of Lords. The senators are appointed for life by Her Majesty. The House of Commons is also similar to the British Lower House, and is composed of representatives from the various counties and cities in all the provinces. The Commons have the sole right to introduce money bills, and any bill to become law must pass both Houses, and receive the assent of Her Majesty through his Excellency the Governor-General. Originally the franchise for the election of members was the same as that in use in each pro-

vince, but an Act has been recently passed making an uniform and very liberal franchise for the whole Dominion. A session of Parliament must be held once at least in each year, and the maximum duration of a Parliament is five years.

The subjects respecting which the Dominion Parliament may legislate are :—

1. The public debt and property.
2. The regulation of trade and commerce.
3. The raising of money by any mode or system of taxation.
4. The borrowing of money on the public credit.
5. Postal service.
6. The census and statistics.
7. Militia, military, and naval service and defence.
8. The fixing and providing for the salaries and allowances of civil and other officers of the Government of Canada.
9. Beacons, buoys, and lighthouses.
10. Navigation and shipping.
11. Quarantine and establishment and maintenance of marine hospitals.
12. Sea-coast and inland fisheries.
13. Ferries between a province and any British or foreign country, and between two provinces.
14. Currency and coinage.
15. Banking, incorporation of banks, and issue of paper money.
16. Savings banks.
17. Weights and measures.
18. Bills of exchange and promissory notes.
19. Interest.
20. Legal tender.
21. Bankruptcy and insolvency.
22. Patents of invention and discovery.
23. Copyrights.
24. Indians and lands reserved for Indians.
25. Naturalization and aliens.
26. Marriage and divorce.
27. The criminal law, except the constitution of courts of criminal jurisdiction, but including the procedure in criminal matters.

28. The establishment, maintenance, and management of penitentiaries.
29. Such classes of subjects as are specially excepted in the list of subjects assigned by the British North America Act to the legislatures of the provinces.

In addition to the above, the Dominion Parliament may legislate in respect to agriculture and immigration. Copies of all enactments made by the Dominion Parliament are, after receiving the assent of the Governor-General, forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and her Majesty may, within two years from receipt thereof, disallow any such enactment.

The Ministry is composed as follows :—

Minister of the Interior.

„ „ Finance.

„ „ Justice.

„ „ Public Works.

„ „ Railways and Canals.

„ „ Agriculture.

„ „ Customs.

„ „ Militia.

„ „ Marine and Fisheries.

Postmaster-General.

Minister of Inland Revenue.

Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs.

Secretary of State.

Besides the Federal Parliament, each province of the Dominion has its local legislature.

The representative of Her Majesty is the Lieutenant-Governor, appointed for five years, and paid by the Federal Government. The Lieutenant-Governor is advised by a Cabinet responsible to Parliament. The legislatures of Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia consist of only one house, an elected assembly ; those of Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island of two, an upper and lower. The upper, except in the case of Prince Edward Island, where it is elective, consists of members appointed by the Crown, and analogous to the Canadian

Senate; the lower, of members elected by the various counties and cities in each province. Each province has the right of enacting as to who shall exercise the franchise in provincial elections, and a legislative assembly cannot sit for longer than five years.

The subjects on which the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws are as under :—

1. The amendment from time to time, notwithstanding anything in the British North America Act, of the Constitution of the province, except as regards the office of Lieutenant-Governor.

2. Direct taxation within the province, for the raising of revenue for provincial purposes.

3. The borrowing of money on the sole credit of the province.

4. The establishment and tenure of provincial offices, and the appointment and payment of provincial officers.

5. The management and sale of the public lands belonging to the province and of the timber and wood thereon.

6. The establishment, maintenance, and management of public and reformatory prisons in and for the province.

7. The establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, charities, and eleemosynary institutions in aid for the province, other than marine hospitals.

8. Municipal institutions in the province.

9. Shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer, and other licences for the raising of revenue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes.

10. Local works and undertakings other than such as are in the following classes, which are under Dominion jurisdiction :—

(a) Lines of steam and other ships, railways, canals, and other works and undertakings connecting the province with other or others of the provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the province.

(b) Lines of steamships between the province and any British or foreign country.

(c) Such works as, although wholly situated within the province, are before or after their execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general advantage of Canada, or for the advantage of two or more of the provinces.

11. The incorporation of companies with provincial objects.
12. The solemnization of marriage in the province.
13. Property and civil rights in the province.
14. The administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance, and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in these courts.
15. The imposition of punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province made in relation to any matter coming within any of the classes above enumerated.
16. Generally, all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province.
17. Education.

Provincial Parliaments may also legislate respecting immigration and agriculture, provided their enactments are not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada in regard to these subjects.

Copies of all enactments made by each local legislature must be forwarded to the Governor-General, who may, if he see fit within one year of its receipt, disallow any provincial Act.

The appointment of judges, whose salaries are fixed and provided for by the Parliament of Canada, is vested in the Governor-General.

Each province receives from the Federal Treasury a fixed subsidy, payable half-yearly in advance, for the support of its government and legislature; and also an annual grant equal to 80 cents per head of its population as determined by a decennial census.

Though Canada has established a protective tariff upon nearly all her imports, the British North America Act provides that all articles of the growth produce or manufacture of any one of the provinces, shall from and after the union be admitted free into the other provinces.

There is one part of Canada that has no representation in the Dominion Parliament, and no provincial legislature; the north-west territories, consisting of the provisional provinces of Assiniboia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Athabaska. The population of these vast territories, ceded in 1870 by the Hudson's Bay Company to Canada, is yet too scattered to admit of each provisional province

having its separate legislature. The government of the territories is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor, assisted by a council, partly appointed and partly elected ; but if the stream of immigration continues to flow into them as rapidly as in the last five years, there is no doubt that the same form of government that the older provinces enjoy will be accorded them at an early date. Already an Act has been passed by the Federal and approved by the Imperial Parliament, giving them representation in the Dominion House of Commons, which will come into force at the next general election.

The harmony which exists between the Provincial and the Dominion Legislatures, and the Dominion and the Home Government, affords ample proof of the wisdom of England in acquiescing in the scheme of Canadian Confederation. Before confederation, British North America was composed of provinces divided by sectional jealousies and hostile tariffs, and each a source of weakness to the empire. Before a union could be effected, countless prejudices had to be combated and old feuds set at rest ; but through the wisdom and conciliatory spirit manifested by the leading statesmen of the contracting provinces, and the laying aside of party strife, these differences were at length overcome, and to-day Canada is becoming a bulwark of strength rather than a source of weakness to the mother-land, as is practically demonstrated by that magnificent undertaking, the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which has opened a safe and speedy road to India passing wholly through British territory, the importance of which, from a military as well as a commercial point of view, cannot be over-estimated. If then such good results are apparent after nineteen years of Colonial Federation, have we not good grounds for assuming that equally beneficial results would accrue were we to apply the same principle to the empire ?

We trust we shall be pardoned for dwelling at such length upon the Constitution of Canada, and that we shall not be considered to have done an injustice to the other self-governing colonies by not having devoted a like consideration to their internal modes of government. We have allowed the Constitution of the Dominion to occupy so much of our attention, because

it is similar to that which we propose for the empire, and because we have urged all the other colonies to accept it in principle.

GROUP III., consisting of the Australasian colonies, almost rivals Group II. in importance and population. In this group the progress of interfederation has been marked, although not to such an extent as in those we have just been speaking of. We are aware that many prejudices must be overcome before we can expect such a comprehensive scheme to be adopted as we see working so well in British North America, but we do not despair of seeing it finally consummated.

The principle has been practically accepted in the Act recently passed by the Imperial Parliament authorizing the establishment of an Australian General Council, and by the co-operation of the various colonies for defensive purposes. These measures, however, we do not consider as final. The geographical position of the colonies we have included in this group, and the similarity of their interests, both commercial and political, seem to demand their more complete unification. It is our belief that ere long they will find this a necessity. We do not believe they desire independence; but should independence be granted them, they would find in order to retain their independence that they would be compelled to effect a union of some sort. Divided, they would find it impossible to obtain any consideration from other States. Should any one of them enter into a treaty with a great foreign power, and that power see fit to break it, how would it be possible for the aggrieved colony effectually to obtain its enforcement? Neither could they successfully resist the encroachments of any power in Australasia, and we know that two at least of the great powers, even with the colonies under the potent protection of England, are striving hard to obtain a foothold in that part of the world. With that protection removed, and the colonies divided amongst themselves, it would no longer be necessary for them to veil their designs, and from annexing small and comparatively unimportant territory, they would turn their eyes to the acquisition of possessions of some real value. Under these circumstances, would the colonies disunited enjoy independence for long? Does any one suppose that the American colonies who threw off England's yoke in 1776 would have developed into the magnificent empire to-day



known as the United States of America unless they had confederated? Had they not done so, they would have either one by one been reconquered by England or other nations, or have deteriorated into the condition of the petty republics of Central and South America. We are no great admirer of American institutions, but even a prejudiced observer cannot but admit that the progress and success of the United States as a nation has been phenomenal, in spite of the disadvantages and weakness of some parts of their Constitution. This is accounted for by the fact that they have always shown a bold and united front to the world. So important did they deem their unity that they underwent one of the most sanguinary internecine struggles of modern times for the purpose of maintaining it.

But, it may be urged, although confederation would possibly be a necessity in the event of independence being granted—which is not only an unlikely thing, but a thing that Australians by no means desire—it is not so under the present condition of things. We would reply, however, that even should the existing relations with England remain unchanged, which they certainly cannot do for ever, the argument in favour of interfederation loses none of its force. Would England prefer her Australian colonies to remain as they are now rather than consolidated into one dominion, with a common militia, marine, tariff, and postal system? Not only would they when consolidated be rendered much easier of protection, not only would her diplomatic intercourse with them be much facilitated, but commercially they would be much more valuable. They would be enabled to undertake national works for the better development of their resources; these works would offer fields for the investment of British capital; their facilities for attracting immigration would be enlarged: and it would thus be found that not only would confederation benefit the mother-country, but the prosperity of the colonies themselves would be largely increased thereby.

From another point of view colonial federation is equally important. If the Australian colonies desire Imperial Federation and representation in a supreme council, will not their interests be likely to receive greater consideration and attention if their representatives are the representatives of united Australia, and not

simply of each individual colony? Will not the extra responsibilities which Imperial Federation will bring, be better borne by one dominion than by seven or eight colonies? These few reasons we commend to the Australasian colonies for their consideration; not from any selfish interests, but from a desire to see them in a position where they will add not only strength to themselves, but also to the other colonies of the British Empire, who view with pride and admiration the remarkable progress they have made and are still making as an integral portion of one great family, having the same ancestors, language, traditions and institutions, and which we hope to see ere long united by political as well as sentimental ties.

GROUP IV. consists, also, of possessions geographically adjacent and having very similar interests. It is not necessary again to adduce arguments in favour of Colonial Federation, but we believe it might be adopted by this group as well as the previous one, and for similar reasons. And in connection with this group, we would say that it will be noticed that in our grouping we have included some possessions that are not yet sufficiently advanced to warrant self-governing powers being conferred upon them. Thus, in the previous group we have included, for instance, New Guinea. Now it need not be inferred from this that we intend to make New Guinea an equal member of the Australian Confederation. And in the group now under consideration, it is not to be supposed that the native states are to be granted responsible government. It is our intention in such cases that the government of these dependencies shall be administered by the group of self-governing colonies with which they are classed, in much the same manner as that of the north-west territories is administered by Canada. Most of these dependencies, though sparsely settled by white people, offer under proper management either desirable fields for immigration, or are valuable for natural products and commercial purposes; consequently they could not be looked upon as a burden by the group with whom they are associated. We shall perhaps be pardoned if we again refer to Canada. The north-west territories, before the cession of them by the Hudson's Bay Company to Canada, were looked upon as absolutely valueless except for hunting. After their transfer to Canada, they were

found to consist of some of the finest agricultural lands in the American continent, if not in the world. Canada immediately set to work to make these lands accessible to immigrants by building a railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and went to great expense in developing the country. But although much expenditure was incurred, and one of the political parties of the Dominion was greatly opposed to this policy, the acquisition of the north-west, and the amount paid in developing it, has been one of the best investments ever made by Canada.

Such we believe will be found to be the case of some of the dependencies that we have placed under the control of our various sub-federations. Emigration will still continue from the Old World, and as the available fields to which at present it is directed will in course of time become filled up, new fields must be provided, and the group that has the largest area of unoccupied land, and is most successful in attracting immigrants, will become the most important.

GROUP V. comprises the West Indian possessions of Her Majesty. It may seem at first sight, owing to many of its component parts not having—in some cases not being sufficiently developed to have—responsible government conferred upon them, that our plan of Colonial Federation is not easily applied to this group. We admit that it cannot be so perfectly carried out as in the former groups, but it can be done enough to answer our purpose. Our object is to get a central legislature representing the West Indian possessions. This it would not be difficult to do. The various possessions would send representatives to this Parliament, which would legislate on much the same subjects as the other Federation Parliaments, and, in all cases where practicable, they would have their local assemblies to legislate on local matters. Where it might not be practicable, there is no reason why the Government of the dependencies should not be administered by officers appointed by the West Indian Federal Parliament, instead of by the Colonial Office as at present. No injustice would be done to any of the possessions by this means, and some of them would be made much more self-governing than they now are. We may remark that Jamaica, the most important of the group, not long ago applied for permission to enter the Dominion of Canada, which shows the value she sets upon the Federal Consti-

tution, and we do not anticipate that much objection would be raised to the plan we propose, by her at any rate.

In the last two of our groups, the federal system cannot be employed, for obvious reasons. In the Indian Empire the native population is quite unfit to exercise the franchise, and the possessions in the last group are mostly either military or coasting stations, which do not call for any change in the form of their government. The machinery of government now existing in the Indian Empire will very well accord with our proposed Imperial Federation scheme. Each province has its governor and council, and over these again is the Viceroy and superior council. The difference between this and the proposed Colonial Federation is that we intend the latter to be, as far as possible, elective. Subsequently we shall treat more fully of the relation of India to the empire. We might say, however, that it would be more convenient to our scheme were Ceylon made a province of the Indian Empire, in the same manner as Bombay, Madras, or Bengal.

Having thus, as it were, laid the groundwork in a reorganization of the colonial system of government, we judge it time to proceed to the federal constitution. We would say, however, that should this latter and most important part of our plan fail to meet with general approval, we have not the least doubt that the British Empire would be greatly strengthened and systematized were the colonies merely united into groups in the manner here indicated. It will be seen from what we have said, that the colonies, generally speaking, will have, as they now exist, a Government, representative or otherwise, legislating on local matters. Colonies contiguous to one another, or having a similar interest, will unite and have a central Government, whose duties have been previously indicated. It is our proposal that above these central Governments, or sub-federations, a still superior legislature should be placed, in which each group should have proportionate representation, whose province it should be to legislate on all matters of imperial concern, and such matters as are not delegated to the other legislatures.

The representation in this council, which will consist of one chamber, will be divided amongst the groups according to the amount of population each has jurisdiction over.

We will presume that each group is entitled to one member for 100,000 population. The number of members that each would have would be therefore, approximately :—

Great Britain	.	.	.	.	.	.	360
Canada and Newfoundland	.	.	.	.	.	.	52
Australasia	.	.	.	.	.	.	35
South Africa	.	.	.	.	.	.	17
West Indies	.	.	.	.	.	.	15

Of the representation of India and the scattered dependencies we shall have to speak later.

The manner in which these representatives shall be selected by the various groups is the next subject that demands our consideration.

Several modes of selection have presented themselves to us, none of which, we must candidly confess, are quite free from objections. The principal of these are :

1st. That each group should be divided into as many constituencies as it is entitled to representatives, and that each constituency should elect its own member.

2nd. That the Federal Parliament of each group should elect the representatives of that group.

3rd. That the electorate of each group should elect representatives who would meet in convention and select from among themselves the number of members that each group is entitled to in the supreme council.

Whilst the first mode is the most in accord with the English idea of representation, and would work admirably so far as Group I. is concerned, its adoption in respect of the other parts of the empire is totally impracticable, on account of the immense area of some of the constituencies that would be created, and their scattered population, the expense of securing returns, and the almost impossibility of inducing any candidate to contest an election in such cases.

That the Parliaments of the various sub-federations should select from their members the representatives to the superior council at first appeared to us the most feasible plan, but upon consideration we found many grave objections to it. The Colonial Parliaments

are elected on purely local issues, and the party that might represent the people on home questions would not necessarily reflect their views on imperial matters ; in fact, at present a man frequently votes for one party in provincial and for the opposite in federal questions, being of opinion that Toryism is best for the latter and Liberalism for the former, and *vice versa*. Indeed, the party lines are differently drawn in the colonies and in the United Kingdom. Because a man may be a Conservative or a Liberal in colonial politics, it does not follow that he will support a party of the same name in the Imperial Council. But there are other objections. The representatives to the Imperial Council, for obvious reasons, should not be allowed to remain members of their local Parliaments. Hence new elections would have to take place to fill the vacancies created by their removal, and in the event of a dissolution of the Colonial Parliament the imperial representatives would, if not re-elected, lose their seats in both the imperial and colonial house. Moreover, this would create so much confusion that the colonies would never submit to it, neither do we think would Great Britain ; for consider what it would be to take 360 members out of the British, 52 from the Canadian, or 35 from the Australian Parliaments. If these were selected from the really best men, and those most qualified to sit in the Imperial Council, we are inclined to think that what was left would not be of very high calibre. No Home Government could exist under such circumstances. Our acquaintance with colonial politics leads us to suspect that as the members of the superior council would soon become the nominees of the colonial federal governments, it would become a receptacle for broken-down party hacks, whose days were gone by in the local political arena. These are a few of the objections ; space forbids us dealing more fully with them ; but others will, we fancy, suggest themselves to those who give the matter a little consideration.

The third mode may be objected to as an innovation, but, failing the first, is the only true way to secure fair representation for the colonies in imperial matters. It calls for little new machinery. The electors in each constituency sending members to the Colonial Federal Parliament will elect one representative in the same manner as they elect their ordinary Members of Parlia-

ment. These representatives will then assemble in convention, and select from among themselves the number of members the group is entitled to send to the Imperial Council. The cost of such election should be defrayed by the constituency, not including, of course, the personal expenditure of the candidates seeking election; and each member should be entitled to receive from the federal government his travelling expenses in going to and from the convention, and a certain amount, to be fixed by law, for each day the convention is in session. Members of the Federal Parliaments might be elected to the conventions; but in the event of their being elected to the Imperial Council, they should forfeit their seats in the federal house, except in the case of peers of the United Kingdom, who would continue to hold their seats in the House of Lords.

As population is dense in the United Kingdom, and 360 constituencies of moderate size might easily be created, there would be no objection to Group I. electing its representatives directly, without the aid of a convention, if the latter method of election proved distasteful. We are convinced, however, that some sort of convention system must be adopted by the colonies. In any scheme of Imperial Federation, the problem how to give the colonies proper representation must be solved, and we are of opinion that this is one of the fairest and least cumbersome methods that can be devised; we have not yet, at least, seen any other suggestion more feasible.

As the representatives of the outlying parts of the empire would be put to considerable expense to reach London, at which place the superior council would of course hold its sittings, the various Federal Parliaments should defray the travelling expenses of their representatives. They might also, if they deemed it advisable, pay them a certain indemnity during the time the Council was in session.

The Council should be dissolved at the end of either five or seven years—we are inclined to favour the shorter period—and should hold a session at least once each year. Her Majesty would, of course, retain her prerogative of dissolving it when she deemed fit, at any time before the expiration of that period. Any British subject, upon subscribing the usual oath, should be eligible

to sit as a member, and members should not be subject to any property qualification. The privileges of the Council should be the same as those of the British House of Commons, except that members of the House of Lords should be eligible for election thereto.

The superior council—or, rather, we should call it the Imperial Parliament of the British Empire—being supposed to be constituted, on what subjects shall it be competent to legislate? Being more of an advisory and deliberative assembly than a legislative body, its legislative functions will not be very onerous. The Queen would retain the prerogative of making peace and war, the right of sending ambassadors, of making treaties, and of regulating and raising fleets and armies; and would, as now, be guided in such measures by the advice of her Cabinet Council. But those members of the Privy Council advising her on these points would be members of, and be responsible to, the Imperial Council, or, as we shall now call it, the “Imperial Parliament,” in contradistinction to the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland.

The Cabinet might consist of the following officers, viz. :—

The President of the Council.

„ Chancellor of the Exchequer.

„ Secretary of State for Great Britain.

„ „ „ Canada.

„ „ „ Australia.

„ „ „ South Africa.

„ „ „ the West Indies and Dependencies.

„ „ „ India.

„ „ „ Foreign Affairs.

„ „ „ War.

„ „ „ Admiralty.

Each group of the federation would thus have a department to look after its particular interests, in the same manner as in the British Parliament there is a Secretary for Scotland, Ireland, Indian, Colonial, and Home Affairs. The President of the Council would probably be the Premier; the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would fulfil the functions which the minister of that title



in the British Parliament now performs ; the duties of the Secretaries for War and the Admiralty would be similar also to those of the Minister of War and the First Lord of the Admiralty ; and the finances of the empire would be under the control of a Financial Minister, or Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Ministers of War, Admiralty, and Foreign Affairs would no longer be required in the British Cabinet.

The Cabinet would be, as we have said, responsible to the Imperial Parliament, as the present British Cabinet is to the British Parliament.

The army and navy, and everything connected therewith, would hereafter be under the control of the Imperial Parliament. All vessels of war, arms, accoutrements, and everything connected with the management of the military and naval service, would be handed over to the Imperial Government ; and the latter would assume a proportion, say two-thirds, of the National Debt. On this we shall speak further at a later stage of our paper. The relations of any part of the empire with foreign States, and the making of treaties, commercial or otherwise, would pertain solely to the imperial authority.

The manner in which the Imperial Parliament shall raise its revenue is another point for consideration. The various Federal Parliaments, including that of the United Kingdom, will have it in their power to impose tariffs, or to adopt whatever fiscal policy they may deem most suitable to their interests. They may, subject to the approval of the Imperial Parliament, enter into commercial treaties one with another, for the better interchange of their various products, though treaties with foreign States will be made by the Imperial Parliament. We consider it chimerical to expect that it is possible for the present, at any rate, to form a commercial federation of the empire, and for this reason have left the various federations free to adopt whatever regulations they may think will conduce to the most satisfactory development of their resources and industries, and the general well-being of their population. We have no doubt that it will be found advisable and desirable to have as uniform a system as possible amongst all portions of the empire ; but this is a matter that will right itself, and cannot be regulated by legislation, for the colonies

will be sure to resent any interference with the fiscal policy they have rightly or wrongly chosen for themselves ; and so we think would the United Kingdom also.

Since the empire will be deprived of any revenue that might accrue were this matter under its control, some other means must be found to provide for carrying on its government. The best means is, we think, for the Imperial Parliament to assess the population of each of the federations at so much per head, which amount will be paid into the imperial treasury by the respective Federal Parliaments. The Imperial Government would bring down its estimates ; and when it was found how much would probably be required for the year, a uniform rate could be struck, based on the population each federation had at the time of the taking of the last census. The census would be taken decennially by the Federal Parliaments, under the supervision of an officer appointed by the Imperial Government ; and if the population of any group had increased sufficiently, they should be entitled to proportionate additional representation in the Imperial Parliament ; and if it had decreased, their representation would be proportionately diminished.

The maintenance of the royal family should be divided between the British and Imperial Parliaments. We are not prepared to state the relative proportion that each should pay ; but whilst Her Majesty would be the head of the empire, she would also be Queen of Great Britain and Ireland ; and while all the other parts of the empire would be governed by her viceroys, she would still maintain the position she now holds in respect to the British Isles. It would be only fair, therefore, as all the other parts of the empire would pay for the maintenance of their viceregal courts in addition to what they paid for the support of Her Majesty as head of the empire, that the British Parliament should be required to contribute to the support of Her Majesty as Queen of Great Britain.

The Imperial Parliament would be able to borrow money for imperial purposes, and, as we have suggested, assume a proportion of the National Debt of Great Britain. As a great part of this debt was incurred in acquiring and protecting the colonies and dependencies, they cannot complain if they are asked to

liquidate part of it. Besides, the empire would receive valuable assets in the shape of the British navy, the dockyards, arsenals, etc., which have cost the British taxpayer a vast amount of money. We do not say the empire should assume the whole of the debt, as some of it was incurred for purely British purposes. What exact proportion each should bear would be the subject of mutual arrangement, although we have suggested, for the purpose of illustration, that the Imperial Parliament should bear two-thirds and the British one-third.

Our remarks on the proposal to levy a rate per head on the population of the various sub-federations is intended to apply only to groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. India and the dependencies must be treated separately. The interests of India are so great that they certainly should have representation in the Imperial Parliament; but, as we have pointed out, it is impossible to give India representation on the same basis as the others. We must, therefore, make an arbitrary distinction, and we propose that, say, twenty members shall be sent to the Imperial Council by the Government of India. As India will not thus have representation by population, she should not be taxed according to her population. We would, therefore, suggest that she pay into the imperial treasury a percentage upon her revenue, and maintain her own army. The dependencies will be governed by the Imperial as they are now by the British Government. Should any dependency have the requisite number of inhabitants, it may be permitted, on signifying its desire, to send a representative or representatives, as the case may be, to the Imperial Parliament, and shall then pay its share of taxation like the rest.

Having thus shown, in a very crude and rough manner, the groundplan of our scheme, we will glance at the elevation. We will reverse our previous order, and commence from the top instead of from the foundations.

Above all we see Her Imperial Majesty, the ruler of the greatest of ancient or modern empires, assisted and advised in the conduct of the affairs of that empire by a Cabinet responsible to an Imperial Parliament, which Parliament is composed of representatives from each component part of the empire. The empire is divided into groups, each group comprising certain

parts which are geographically adjacent, and whose interests are similar, and having a Parliament supreme in all matters outside those of imperial concern. The majority of these groups are sub-divided into provinces, such provinces having local legislatures dealing with matters of purely provincial interest.

Is there anything in such a plan that is repugnant to common sense? are the principles of constitutional government violated in any manner. Is it not far more logical, consistent, and equitable than the present cumbersome, incongruous and inequitable system?—if, indeed, anything so utterly unsystematic may be termed a system? We would ask that all sectional and petty feelings and prejudices be laid aside, and this scheme be discussed on its merits. We regret that space will not allow us to enter more fully into details, because we know that a scheme, though theoretically reasonable, may be condemned as not practically workable. Some objections we have been able to anticipate and consider; many will doubtless be raised that we have not discussed. These, however, we are prepared to meet and answer. We do not say that the scheme we have propounded may not be advantageously amended in some minor details; but in our opinion any scheme of Imperial Federation to be successful and give satisfaction must be based on the general principles here laid down.

We have heard it proposed by some that it would be sufficient to give representative colonists seats as life peers in the House of Lords; by others that Agents-General of the several colonies should form an advisory board in London, and be consulted on all matters in which the colonies were interested; and by others that the colonies should send representatives to the British House of Commons, who would sit and vote only on imperial questions. We do not desire to go out of our way to disparage any scheme that has for its object the closer connection of the colonies and the mother-country, but we would venture to point out that none of the above proposals really solves the question of Imperial Federation. When a man moves from one part of the United Kingdom to another, he does not lose his privilege of taking part in directing the affairs of the nation; why then should a man when he moves to the colonies, where he is still a British subject, be

deprived of any voice in the management of affairs which still affect him as much as when he remained in the United Kingdom? This is one of the anomalies which Imperial Federation, if it really be federation, must remove. The idea of a few colonists sitting in the House of Lords, is to a colonist absurd. What the colonies, if they contribute to the revenue of the empire, will expect and demand, is representation in the House that controls the public purse. In regard to the second proposal, the Agents-General; although doubtless first-class men, cannot really be said politically to represent in imperial matters the colonies whose business they are sent to transact. True they are usually appointed by the colonial governments from amongst their political supporters, and thus doubtless represent public opinion on colonial matters. But from this it does not follow that they would echo the voice of their respective colonies on imperial subjects. Even if they were able to give advice according to the opinions of the majority of their fellow-colonists, there is no guarantee that such advice would be acted upon; in fact, if by following it a Ministry would be likely to render itself unpopular to the British public, it is exceedingly probable that it would be disregarded.

As to the proposal to allow representatives from the colonies to sit in the British House of Commons, the difficulties in the way of having such a class of members in that assembly have been fully shown in the recent debates on Mr. Gladstone's Bill for the future government of Ireland, and it is not necessary for us to recapitulate them. Not only would the House of Commons be increased to an unwieldy size if the colonies were granted their proportionate share of representation, but deadlocks would constantly occur. The colonial members as a body might doubtless approve the imperial policy of a Government whose home policy was condemned by the British members. In this case, the Government would find themselves able to command a majority on imperial matters, but would be in a minority on home matters, or *vice versa*. It is very difficult, too, to decide under such circumstances where the line of demarcation between imperial and other subjects should be drawn. Take for instance a motion for the abolition of the House of Lords. It might be urged, on one

side, that this was an imperial subject, and on the other that it simply affected British interests. Under our proposed system this question would not come up, as it would clearly be for the British group to say whether they preferred two Houses or one, and the decision would in no way alter or affect the imperial policy. The scheme to give the colonies representation in the present British Parliament is, however, so beset with difficulties that we will not further consider it. From such as we have indicated our plan is at least free. By separating the conduct of imperial affairs from that of matters simply affecting the United Kingdom, we leave the British Parliament entirely free to regulate its own internal matters as seems best to it. It would, as we have before stated, be in fact the same as at present, consisting of Queen, Lords, and Commons, and might amend or change its constitution in any manner that suited it, without interfering in any way with imperial matters. We should certainly regret to see such things done, but it would really make no difference to the colonies or the Imperial Council if the United Kingdom chose to disestablish the national Church, abolish the House of Lords as a part of the legislature, or carry out any of the violent changes that demagogues are fond of agitating. If it were deemed advisable in the interests of the United Kingdom to constitute a separate Parliament for Ireland, or in fact for each of the three kingdoms, after the model of the federal and provincial houses which we intend the groups of colonies to have, it is not at all likely that the Imperial Parliament would disallow any Act or Acts passed for that purpose if it were clearly the desire of the United Kingdom. It is obvious, however, that the Imperial Parliament could not initiate such measures.

We refrain altogether from expressing an opinion as to whether it would be for the advantage of Great Britain to adopt a Constitution similar to that we have outlined for the colonies, believing that this is a question she must decide for herself. It certainly is immaterial to our scheme of Imperial Federation, whether she does that or retains the mode of government under which she has prospered in the past. We are aware that any attempt on the part of colonists to dictate to the mother-land as to her own internal affairs would be as much resented as any attempt on her

part to interfere with colonial autonomy. And the difficulties in the way of Imperial Federation are already sufficient, without creating unnecessary opposition.

Having outlined our scheme, we may probably be asked what steps should be taken to carry it into effect?

In our opinion an invitation should be sent from the British Government to all the other Governments comprising the British Empire, inviting them to send delegates to a convention to be held in London, for the purpose of considering the condition of the empire, and devising, if possible, a scheme for the federation of it. No cut-and-dried scheme should be forced upon this convention, but the matter should be fully discussed, and a committee appointed to draft a series of resolutions; these resolutions would be submitted to the convention, who would discuss and probably amend some of them. Before dissolving they would adopt certain resolutions setting forth the results of their deliberations and, if they found Imperial Federation feasible, containing the basis of a scheme for its consummation, upon which they were all agreed. The delegates would then return and induce their legislatures to adopt the same resolutions as had been passed by the convention. Upon this being done, an Act in accordance with these resolutions would be passed by the British Parliament, and, on proclamation by Her Majesty, the scheme provided by it would come into force.

In the meantime, public opinion must be educated and prepared for the change. Our opinion is that this can best be done by submitting to the public, through the press and otherwise, any schemes that may be propounded, having for their object the federation of the empire. It has been urged that as yet no schemes should be brought forward; that the public should be brought first to consider the desirability which exists for such a federation. We have asked many people the question, What do you think of Imperial Federation? The reply has almost invariably been, "Well, Imperial Federation is all right *if it is practicable*. If you can prove that to us, we have no objection to it." As a matter of fact, most people admit in the abstract that a closer connection between England and her colonies is desirable. The days when it was the fashion to regard the colonies as a dead

weight on the mother-country, and to advocate their abandonment, have gone by, and quite the contrary feeling is now manifested.

The plan of Imperial Federation which will eventually meet with general acceptance must be evolved. The only way to do this is to have the possible plans thoroughly ventilated and criticised, and their weaknesses and imperfections unsparingly pointed out. From the ruin of these plans will arise others more perfect, which will pass through the crucible of public criticism and come forth defecated and freed from their dross and impurities. By these means the defective schemes will one by one drop out, until the public choice is narrowed down to perhaps one or two; the time for the convention will then have arrived, and we may trust that by it the best possible plan will be selected.

If in our essay we have advanced but one idea that may be grasped by a master hand, and welded with others into a complete whole, we shall have good cause for self-gratulation; for, as we have said, it is impossible for any one individual to devise a perfect scheme, and it should be the duty of every true Briton, instead of insisting upon his own particular crotchet, to assist to his utmost in bringing about a result that will give as nearly as possible universal satisfaction.

We know we need not appeal to British patriotism in vain. There is a tide in the affairs of nations, as well as in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. That tide is now on the flow for us; shall we let it ebb without taking advantage of it? Is this jubilee year in the reign of the greatest and best of England's sovereigns, a year when distinguished representatives of our transoceanic possessions are flocking to our metropolis to gaze upon the concentrated proofs of our empire's greatness—is this year, we say, to pass without a step, and a very long step, being taken to effect a political as well as a sentimental tie, a tangible instead of an invisible union between Britain and her colonial children?

By a long step we do not necessarily mean any legislative action—legislative action, if premature, will defeat the end it has in view—but rather a renewed activity on the part of the advocates of Imperial Federation, a vigorous crusade to educate public



opinion both in England and the colonies, and a plentiful sowing of the good seed which, if judiciously and carefully cultivated, will bring forth such a glorious harvest.

In the patriotism and good sense of the colonies we have equal confidence. With them rests chiefly the consummation of this great scheme. They may rest assured that England will not attempt to force any measure of this kind upon them. Imperial Federation, to be a success, must be a real federation, and not a hollow, artificial union of unwilling and lukewarm members. Such a union would be mischievous to the best interests of all parties concerned, and the surest way to ruin the empire. Federation, to be a success, must be brought about by spontaneous action on the part of the colonies and the mother-country. Public opinion in the colonies absolutely needs education on the subject; and this education must be undertaken by colonists themselves. Already the opponents of Imperial Federation in the colonies are stating to the public that it is but a dream of British politicians and Downing Street officials; that it is but a scheme to ease the British taxpayer at the expense of the colonist; and that it is but another name for a Zollverein of the British Empire, whereby colonial industries will be ruined for the benefit of British manufacturers. The objectors are not insignificant, and a very great portion of the colonists have not yet given the matter serious consideration. To refute the objections raised by the first class, and to present the subject so that the latter must take cognizance of and develop an interest in it, must be the work of its advocates for the present: and their motto must be "*suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.*" When the colonies fairly consider the matter, we have no doubt as to the result. The average colonist, though opposed to innovation simply for the sake of change, is ever ready to grasp any scheme for improvement. Whilst truly Imperial Confederation will confer advantages on England, the advantages to the colonies will be equally great. It will not be for them, as some near-sighted and narrow-minded individuals allege, a scheme by which they will give all and receive nothing. They will enjoy all the advantages of independence in the management of their own affairs, combined with the benefits which accrue from being integral parts of the greatest of nations.

As independent States they would each have to maintain military and diplomatic establishments, costing them far more than the contribution they will be required to pay to the imperial exchequer, to which they cannot reasonably demur,—for surely no *English* colony desires to shirk the duty of providing for its defence. We might, were we so disposed, continue to enumerate the advantages of Imperial Federation to both the old and young portions of the empire ; but as it is our object simply to set forth a scheme which we think workable *should the whole of the empire decide in favour of Federation*, we forbear.

In this scheme we have endeavoured to maintain whatever parts of the present system can safely be retained, to introduce nothing but what experience has proved to be in accordance with British constitutional government, to give to each part of the empire perfect autonomy in its local affairs, at the same time uniting them into one imperial whole ; and to strengthen and solidify an empire which transcends all others, of ancient or modern times, in grandeur and magnificence ; to be a citizen of which will be a passport throughout the whole world, securing for the fortunate possessor all, and more than all, the homage and privileges accorded to the ancient Roman when he made the proud boast, "*Civis Romanus sum.*"

No. V.

By C. V. SMITH,

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## IMPERIAL FEDERATION.

(See Motto, next page.)

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## IMPERIAL FEDERATION:

SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE MODE IN WHICH IT CAN BE  
CARRIED INTO EFFECT.

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*"There is not the least probability that the British Constitution would be hurt by the Union of Great Britain with her Colonies. That Constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it."*—  
ADAM SMITH, "Wealth of Nations," bk. iv. chap. vii.

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## PART I.

## FEDERATION OR INCORPORATION.

*Statement of the Question.*

THE political problem, which is popularly known by the name of Imperial Federation, has, during the last few years, advanced by rapid strides from stages in which, first, its expediency, and then its practicability, were moot points, to a position in which these are all but universally conceded, and the only question remains as to the best means of carrying it into effect. The popular name of the problem, though unavoidable in the absence of a more appropriate, succinct designation for it, is unfortunate, as tending to disguise the real object which it is desired to attain. That object is, in the first place, the admission of the colonies to an adequate share in the direction of the affairs of the British Empire as a whole, and in the burdens and responsibilities, as well as the prestige and privileges, which that direction involves; and in the next place, as the end and purpose of this admission of the colonies, the permanent security of the empire against attack from without and disruption from within. This admission of the colonies, however, can be accomplished in one of two ways: either (*a*) by Federation, which would involve the construction of a new Imperial Constitution, of what is technically known as the *rigid* type; or (*b*) by Incorporation of the colonies into the existing English Constitution, as contemplated by Adam Smith in the passage which has been prefixed as a motto to the present essay. This Incorporation would in-

volve a further alteration of our present Constitution, which has been already many times modified, and is capable of indefinite additional modifications; but it would not require the creation of any new political organism, and, after the operation had been performed, the Constitution would remain of the same *flexible* type as it is at present. The first point, therefore, to be decided in the present inquiry, is whether the desired object can best be attained by Federation or Incorporation. In determining this point, we are bound to consider not only which process will most perfectly effect the purpose which we have in view, but also which process can be carried out with the least amount of friction and difficulty. A little consideration will satisfy us that, while there is very little, if any, difference between the two methods as regards their capacity for achieving and maintaining the desired consolidation of the empire, the method of Incorporation is by far the most obvious to adopt and the most easy to accomplish.

### *Conditions of the Problem.*

The question before us, like all other political questions, is one which it is idle to discuss in the abstract. If we did so, we should probably come to a conclusion diametrically opposite to that which is warranted by the facts. We must take into account and give due weight to all the various circumstances of the case. We must have regard to the physical conditions of the problem on the one hand, and to the peculiar characteristics of the English race on the other; and, above all, to the existing political organizations which it will be necessary either to supplant or to alter. If we had a sheet of white paper before us, if the field was unoccupied and ready to be included in a brand-new Imperial Constitution, it would be comparatively easy to draw up a scheme which would be faultless in theory and workable in practice. We should probably propound something after the model of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, with an hereditary monarchy in place of an elective presidency, and with such other improvements as experience would suggest. But our sheet of paper is not blank, our field is not unoccupied. The existence of the various colonial Constitutions which have, during

the last fifty years, been created by Parliament, would afford no great obstacle to the introduction of an entirely new organization, and they could even be incorporated in almost, if not quite, their present shape into a scheme of Imperial Federation. But the great and, in the opinion of the present writer, insuperable barrier to the adoption of any such scheme is the English Constitution, and particularly the position and power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom under that Constitution. In order to appreciate this, it will be necessary briefly to notice the distinctive characteristics of a Federal Constitution on the one hand, and the English Constitution on the other. We shall then see the difficulty, amounting well-nigh to an impossibility, of effecting a transformation from the latter to the former.

### *Characteristics of a Federal Constitution.*

The characteristics of a Federal Constitution may be best understood by observing its working in the cases of Switzerland and the United States. A Federal State was defined by the late Mr. W. E. Forster as a State which, in its relation to foreign countries, formed but one nation, but in its internal relations consisted of many nations. This definition is not absolutely correct. Neither the Cantons of Switzerland nor the States of the American Union have unfettered control over their internal affairs. Until the alteration of the Swiss Federal Constitution, which was effected in 1879, no Canton had the power of imposing the penalty of death for the commission of any crime, however heinous; and at the present day no American State is at liberty, under the Constitution of the Union, to establish slavery within its borders. It is, however, true that a large, though not complete, autonomy on the part of each constituent State, in the regulation of its home matters, is an essential characteristic of a Federal nation. But the main distinguishing features of its Constitution are: (i.) that the Federal Assembly is not possessed of sovereign power; (ii.) that the Supreme Tribunal of the Federation is invested with the power and duty of judging as to the legality of the measures enacted by the Federal Assembly, and of disregarding them if it considers them illegal;

and (iii.) that in consequence of the two features just mentioned, and of the provisions in the Constitution by which they are supplemented, the Constitution, though not absolutely unalterable, is, as has been already observed, of a *rigid* type.

(i.) *The Sovereign Power.*—As regards sovereign power, it is of the essence of a Federation that this should not be vested in the Federal Assembly. Although, as we have seen, the federated States do not remain absolutely independent as regards the management of their internal concerns, they yet retain their autonomy to a large extent. But besides this, they remain as integral and constituent factors in the Federation. That expression implies, etymologically, a treaty or compact between the States which are united under it; and this treaty or compact is not a mere nominal one, but lies at the root of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, if it is desired to alter the Constitution, or, in other words, to vary the compact of which it is the embodiment, the parties to the compact must be consulted and their consent obtained. The representatives of the different States in the Federal Assembly are not deemed qualified to give consent on behalf of the States for this purpose. It can only be obtained by a reference to the States themselves in their corporate capacity, or to the aggregate population composing the States. In Switzerland the latter practice is adopted; and if an alteration of the Constitution is desired, the proposal is referred to the decision of a direct vote of the whole population. It was thus that the change in it was effected as to the penalty of death, to which allusion has been already made. The Constitution of 1874, which is that now existing in Switzerland, had abolished that penalty; but in May, 1879, it was decided by a majority of 195,000 against 180,000 that each Canton should have liberty to re-enact its infliction within the cantonal limits. In the American Union, on the other hand, any proposed amendment of the Constitution, while it must in the first instance receive the approval of both Houses of Congress, can only become law if it is ratified by a majority of three-fourths of the States, acting through their legislatures, or through conventions specially summoned together for the purpose of accepting or rejecting the amendment. The consequence is that in each country the Federal Assembly or Congress is not

a sovereign body, but can only act and make laws within the limits of the existing Constitution. The absolute sovereign power resides in the one case in the people at large, and in the other in the aggregate of the States, but so that it can only be called into action in the one case by a *referendum* or reference from the Federal Assembly, and in the other by the votes of a two-thirds majority in each House of Congress.

(ii.) *The Federal Tribunal*.—As a necessary accompaniment of this absence of sovereign power in the Federal Assembly, the Supreme Federal Tribunal must be invested with the prerogative of sitting in judgment on the proceedings of the Federal Assembly, and deciding as to the legality or illegality of its measures. While, therefore, the position of the supreme court of justice, and of the judges who sit in it, is one of great importance and responsibility in all large States, it is doubly so in States where the Constitution is federal, since in these it is charged with the duty not only of interpreting the law as between individuals and between the Government and an individual, but also of determining whether a particular law of the federal legislature has been constitutionally enacted or not. It has also, of course, the function of determining disputes as to jurisdiction between the legislatures of the different constituent States, and between any one of these and the federal legislature; but a parallel to this function may be found in non-federal States, in the duty of the courts to decide on the validity of the bye-laws and proceedings of local bodies which have been invested with limited authority. It is needless to say that in both Switzerland and the United States the greatest care is exercised in the selection of the judges of the Supreme Court or Federal Tribunal. In Switzerland, so great is the jealousy felt respecting their office, that they are elected by the Federal Assembly for the limited period of six years.

(iii.) *Rigidity of the Constitution*.—It follows from the inability of the Federal Assembly to alter the Federal Constitution, that this Constitution is of a *rigid* type; that is to say, that alterations in it can only be made with great difficulty. That such is the case in the United States of America, is evident from the special difficulties which, as has been stated, have been design-



edly placed in the way of its amendment, by requiring the assent of substantial majorities of the parties and bodies interested in it, before any alteration can become law. And it may be added, that the individual States have copied the example of the Federal Constitution, and have placed artificial difficulties in the way of changes of their own State Constitutions. But experience has shown that the difficulty of altering the Constitution is no less great in Switzerland, where a *plebiscite* is required to effect it. As already mentioned, an alteration was effected in 1879; but several others, the adoption of which might have been expected, have been rejected by the popular vote; and it is not, upon reflection, surprising that such should have been the case. Approval of a principle is one thing, and approval of the precise formula or mode by which it is proposed to carry it out, is another. When it is not the former but the latter which is put to the vote, and the people are required to say "aye" or "no" to it, without the power of changing one letter of the exact proposition submitted for their approval, the *maximum* of opposition to the proposal is distinctly courted; while only those will support it who recognise in it their own particular shibboleth.

### *Characteristics of the English Constitution.*

The English Constitution, as it prevails at present throughout the whole British Empire, stands out in marked contrast to Federal Constitutions in every important particular. It did not, like them, originate in a compact between equal independent States, but developed slowly and, it may almost be said, spontaneously with the growth of the English nation. It is true that twice in its history it has been modified by a treaty between the Supreme Legislature for the time being, and a co-ordinate independent Parliament; but each of these treaties resulted in the extinction of the independent body, and the absorption of it and of the country under its jurisdiction into the Parliament and political organization which represented the English Constitution. Under this Constitution (i.) the deposit of the sovereign power, and (ii.) the position of the supreme tribunals, are essentially different from what we have seen them to be in the case of Federal States, and,

in consequence, (iii.) the Constitution is endowed with unlimited flexibility.

(i.) *The Sovereign Power.*—Under the English Constitution the sovereign power is absolutely vested in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or, to speak with more technical accuracy, in the king (or queen) in Parliament. Theoretically there are no limits to the exercise of this sovereign power by Parliament, except those which are imposed by the physical laws of nature and by the metaphysical conditions under which all human affairs are conducted. Parliament, of course, cannot alter the order of the seasons. We do not require to be reminded of that. But the impossibility of infringing metaphysical laws is not so obvious; and our Parliament has in past ages attempted to do what, as the result has shown, was beyond its power, namely, to place irremovable fetters upon the exercise of its own supreme authority, while still, by virtue of our Constitution, retaining that supreme authority intact. Thus it has attempted to enact that a certain statute, which it had passed, should be incapable of repeal for all time. It was, however, long ago perceived and enunciated by Sir Edward Coke, that such an enactment was beyond the power of Parliament to make, and that its existence in our statute book was no bar, in the very slightest degree, to the power of Parliament at any future period to alter or repeal at pleasure the statute to which it had reference. The Irish Government Bill of the late Administration lay open to the same charge of attempting the impossible. It proposed, while retaining the sovereign power of the Parliament at Westminster intact, to render the provisions of the Bill unalterable by that Parliament except with the consent of the new Irish Legislature, or after Parliament had for the nonce been swelled by a contingent of Irish members. The theoretically unlimited authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom extends to every part of the British Empire; whence it is popularly known as the Imperial Parliament. It has never yet, however, been authoritatively dubbed with that name, though this was proposed to be done by the Irish Government Bill. It has theoretically, by virtue of this authority, absolute power to alter to any extent and even repeal, not only all laws made by any of the colonial legislatures,

but also the very statutes which created those legislatures and gave to our large colonies their present local autonomy. This power of altering the colonial Constitutions has, at the desire or with the consent of the colony interested, been more than once actually exercised. And lest any doubt should exist as to the concurrent power of the Imperial Parliament to make laws which should be binding on a colony, although relating to a subject upon which the colony had been expressly authorised to legislate for itself by the local Constitution with which it had been endowed, this power was expressly affirmed by an Act passed in 1865, during the last year of Lord Palmerston's life and administration. Practically, however, there are, of course, other limits to the sovereign power of Parliament. For instance, it cannot enact that which the majority of the members of either House are resolutely, under all the circumstances of the case, unwilling to enact, or deliberately judge to be inexpedient for the country; and in neither House would the majority be willing or judge it expedient to enact for any part of the empire a law which they believed would arouse the armed resistance of the part in question as a whole. These practical limits form the real safeguards for the working of our Constitution. Since the terrible lesson as to the danger of overstepping them which we were taught in the last century by the revolt of our American colonies, they have been found sufficient for the security of the empire, and the danger of their being infringed is at the present day very remote.

(ii.) *The Supreme Tribunals.*—Owing to the absolute supremacy of our Parliament, the supreme tribunals in the British Empire occupy a very different constitutional position to that which they hold in Federal States. In questions respecting Acts of Parliament, their function is limited to determining the meaning of the Act or group of Acts, the effect of which is in dispute, and the point as to whether the Act or Acts be valid and constitutional cannot be raised before them or determined by them. They are bound to treat every statute, however opposed to natural justice or to the pre-existing theory or practice of our Constitution, as valid and binding upon themselves and upon all affected by it. As a consequence of this, the composition of these tribunals, although practically excellent and possessing the confidence of British subjects

throughout the empire, is not technically as perfect as it would doubtless have been made under a Federal Constitution. The fact that there is one ultimate Court of Appeal for the United Kingdom (namely, the House of Lords) and another for the other parts of the empire (namely the judicial committee of the Privy Council), is in itself an anomaly. Besides this, the members composing the two courts are still, though to a less extent than formerly, a fluctuating body; and there is no absolute certainty before what judges any particular case will be tried.

(iii.) *Flexibility of the Constitution.*—The effect of the deposit of supreme sovereign power in Parliament is to render the English Constitution in the highest degree flexible; that is to say, capable of alteration and amendment. A measure vitally affecting the political organization of the United Kingdom, or of any other part of the empire, can be passed with the same formalities, neither more nor less, as are required for the passing of an Act authorising the construction of a tramway or establishing a close time for young eels. The absolute power of Parliament extends not only to all our other institutions, but also to the duration, composition, and functions of Parliament itself. Thus in the last century a Parliament elected for three years under the Triennial Act, passed the Septennial Act, and continued in session under its authority for seven years. During the century of its existence, the American Constitution has received but fifteen amendments, of which ten were made during the first five years, and two more during the next fifteen, leaving only three during the remaining eighty years. It would be difficult to enumerate the various Acts of Parliament passed during the same period, by which, in various modes, through enfranchisement, alteration in the conditions of registration, change in the property qualification or oath of members of Parliament, modifications in the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland, concession of local constitutions to colonies, and many other ways, amendments have been made in the English Constitution in its bearings on different portions of our empire.

#### *Insurmountable Obstacles to Federation.*

It is obvious, then, that to transform such a Constitution into one of a federal character would involve a change of the most

radical and sweeping description. Not that on that account alone all idea of it ought necessarily to be abandoned. Could it be proved that such a change was desirable, and was capable of being accomplished, the most determined Conservative amongst us would not hesitate to support it, even though it would entail the annihilation of the world-renowned English Constitution and the extinction of the mother of all modern representative assemblies. But it may be safely affirmed that it is idle to expect that so vast a change will be acquiesced in and permitted to be carried out unless conclusive reasons are shown in its favour. The teaching of history does not warrant us in the conclusion that the formation of a Federal Constitution is an easy or natural matter. It was not until 1848 that the Swiss Cantons, which had previously been united in a league, as independent States, agreed to a Constitution which transformed them into a Federal State. And in America the adoption of federation may almost be said to be due to the energy and ability of one man. The form which the political organization of our revolted colonies would ultimately assume, hung for some time in the balance; and it was mainly, if not entirely, by the writings and eloquence of Alexander Hamilton, that in 1787 the present Constitution of the United States of America was acquiesced in by the different constituent States. If federation was found to be a difficult process where there were no previous national institutions to be displaced, and where circumstances pointed to it as the only safe and feasible course to take, how much more difficult of accomplishment would it be where it would involve the overthrow of a Constitution which has had a gradual growth of a thousand years,—a Constitution to which the English people, and, it is not too much to say, through them the rest of the civilized world, owe whatever political freedom and privileges are now to be found existing among them,—a Constitution, moreover, which is diametrically opposite in its fundamental characteristics to a federal organization, which in its origin resulted from the natural opposition of the genius of the English race to the political rigidity which is involved in federation, and has by its successful development tended to confirm and intensify that opposition. It may be safely affirmed that nothing but a great catastrophe, or a sense of the most imminent danger,

would induce the English people to consent to a step so contrary to their national instincts and prejudices. But it is precisely the occurrence of such a catastrophe, and even the imminence of such a danger, which the advocates of what is called Imperial Federation desire to avert. It appears clear, therefore, that if they would accomplish their object, they must seek some other method of doing so than that of federation, strictly so called.

### *Feasibility of Incorporation.*

The solution of the problem lies, as the present writer believes, in the direction of Incorporation; that is to say, of the inclusion of the colonies into the existing English Constitution, the necessary modifications being made in the Constitution for the purpose. It is evident that there is no inherent difficulty in this. Nearly two centuries ago, the Constitution was modified for the purpose of incorporating into it the kingdom of Scotland, and again, nearly a century ago for the purpose of incorporating Ireland. It is perfectly capable of further modifications for the purpose of incorporating the trans-oceanic dominions of our sovereign; though, as we shall see, the modifications would require to be of a more serious character than in the two former cases. Is there, then, any insurmountable practical difficulty in the way of its accomplishment? Two, and two only, can be suggested; and of these one has been removed in anticipation by the achievements of science during the present century, and the other appears to be on the eve of being removed by the course which political affairs are at present taking in the United Kingdom. It is scarcely necessary to say that the difficulties alluded to are (i.) the distance in point of space, and length in point of time, which have to be surmounted in the transit of persons and transmission of intelligence from different parts of the empire to the metropolis; and (ii.) the impropriety as well as impossibility of all the matters which at present engage the attention of the Parliament at Westminster, as well as the additional affairs which the change would inevitably bring under its consideration, being dealt with by a Parliament composed of representatives from all parts of the empire. We shall find upon consideration that the

first difficulty is purely chimerical, and that the second is in a fair prospect of being speedily removed by the natural development of events.

(i.) *Objection as to Space and Time.*

The difficulty as to space and time is one which, it may be observed at the outset, if there is any force in it, stands in the way of federation just as much as of incorporation. Before proceeding to show its utter groundlessness in the present day, it may be well to see what was thought of it by such a great authority as Adam Smith in the last century, before steam and electricity had revolutionised the means of transit and communication. Writing before the revolt of our American colonies, he says:—

“ . . . There is not the least probability that the British Constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain with her colonies. That Constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal perhaps arise, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people, both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

“We on this side the water are afraid lest the multitude of American representatives should overturn the balance of the Constitution, and increase too much either the influence of the Crown on the one hand, or the force of the democracy on the other.”

Inasmuch as no such fear would be entertained in the present day, we need not be detained by Adam Smith's proof of its being illusory.

“The people on the other side of the water,” he proceeds, “are afraid lest their distance from the seat of Government might expose them to many oppressions. But their representatives in Parliament, of which the number ought from the first to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all oppression. The distance would not much weaken the dependency of the representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that he owed his seat in Parliament, and all the consequence which he derived from it, to the goodwill of the latter.”

The facilities for the transmission of persons and documents

from the most distant parts of our empire—from New Zealand and Fiji—to London are greater in the present day, and the time occupied in it shorter, than from the American colonies in the days of Adam Smith, and from the extremities of England when our representative institutions were first created. Moreover, by means of the electric telegraph, intelligence can be transmitted to and from every part of the British dominions with a speed the conception of which never entered into the wildest dreams of our ancestors in the last century. As a matter of fact, if our North American colonies were to send representatives to Parliament in London, they would, according to the present computation of time by the local solar day, be informed of the sayings and acts of their representatives at an earlier hour than those sayings and acts were recorded as having taken place. The physical difficulty as to the incorporation of the colonies into the English Constitution may, therefore, be said to be non-existent.

(ii.) *Objection as to Multiplicity of Business.*

There remains, however, the difficulty that the introduction of colonial representatives into Parliament would entail the imposition of further business upon that already overburdened assembly, and would involve their having a voice in the internal affairs of the United Kingdom, with which they have no right to intermeddle; besides which, the House of Commons has already in point of numbers attained unwieldy dimensions, and could not bear any further considerable increase. This difficulty is one which cannot be extenuated or overlooked. It would be impossible to make any substantial addition either to the business or to the numbers of our present House of Commons, without entirely destroying its efficiency. To admit colonial representatives to a share in the administration of the purely local business of the United Kingdom would not and ought not to be tolerated; while, on the other hand, to allow them to sit and vote when Imperial matters were under discussion, and exclude them when the internal business of the United Kingdom came on for consideration, would be a most objectionable and unworkable feature. A similar plan was, no doubt, mooted with respect to the presence of Irish repre-



representatives at Westminster during the late debates on Mr. Gladstone's Irish Government Bill, but the plan met with general and well-merited condemnation. Two conditions are, therefore, essential to the admission of the colonies into the existing English Constitution : first, the withdrawal of the purely local concerns of the United Kingdom from the direct cognizance of the Imperial Parliament ; and secondly, a diminution of the number of representatives from the United Kingdom in the House of Commons. It would probably be vain to expect that the assent of the people of England, Scotland, and Ireland could be obtained to these measures merely for the sake of rendering possible the introduction of colonial members into Parliament. But their own felt wants appear likely to induce them to carry the former of their own accord and for their own benefit ; and when that has been achieved, their acquiescence in the latter will be, comparatively speaking, easy and natural. The Irish Home Rule Bill of the late Government has met with the fate which it deserved. It has been slain and buried beyond the possibility of a resurrection. But the principle of Home Rule, in some form or other, survives, and is tolerably sure before long to find some practical embodiment. Mr. Chamberlain and his friends are notoriously in favour of creating separate local assemblies in the different parts of the United Kingdom for the management of local affairs. Evidence is not wanting that Lord Salisbury and his Cabinet are of the same mind. At the banquet given to her Majesty's Ministers at the Mansion House on the 11th of August, 1886, Mr. Edward Stanhope, speaking as Secretary of State for the Colonies, and one of the responsible members of that Cabinet, declared that he and his colleagues were in favour of Home Rule within the lines of the Union, though they were opposed to any scheme which would transgress those lines. We may confidently, therefore, affirm that the establishment of subordinate legislative bodies in the different parts of the United Kingdom for the administration of local affairs is a measure within the field of practical politics, and is likely to be shortly accomplished in the interests of the people of the old country. And when it has been effected, a diminution in the number of representatives in the Imperial Parliament from England, Scotland, and Ireland alike will appear to the people of

those countries not only to be unobjectionable, but to be an obviously expedient proceeding in the interests of the economy alike of time and energy and money.

## PART II.—MODE OF EFFECTING INCORPORATION.

### § 1. *Machinery to be Employed.*

*Action of the Imperial Parliament.*—The choice of Incorporation in preference to Federation will be found to have freed us from all embarrassment as to the machinery to be employed in effecting the object at which we aim, and to have left us free to concentrate all our energies on overcoming the various obstacles which inevitably meet us in arranging the details of the plan itself. Were we to resolve on Federation, it would be necessary to submit these details to all the various colonial legislatures, since Federation implies a mutual formal compact between the different Federated States. And when we reflect on the difficulty of getting the members of a single legislative body to agree on all the details of a long and complicated measure, we can form some estimate of the almost inseparable difficulties which would beset the endeavour to obtain the consent of our various colonial assemblies in both hemispheres to the language and particulars of an elaborate Act of Federation. In proceeding, however, by Incorporation, no such attempt is necessary. The measure, or series of measures, by which it is accomplished, need only be passed by the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, and straightway, by virtue of the supreme sovereign power of that body, it will become law throughout the British Empire.

*Addresses from the Colonial Legislatures.*—Of course it is not pretended that any such measure or series of measures should be passed against the will or even without the full consent of the colonies. But the veriest tyro in politics will at once perceive that the obtaining of the consent of the colonial legislatures to an Act passed or to be passed by another body is a far easier matter than the attempt to carry an Act, intact in all its clauses and provisions, through every one of those legislatures. Besides, according to the plan about to be proposed, the consent of the

colonies through their several legislatures will only be required to the first step in the scheme. All its further details will be elaborated in Parliament, after that body has become imperial in fact as well as in name; and these details will be assented to by the colonies through their representatives sitting in Parliament, and not through their local assemblies. No doubt, however, the consent of the colonial legislatures will virtually be essential to the passing of the initial measure through the Parliament at Westminster. But it will be observed that, inasmuch as these legislatures are subordinate to and not co-ordinate with that Parliament, no formal consent to the measure is necessary on their part, as was necessary on the part of the independent Parliaments of Scotland and Ireland to the Acts of Union with those countries respectively. Neither will it be proposed, as in the case of those Acts, to swallow up or abolish the existing legislatures of the provinces which are to be incorporated. The requisite consents may therefore be given in an informal manner. It will be better that they should precede the passing of the Act, rather than that the Act should be passed provisionally, to take effect only if it obtained certain specified consents; and they might conveniently be tendered in the form of addresses to the Sovereign from the colonial legislatures, praying for the passing of an Act which should incorporate the colonies into the Constitution of the United Kingdom.

*Gradual Development of Imperial Unity.*—Mention has already been made of the advantage which the proposed plan of Incorporation possesses in rendering the assent of the colonial legislatures necessary only to the initial stage in the process. It possesses the further and still greater advantage that after the first step has been taken, the process can be worked out gradually, as circumstances permit and as growing experience shows to be best, instead of our being at the outset irretrievably bound to a hard and fast system, which may prove in its working to be in many respects faulty and inexpedient, but from which it is impossible to recede, and which can only be altered in some of its minor details with infinite difficulty and at the cost of great friction. It will be remembered that the Federal Constitution of the United States was amended twelve times within the first twenty

years of its existence. Each of these amendments could only be effected by means of an elaborate process. The next amendment was not achieved till after the bloodiest and most costly civil war which has ever occurred in the history of mankind. Under the plan of Incorporation which is proposed in these pages the unity of the empire as regards its constitution, its defences, its finance, and its common interests, will be gradually developed, and amendments and alterations in the development will be as easy as they have hitherto been in the Constitution and affairs of the United Kingdom.

### § 2. *Preliminary Measures.*

*Delegation of Jurisdiction in Local Home Matters.*—It has been observed that, in order to clear the way for the admission of colonial representatives into Parliament, and for the transaction by Parliament of the common business of the empire, a preliminary measure is necessary, and one which appears likely to be brought about for other reasons and with another object ; namely, the delegation of the home affairs of the United Kingdom to the jurisdiction of some subordinate body or bodies. When we proceed to discuss the details of this delegation, as well as the details of the consolidation of the empire which is to follow it, we must, of course, bear in mind that principles are one thing, and the precise methods of carrying them out are another. The details suggested in the following pages are only essential to the whole proposed plan of incorporation, so far as that plan cannot be carried out with the substitution of any other details for them. Objections to any particulars of the scheme here put forward are not valid objections to the scheme itself, unless it is clear that no unobjectionable particulars can be inserted into the scheme as an alternative for them. After premising this much, the following suggestion is made for the local self-government of the different parts of the United Kingdom. There might be created three separate councils for England, Scotland, and Ireland, each consisting of a Lower House composed of representatives elected by the same constituencies and in the same manner as the

English, Scotch, and Irish members of Parliament are at present elected, but holding office for a definite period of five years. It may be observed, by way of parenthesis, that throughout these pages "England" is used in its statutory sense, as inclusive of Wales. The Upper House in each council might consist of representatives chosen for the same period by the municipal councils of the boroughs and quarter sessions of the counties, or whatever form of county boards may hereafter be substituted for the latter. To these councils might be entrusted the management of the local affairs of the respective parts of the United Kingdom. Their powers would naturally be very similar to those which are vested in the legislatures of the different provinces of the Dominion of Canada by the British North America Act, 1867. Each council would have jurisdiction in the country for which it was constituted in the following matters. (a) Direct taxation, and imposition of charges on various licences for the local requirements of the country. (b) Borrowing for the same requirements on the exclusive credit of the country. (c) The establishment and regulation of offices, and appointment and payment of officers for local purposes. (d) Municipal and other local institutions. (e) Local public works, except those undertaken for or connected with the common defence of the empire or intercommunication between its different parts. (f) Education. (g) Property, and civil rights. (h) The administration of justice in the country, in both civil and criminal proceedings, and the imposition of punishments, but exclusive of the appointment of the judges; and (i) Generally, all other matters within the country of a local or private nature. It might be enacted that the Acts of these councils should come into force on being approved by an order of the Privy Council. They would, of course, be at all times liable to be altered, repealed, or superseded by an Act of Parliament; it being the essence of the present proposal that the local councils should be in all respects subordinate bodies; so that Parliament should have theoretically the same power of interfering with and, if necessary, abrogating all the proceedings of the councils, and even the councils themselves, as it has in theory at present with regard to each of the colonial legislatures. This theoretical power would in practice

only be put forth when an evident necessity for its exercise arose. The power of the central executive or government of the day to prevent any inexpedient measure of the local councils from coming into force, by withholding the confirmatory order of the Privy Council, would probably be more frequently called into action; especially at first, before the new councils had acquired wisdom and prudence by experience.

*The Irish Difficulty.*—The foregoing scheme of local self-government for the United Kingdom has, of course, been propounded on the assumption that it would be worked loyally and honestly, and in the same spirit as that in which a similar autonomy has been carried on in our large colonies. It will, however, at once be objected that in the present state of feeling in Ireland such an assumption is utterly unwarrantable. Inasmuch as we are engaged in a practical inquiry, and must take into consideration all the actual circumstances of the various parts of the empire as they at present exist, we are bound to give full weight to this objection. The answer to it is twofold. In the first place, the Irish council would be in a position of subordination to the Parliament at Westminster, which would render it easy for the latter at once to check any tendency on the part of the council to abuse its powers, either in the direction of local injustice or of injury to the interest of the empire at large. The misuse of its powers would be further restrained by the control and authority which is reserved by the scheme to the central executive. In both of these respects the scheme differs widely from that contained in Mr. Gladstone's Irish Government Bill; since under that Bill the new Irish legislature was to have been in a sense co-ordinate with and independent of the Parliament at Westminster, and there was to have been an independent Irish executive. But in the second place, the scheme here advanced is only proposed as a necessary part of the plan for consolidating the empire by admission of colonial representatives into the Imperial Parliament. If this should be accomplished, the work of dealing with a recalcitrant Ireland would thenceforth be very different from what it has hitherto been. Instead of having to cope with Great Britain alone, the sister island would find the united force and weight of the whole British Empire arrayed

against her if she attempted to act disloyally to or unworthily of the great civilised and orderly entity of which she formed a part.

*The Established Churches of England and Scotland.*—It is impossible to pass over without notice the effect which the proposed delegation of local affairs in the United Kingdom would have upon the Established Churches of England and Scotland. No change would, in the opinion of the present writer, be justifiable which would in any degree compromise the position of those Churches. The Church of England, at any rate, deserves no such treatment at our hands. She lies at the very root of all the institutions of the country, it having been mainly through her that the English succeeded, a thousand years ago, in forming themselves into an united nation; and Parliament was formed upon the model of the ecclesiastical assemblies which were held long before it came into existence. The proposed change, however, need not prejudice the Established Churches in Great Britain. It might be enacted that no measure should be passed by the English council affecting the Church of England except with the consent of the convocations or other future ecclesiastical assembly of that Church, nor by the Scotch council in respect of the Church of Scotland except with the consent of the General Assembly. The royal supremacy would be preserved by the necessity of an Order in Council to ratify all ecclesiastical as well as all civil acts of the new legislative councils.

### § 3. *Act of Incorporation.*

*Reform of the Lower House of Parliament: Admission of Colonial Representatives.*—The way having been thus cleared for the incorporation of the colonies into the existing Constitution of the United Kingdom, this incorporation would be effected by the simple process of summoning representatives from the colonies to sit in the Commons' House of Parliament. After the establishment of the legislative councils in the United Kingdom, it would be a ridiculous waste of power to maintain the representation of that kingdom in the Lower House at its present figure. If for the purpose of returning members to the Imperial Parlia-

ment, the present constituencies were massed together with an average of five in each group, it would give an ample representation to the population of the United Kingdom in the assembly which was charged with the concerns of the whole empire. Absolute and rigid uniformity would be inexpedient. It does not exist under the present representative system of the United Kingdom, and no one but a mere theorist would desire it in the future. For instance, it would be right that the city of London should by itself return one member to the re-modelled Imperial Parliament. But the general effect of the reform should be that one member should in future have a seat for every five who are now returned. The English Universities, which now return five members in all, might be united into one constituency for the return of a single member. The whole result would be that whereas now one member represents, roughly speaking, a population of 50,000, each member would in future represent 250,000 ; or, in other words, there would be four members to every million of the population. This would give 104 members to England, 15 to Scotland, and 21 to Ireland, or 140 to the whole United Kingdom. The representation of the self-governing colonies should then be framed upon a similar basis. We should in this way obtain an Imperial House of Commons of 188 members, returned in the following proportions from the various parts of the empire, and representing the population of each on a tolerably uniform scale :—



PROVINCE OF EMPIRE.	POPULATION.	NO. OF MEMBERS.
UNITED KINGDOM :		
England . . . . .	25,974,439	104
Scotland . . . . .	3,735,573	15
Ireland . . . . .	5,174,836	21
		—140
CANADA :		
Prince Edward Island . . . . .	108,891	1
Nova Scotia . . . . .	440,572	2
New Brunswick. . . . .	321,233	2
Quebec . . . . .	1,359,027	6
Ontario . . . . .	1,923,228	8
Manitoba, British Columbia, and Territories	171,859	1
		— 20
Newfoundland . . . . .	161,374	1
Guiana . . . . .	252,186	1
West Indies and Bermudas . . . . .	1,255,484	4
Cape Colony . . . . .	1,121,648	5
Natal . . . . .	424,495	2
New South Wales . . . . .	921,300	4
Victoria . . . . .	961,276	4
South Australia. . . . .	313,322	2
Queensland . . . . .	309,913	2
Tasmania . . . . .	130,540	1
New Zealand . . . . .	564,304	2
Total . . . . .	45,625,500	188

This is a small House when compared with its present numbers, but it will evidently be better to err, if at all, on the side of defect rather than of excess in its size. It will not be desirable to bring over more colonists from their homes and from their home occupations to attend the Parliament at Westminster than are absolutely required for a due representation of the colonies. Moreover, this number is only a starting-point, and will be continually liable to increase from two causes. In the first place, a progressive increase is going on in the population of our great colonies, of which account will have from time to time to be taken by granting to them additional representatives in the House.

*India and Crown Colonies.*—But in the second place, no position has been assigned in the above scheme to India or any of our Crown colonies, except such of them as are included in the West Indies. They cannot as yet be considered ripe for joining in the proposed representation of the empire, though they might be given a voice in the Imperial Parliament, by the elevation of some of their leading men—the great native princes of India, for instance, and any specially prominent men in the Crown colonies—to the imperial peerage, and thus affording them a seat and a vote in the Upper House. But who shall say how long this immaturity for the franchise will continue? It will be well rather to anticipate than to be behind the time of its passing away, in giving to India and to the Crown colonies such a representation in the councils of the empire as will make them feel that they are indeed integral parts of it, and that their welfare and safety are inseparably bound up with its prosperity and security.

*The Imperial Franchise.*—For the principle of an equitable representation in Parliament of all parts of the empire to which representation can be properly accorded, does not by any means necessitate a uniformity of franchise throughout the different provinces. It is only within the last two years that the franchise has been made uniform throughout the United Kingdom, and the Universities franchise still remains as an exception and contrast to the rest. The right of voting for members of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada depends on different franchises in the various provinces. Manhood suffrage for the local legislative assembly has been adopted in some of the Australasian colonies, but not in others. It is open to discussion whether, after the imperialization of the Parliament at Westminster, the election to the Lower House should be direct or indirect. A direct franchise would, however, probably be insisted on; and in that case it would be well that, instead of being uniform throughout the empire, it should be identical in each province with the local franchise in vogue in the province for the right of election to the Lower House of the local legislature. And if this principle be adopted, there is no reason why a very circumscribed franchise should not in the first instance be created in India and in certain Crown colonies. They might thus be

given representation in the Imperial House of Commons at a far earlier stage in their development than if we were to wait until they were ready for the franchise on a similar scale to that on which it exists at present in our self-governing colonies.

### *Subsequent Measures.*

*Completion of Imperial Unity.*—By the practical recognition which the admission of colonial representatives on an equable basis jointly with the representatives of the United Kingdom into the Lower House of the Imperial Parliament would give to the principle of the participation by the colonies in the control and the burdens of the empire, the problems with which we started would be virtually solved. The subsequent measures by which the principle would be carried out to its complete and logical conclusions would be gradually elaborated in Parliament by the combined counsels of the home and colonial representatives. It is vain to speculate upon the precise form which these measures would take. The present essay, however, would be incomplete if it did not attempt a sketch of the course which might be adopted in the direction of consolidating the empire internally, and rendering it secure from external attack.

*Reform of the Upper House of Parliament.*—Nothing has been said as yet about any alteration in the composition of the House of Lords, beyond a hint that it might receive an accretion from some of the native princes of India as well as leading colonists. Although the reform of the House is neither requisite for, nor a necessary consequence of, the incorporation of the colonies into the English Constitution, yet probably it would either accompany or speedily follow that event. The nominal size of the House, though never approximately reached in its actual sittings, would be theoretically incongruous beside the greatly reduced House of Commons. We may anticipate, therefore, that the number of peers who would receive summonses to attend Parliament would be in some way limited. We are not however, concerned to suggest how the limitation might be best effected. The Lower House is at the present time the key of the Constitution. The composition of the Upper House is, comparatively speaking, of

little moment. No serious fault can be found with its present practical working; and the risk which must be carefully guarded against in attempting its reform is that of developing defects from which it is at present free. As the lineal successor, in an unbroken line, not only of the Great Council of the Norman kings, but also of the Witenagemot of England before the Conquest—nay, more, of the Witenagemot of Wessex, whose existence dates from the foundation of that kingdom, in A.D. 576, by Cerdic, the lineal ancestor of our present gracious sovereign—it is entitled to our enlightened respect, and should be handled with care and caution. It is at present accessible to every genuine expression of the popular will. If its members be artificially limited, if the peers who obtain a seat in it owe their position to election by their fellow-peers, let us beware lest, instead of, as now, regarding themselves as sitting to represent the whole nation and legislate for its benefit, they consider themselves in the light of what they would actually be—representatives of a limited order, and deem it their duty to act with an exclusive regard to the interests of that order.

*Imperial Finance.*—We pass on to the practical matters of business which will occupy the attention of the imperialized Parliament. First and foremost among these, as being that on which all the rest will depend, is the subject of finance. What sources of revenue from the various parts of the empire will be under the control and at the disposal of the Imperial Parliament? We have three precedents to guide us in suggesting an answer to this question. There is first that of the United States of America. In that Federation, nine-tenths of the common revenue is produced by customs duties on imports and excise duties on distilled spirits, fermented liquors, and tobacco, and on banks. The remainder is derived from miscellaneous sources, including the profit on coinage, sales of public lands, and fees on patents and public appointments. As the revenue is largely in excess of the expenditure, and a considerable portion of it is devoted yearly towards liquidating the national debt, there is no necessity to contemplate any levy of contributions to it from the constituent States. It is otherwise in the next case to which we shall refer—that of the German Empire. There the revenue from customs

and excise, posts and telegraphs, suffices to defray only about nine-fifteenths of the annual imperial expenditure. The governmental receipts from railways and certain other items make up another fifteenth; but the remaining third is supplied by contributions from the various States of the empire, in proportion to the population of each. Our last precedent is that of the Dominion of Canada. We find here a state of things exactly the reverse of that which exists in Germany. The Dominion revenue is derived from customs and excise and the post-office, and from various miscellaneous sources, and it is assumed that it will in each year considerably exceed the expenditure. If it does not, an excess must be provided by borrowing; for, by the British North America Act, 1867, which gave to the Dominion its legal status, the Dominion is required to make annual payments to the several provinces for the support of their governments and legislatures. The amount so paid in the financial year ending June 30th, 1884, was no less a sum than 3,600,000 dollars, or about £720,000. There can be little doubt that in the consolidated British Empire of the future the German model would be followed. The imperial revenue would consist of the proceeds of certain customs and excise duties, and of all the stamp duties and posts and telegraphs throughout the empire, and of other miscellaneous items. Any deficit in it would be reasonably required to be supplied by the different provinces of the empire, according to their population—exclusive of India, as long as it had a separate military establishment and was not proportionately represented in the Imperial House of Commons. The national debt of the United Kingdom would properly remain a charge upon the imperial revenues. It has been created in acquiring and maintaining the position which Great Britain at present occupies among the nations of the world, with the material advantages which flow from it; and every portion of the empire has derived, and still derives, a benefit from that position, and has partaken of those advantages. The imperial revenues would also bear the charges of the Crown and the civil list; but as a set-off to these, the income of the Crown lands in the United Kingdom would be carried to the credit of these revenues, instead of swelling the funds at the disposal of the local councils.

*Imperial Defence.*—The main purpose to which the imperial revenues would be devoted, as being the main object of the consolidation of the empire, would be that of imperial defence, in its three branches of the land forces, the navy, and fortifications. As regards the first and third, India would probably for a time be separately administered; but it may be anticipated that she would ultimately be incorporated into the same organization as the rest of the empire. With this exception, the whole control of the land and sea forces of the empire and of the imperial fortifications—using the last word in its widest sense, to include arsenals and dockyards as well as fortresses and coaling stations—would naturally devolve on the Imperial Parliament and the imperial executive. In allotting them to the different parts of the empire, due regard would of course be had to the comparative wants of each; but it would be of the essence of the scheme, in the interests both of safety and of economy, that the whole machinery of imperial defence should centre round one pivot, and should be organized on one harmonious plan. This was one of the first results of the imperial unification of Germany, effected in 1870-1; and the earliest efforts of our imperialized Parliament would undoubtedly be directed in the same direction. With regard to the measures, to a certain extent retrograde, which will be necessary to carry out this policy, something will be said hereafter.

*Imperial Inter-communication.*—The imperial executive and legislature would likewise assert exclusive control over the posts, and ultimately also over the telegraphs, throughout the empire. This would be essential in time of war for the conduct of belligerent operations, and hardly less expedient in time of peace in the general interests of the inhabitants of the empire. One of the first practical results of the step might be expected to be the establishment of an uniform penny post between all parts of the British dominions.

*Imperial Control over Certain Railways, etc.*—It would be found further necessary that the central imperial authority should exercise active control over such of the railways, canals, and roads within the empire as were possessed of special strategic importance for defensive purposes, or formed the means of com-

munication between contiguous provinces, or between the empire and any foreign country, and also over certain lines of steamships. An instructive precedent on this point is supplied by the British North America Act, 1867. That Act excepts from the local works and undertakings which are to be under the control of the Government of the province in which they are situate, the following classes of enterprises :—(a) Lines of shipping, railways, canals, telegraphs, and other works connecting the province with any other province, or extending beyond the limits of the province ; (b) Lines of steamships between the province and any British or foreign country ; and (c) such works as, though wholly situate within the province, are at any time declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general advantage of the Dominion or of two or more of the provinces. The excepted enterprises were, by the Act of 1867, placed under the control of the Dominion Parliament ; but after the imperialization of the Parliament at Westminster, works and undertakings of a more than local character and importance will properly be controlled by the central legislature of the empire.

*Fiscal and Commercial Arrangements.*—It is not easy to forecast the fiscal and commercial changes which would result from the admission of colonial representatives into the Imperial Parliament. They may be divided into two classes : (1) Those which would necessarily follow from the measure, and (2) those which might be expected sooner or later to be brought about in consequence of its having taken place. The first heading would not embrace any large or important number of particulars. Each province of the empire (except, for the present, India) would be bound to send up to the imperial exchequer all the income received within its limits in respect of the customs and excise duties on certain articles, say alcoholic liquors and tobacco, and a further contribution, if necessary, proportionate to its population, to supply any deficit in the imperial revenue. The collection of the duties, however, might either be undertaken by imperial officials or be left in the hands of the provincial Government. The course adopted would probably not be uniform, as there would be no necessity for its being so. In the United Kingdom the customs and excise officers would probably be imperial. In

colonies which levied additional customs duties for their own local purposes, the organization of, at any rate, the customs would probably remain in the hands of the provincial Government, and the province would deduct a sum in respect of cost of collection and management, before remitting to London the proceeds of those duties to which the imperial exchequer was entitled. The further provincial contribution, if any, to the imperial resources would, of course, be raised as part of the revenue of the province by such local means as the provincial legislature might determine upon. These would appear to be all the fiscal measures necessarily consequent upon the unification of the empire in the way proposed in these pages. The second head of inquiry, on the other hand, as to what further fiscal and commercial changes might be expected to result from it, opens up a wide field for speculation, but one which is not very pertinent to the present purpose. Suffice it, therefore, to say that the unification of the empire might not improbably lead to some modification in the present resolute free-trade attitude of the mother-country, and in the stiff protectionist attitude of some of our leading colonies. It would be strange if it did not eventually result in the adoption of the most free and unfettered commercial intercourse between all parts of the empire which could be permitted consistently with the necessary financial requirements of the imperial exchequer and the local Governments.

*Resumption of Certain Powers Delegated to Colonial Legislatures*

—It will have been observed that the foregoing scheme contemplates the resumption by the central legislature and executive of some of the powers and functions at present exercised by local colonial Governments. The case of the control over the postal service and over the great lines of communication by land and sea, which was entrusted by the British North America Act, 1867, to the Dominion Government in Canada, has already been specially mentioned. The new imperial fiscal arrangements, simple as they would be, would yet necessitate a certain interference with the existing local autonomy of the great colonies. The most serious curtailment of the present semi-independent status of these colonies would, however, take place in connection with the new provisions for the defence of the empire. The



control over the militia, military, and navy service, including the volunteers, and generally over the arrangements for defensive purposes, which is now vested in the Dominion Government of Canada, and in the Governments of our other great colonies, would require to be surrendered into the hands of the central Government. But this is, of course, an essential condition of any plan for the consolidation of the empire; and unless the individual colonies are prepared to make this concession for the general public weal, it is idle to discuss the subject at all. The extent of authority which should be left to the local legislatures over such matters as currency and coinage, including the issue of paper money and legal tender, patents and copyrights, would be a subject for future consideration. It is evident that the infusion of colonial representation into the Imperial Parliament would give to that Parliament a moral right, in addition to the legal power which it possesses even at present, to interfere in colonial affairs to an extent beyond the narrow limits which the mere stability and security of the empire required, if that interference could be shown to be for the general welfare of the empire at large; and the same infusion would, of course, induce the colonies to acquiesce in such interference to an extent which, under existing circumstances, they would not tolerate.

*The Imperial Executive.*—Nor would the concessions required by the new arrangement be all on our side, and be demanded from the colonies alone. The colonial representatives in the Parliament at Westminster would acquire a larger share in the management of the domestic concerns of the United Kingdom than would be gained by the home representatives in that assembly in the management of local colonial affairs through the resumption of powers which are at present entrusted to the colonial legislatures. These legislatures would be left, after the resumption had taken place, with greater self-governing functions than would have been entrusted to the local councils in the different parts of the United Kingdom. The scheme advocated in these pages does not contemplate the creation in England, Scotland, or Ireland of any such local executive as is possessed at the present time by the great colonies. Executive officers must, of course, be attached to the local councils of these

portions of the United Kingdom, but they would occupy a wholly subordinate position; and the imperial executive attached to the Parliament at Westminster, and dependent for its continuance in office on the will of that Parliament, would remain the executive of the United Kingdom. It would be desirable that the alterations in this part of our Constitution should be very slight. The functions of the President of the Local Government Board and the educational functions of the Vice-President of the Privy Council would be superseded by the new order of things; but with these exceptions there would be little material change in the home duties of the central Government of the day. The practical advantages of avoiding the necessity of creating a new administrative machinery of a semi-independent character for each part of the United Kingdom are obvious; and any sentimental objections which might at the first blush of the matter be raised against the admission of colonists to a share of the control over the administration of the home business of the United Kingdom will, upon consideration, vanish. The local affairs of the United Kingdom, as the heart of the empire and the seat of the central Imperial Government, concern, in a sense, the inhabitants of the whole British dominions. The United Kingdom derives enormous substantial benefit from the position which it thus occupies; and it is not unreasonable that its people should be asked to give up some amount of privilege in return for that position, especially when it is proposed that the burden of their national debt shall be shifted to the shoulders of the whole empire. But after all, the amount of privilege which would be surrendered would exist in idea rather than in reality; for the preponderance which the United Kingdom would retain in the parliamentary representation would preserve to it for some generations to come the virtual control over the central executive. Moreover, if sacrifice of autonomy there be, it is one which has been made twice before in the interests of true patriotism. The share which the colonists would acquire in the management of the affairs of the mother-country under the proposed arrangement is less than that which was conceded to Scotchmen in English affairs by the Act of Union of 1706, or to Irishmen in the affairs of Great Britain by the Act of Union of 1800.

*Administration of Justice.*—The scheme under consideration would not necessarily require any alteration in our existing courts of justice either in the United Kingdom or in the colonies. As a matter of fact, it is, however, probable that, independently of any action in the direction of imperial unity, and still more if such action is taken, an amalgamation of the two present ultimate Courts of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, will ere long take place. After our scheme came into force, such of the judges of the final courts or court of appeal as held office by appointment, would, of course, be appointed by the central executive. That executive would also appoint the judges of the supreme courts of judicature and of the inferior courts in the United Kingdom. The judges in the colonies and in India, and the law officers of the Crown in the different parts of the empire, would continue to be appointed as they are at present : the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and the law officers for the United Kingdom being members of the central executive.

*Conclusion.*—The foregoing proposals for the consolidation and unification of the British Empire are submitted as being within the range of practical politics and capable of being carried into effect in the natural course of development of the English Constitution, and without any violent dislocation of our institutions. They make no claim to be of a brilliant or ambitious character ; but they claim to be workable, and to entail, if adopted, no break in that continuous political history of more than a thousand years, of which members of the English race are so justly proud, and which has been to them a source of such untold blessings. They would be rejected by foreign jurists as incongruous, inadequate, and imperfect ; but for that very reason they are, as the present writer believes, in harmony with the genius of the people of our empire, and adapted to their wants. British politics have ever been carried on in the past, not under the hard and fast letter of an elaborate and formal paper constitution, but in a spirit of mutual compromise and good understanding. In the conduct of our public affairs we have ever kept in mind the truth expressed in that eternally wise line of Hesiod :—

νήπιοι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἡμῖν παντός.

"Alas, man knows not, simple fool,  
How much the half exceeds the whole."

If we would bring to a successful issue our attempts at the unification of the empire, we must proceed in them in the same spirit. We must labour not for any grand and heroic measure, but for such adaptations of our existing institutions as can be most naturally and readily effected. Above all, we must take care that no premature step is taken which would destroy the absolute sovereign supremacy of Parliament—that essential factor in our Constitution which, as long as it exists, preserves to us the possibility of unlimited modifications and adaptations of our political system to meet the ever-changing phases of human affairs, without recourse to any revolution or *coup d'état*, but which, if it is once extinguished, will probably never be found capable of being replaced.





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